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This thesis examines the way in which corruption discourses are embedded in processes of 
state formation. It builds on the theoretical premise of social constructionism, namely that 
‘corruption’ is not an entity that exists in reality but that it is an agreed-upon classification of 
certain types of behaviours. These processes of social and political construction are 
foundational for corruption discourse, conceptualised as a political practice through which 
the legitimacy of power and authority, of either persons, behaviours or institutions, can be 
challenged. As a socially and politically constructed entity, corruption discourse is shaped by 
political processes and in turn also shapes political processes. The comparison of corruption 
discourses in Britain in the 19th century and in Germany in the late 19th to mid-20th centuries 
endeavours to demonstrate the different ways in which they were shaped, as well as in turn 
shaped, contextual state formation processes. The two countries represent two different 
pathways through which high levels of corruption control were achieved, one democratic, 
the other authoritarian. While anti-corruption measures in Britain were introduced alongside 
democratisation processes in the 19th century, various German states implemented 
measures top-down in their 18th century efforts to modernise state administration.  
This study looks at the times when corruption discourses became a matter of public interest, 
and traces their role vis-a-vis subsequent institutional developments. In Britain this starting 
point is located in the early 19th century, in Germany in the Kaiserreich of the 1870s. Three 
case studies each exemplify and illustrate the different sequences in which corruption 
discourse unfolded. In Britain, these are the 1809 Duke of York case, exemplifying a 
‘discovery phase’, in which corruption discourse first showed signs of becoming weaponised 
for political discourse; the 1830 to 32 Electoral Reform discourse exemplifying a 
‘contestation phase’ in which corruption allegations were strategically used to undermine 
the legitimacy of Parliament and the system through which it was elected; and the 1889 
Corrupt Practices Act discourse, exemplifying a ‘consolidation phase’ in which anti-
corruption measures became normalised rather than being subject to contest. In Germany, 
the 1896/97 Tausch Affair represents a different kind of discovery phase, one that is 
restrained and corrupted by authoritarian intervention; the Erzberger-Helfferich case of 
1919 represents a different kind of contestation phase, one that is characterised by the 
hyper-mobilisation of corruption discourse that contributed to the eventual failure of the 
Weimar Republic; and the Spiegel Affair of 1962, in the context of the Spiegel’s role in post-
war Germany more broadly, represents a successful consolidation phase in the 
Bundesrepublik, in which authoritarian intervention failed to corrupt corruption discourse.  
The cases thus highlight different ways in which corruption discourse was shaped by, and in 
turn shaped, state formation processes. They showcase a range of different institutional and 
political framework conditions as well as a variety of institutional outcomes, of reform, 
consolidation and destruction. The thesis argues that corruption discourse was thus a central 
driver of state formation processes, and that concepts of corruption were integral to the idea 
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The Centrality of Corruption Concepts in the Modern State 
Political corruption research continues to be a marginalised subfield in the political 
sciences. Bo Rothstein laments that corruption is largely absent from leading 
introductory textbooks of the discipline (2015: 89). Michael Johnston complains that 
American political science “has remained steadfastly uninterested in corruption 
issues for generations” (2006: 809). Bo Rothstein and Aiysha Varraich pinpoint the 
erstwhile ‘taboo’ that created a “hesitance, until at least the late 1990s, of doing 
research on corruption” (2014: 21). And Anwar Shah, coming from a practical policy 
perspective, recommends not even to use the ‘c-word’ (2007: 249ff.). While some of 
these statements have a certain tendency to exaggerate – plenty of corruption 
research does exist after all – they reveal an uneasiness in the relationship between 
politics as an academic discipline and corruption research as a subfield of this 
discipline. Political scientists are central to the study of corruption, but the study of 
corruption does not seem to be central to political science.  
Recent years have seen some new strands of research that, by intention or 
coincidence, go some way to redressing this imbalance and tying corruption more 
closely to more central concerns in the discipline. Ironically, the preferred method 
here seems indeed, at least to an extent, to follow Shah’s advice. The ‘c-word’ is still 
mentioned, but it is only in the context of different forms of non-corruption such as 
good governance (Fukuyama 2013, Andrews 2008, 2013), state capacity (Besley & 
Persson 2009, Hendrix 2010), integrity (Doig & McIvor 2003, Hardi, Heywood & 
Torsello (eds.) 2015), quality of government (Rothstein & Teorell 2008, Agnafors 
2013), ethical universalism (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 2011, 2015) or deep 
democratisation (Johnston 2014) - chapter two of this thesis discusses some of these 
approaches. What they have in common is that they analyse corruption in its broader 
context, not as an isolated act of deviance but with an eye on what exactly it is a 
deviation from. To an extent, these studies show how corruption is an integral part 
of the bigger picture of politics, of the very central issues that are at the heart of what 
political science is concerned with. 
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However, when it comes to conceptualising how corruption is, or more precisely how 
ideas of corruption are, not just part of but central to politics and the modern state, 
my contention is that these approaches are still barking up the wrong tree. If the aim 
is to get a better understanding of this centrality, what Niklas Luhmann (1993) called 
a second-order observation can be more helpful. It is not by observing corruption 
itself but by taking a step back and observing those who are observing corruption 
that this centrality can be more clearly distinguished. The aim then is not to define 
what corruption is and determine what causes and effects it has, as most corruption 
research tries to do, but to look at the processes through which it is defined in the 
first place. In this thesis, this approach is informed by the social constructionism of 
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967), and has so far been applied to 
corruption by only a handful of authors such as Steven Chibnall and Peter Saunders 
(1977) or more recently Peter Bratsis in a widely cited essay (2003). It is in Bratsis’ 
work in particular that corruption’s stealthy prominence becomes more apparent. In 
his view, there is a relatively clear distinction between a traditional concept of 
corruption that implies above all some form of degeneration (of the mind, of virtue, 
of morals), and a modern understanding - in essence what is today the standard 
definition – of a violation of the public good or interest or office for private gain 
(different forms of this definition are discussed in chapter two). Bratsis does not 
supply an exact start date for this transformation from traditional to modern, but 
locates it generally in processes of modernisation in the 18th to early 19th century. He 
concludes that “our understanding  of  corruption  becomes  possible  and  thinkable  
as  capitalism  and  the state emerge and become dominant” (2003: 14).  
The distinction between public and private interest in this reading is particularly 
intriguing. While neither were seen as bad in themselves, it was the mixing of the two 
that became seen as illegitimate. This meant that defining what was corrupt and what 
was not could never be a neutral undertaking. It was always a normative project that 
gave legitimacy to some behaviours and withdrew it from others. And in Bratsis’ 
interpretation it was the emergence of the bourgeoisie to economic and political 
power that was driving this normative project. The distinction between public and 
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private was thus part of a political ontology that was imposed on the developing 
modern state, in line with the emergence of capitalism and the rise to power of the 
merchant and industrialist classes at the cost of the aristocracy. A new version of 
normality, of what was seen as the normal behaviour that could be expected of a 
person in what was now seen as public office, and what was its aberration, 
destruction and corruption, slowly developed. And in this process, as Bratsis argues, 
the political goal of ‘non-corruption’ became firmly inscribed in the idea of the state: 
By establishing the division between the normal and pathological in the 
public/private split, the modern understanding of political corruption is at once 
making a statement of fact and presenting us with the political goal of fully realizing 
the normal. (2003: 17) 
It is worth considering the poem Corruption’s Confession to illustrate this struggle 
between different versions of normality. It was published in 1834 in the liberal-
leaning newspaper Bradford Observer, in the midst of an ongoing conflict between 
the reformist movement demanding representation of the people in Parliament, and 
a coalition of ‘old elites’ rooted in the patrimonialism of the aristocracy that was still 
running the state’s institutions – Old Corruption (Harling 1995) as it was still 
commonly referred to. The recent 1832 Electoral Reform Act had only enfranchised 
a disappointingly small segment of the growing population, and – as chapter four will 
show – the decades following the act were mired in controversy and contestation, in 
calls for reform and, in cases, threats of revolution. The poem is essentially a 
bourgeois critique of aristocratic corruption, and in extension of the patrimonial state 
itself - a fitting illustration of what Bratsis has described as the ‘normative project’ 
that makes not just a ‘statement of fact’ but also presents us with the ‘political goal 
of realising the normal’.  
Corruption’s Confession is rich in illustration, and in the following I merely want to 
point towards some of its main themes. At the outset, the author establishes what 
exactly corruption is, and where it is located. Corruption is ‘old’, lives ‘near the crown’ 
in ‘London town’. This appears to be a description of Old Corruption, the 
patrimonialism of the aristocratic elite, residing in the institutions of the central state. 
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The enemy has thus been defined, and the poem goes on to describe some of the 
ways through which it works. The reference to taxation is telling: 
 
This further underlines that the critique here is systemic. It is the state itself that is 
attacked, and its raising of taxes that, as the poem goes on to state, “steals half their 
money” – an act of theft, clearly seen as illegitimate. This indeed resonates with a 
popular motif at the time, from the Napoleonic wars onwards (more on this in 
chapter four). Similar to the ‘no taxation without representation’ movement that led 
to the American War of Independence, there was here an increasing tension between 
the fact that broad sections of the population were financing an ever expanding state, 
but at the same time had little say in how the state was run. Harling describes how 
this particular version of corruption discourse had emerged earlier in the 19th 
century: 
During and after the Napoleonic wars, popular radicals such as William Cobbett 
routinely drew attention to what they called ‘Old Corruption’ or simply ‘Corruption’ 
or ‘The System’ or ‘The Thing’. They used such words interchangeably to describe a 
parasitic political system that took an unprecedented amount of tax money out of 
the pockets of Britons and transferred it to those of a narrow band of well-connected 
insiders through a wide variety of nefarious means. (Harling 2003: 98)  
Corruption’s Confession then goes on to connect the taxation theme to “oppression”. 
The state violence expressed in the “bayonets and artillery” further underlines the 
illegitimacy, the coerciveness of the existing arrangement. Finally, a reference is 






And indeed, if freedom was set loose, a revolution of kinds would ensue: 
 
I have premised above that observing how observers of corruption made sense of 
corruption could provide insights into the centrality of the concept of corruption for 
the modern state. The centrality that can be seen in Corruption’s Confession lies in 
the way the idea of corruption is used to challenge and rearrange understandings of 
legitimacy. The entire point of the poem is to signify that government - defined as old 
corruption, near the crown, London town etc. – with its taxation and its oppression, 
are illegitimate and might as well be overthrown and “chain’d in hell” – a thinly veiled 
hint that even revolution would be a legitimate means of dealing with this ‘evil’. The 
format of a poem, of course, is unusual, and the language used atypically colourful. 
The principle, however, is universal. All the six case studies in my analysis show in 
some way or another how corruption discourse functioned as an important organiser 
of legitimacy. To label political opponents, institutions or entire political systems as 
‘corrupt’ marks them as illegitimate. And Corruption’s Confession is one of many 
thousands of writings and utterances – discourse - around the mid-1800s in Britain 
that did exactly this, questioning the legitimacy of the existing state institutions. At 
the same time, the state itself, in its so-called Age of Reform indeed implemented 
reform after reform after reform, and by the end of the 19th century had developed 
into what can be called a modern semi-democratic state with a largely democratic 
system of representation (as far as the male population was concerned) and a largely 
impartial bureaucratic apparatus. It is unlikely that this would have happened 
without corruption discourse, and without shifts in perception of what were 
legitimate political institutions and which were not. It is in this organisation of 
legitimacy that concepts of corruption became central to the modern state. 
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Corruption as discourse was thus a driver, not just a by-product, a normaliser not just 
an anomaly, a cure not just a pathology, in, of and for the formation of the modern 
state. This thesis hopes to shed some light on some of the processes in which this can 
be observed. 
At this point, a clarification of my use of the term ‘modern state formation’, and the 
place of these legitimation processes within them is in order. In the case of Britain, 
the 19th century comes at the tail end of the formation of the modern state, and only 
so if one chooses a generous definition. I follow here roughly Elias’ (1982) model 
which incorporates not just the monopolisation of power and territorial integration, 
but also elements of the internal re-organisation of the state, the establishment of 
an administrative apparatus and the diffusion of power to a greater number of 
people. And while Elias’ own focus was indeed on the early modern state of the 
preceding centuries, these processes extended well into the 19th century. Britain 
continued the development and expansion of its centralised state administration, as 
well as extending the vote to ever wider parts of the (albeit only male) population. It 
is in these two advancements of the modern democratic state specifically, 
bureaucratisation and democratisation, in this phase of (near-) completion and 
consolidation of said state, that corruption discourse came to play a pivotal role.  
In Germany, corruption discourse interacted with a number of different state 
developments: In the post-1871 Kaiserreich it was compromised by authoritarian 
manipulation by state authorities, mirroring Germany’s slow, difficult, and 
comparatively late transformation from authoritarian to democratic rule. In the 
democratic Weimar, with its heated political conflict lines, corruption discourse, too, 
overheated, undermining perceived legitimacies of politicians, institutions, and the 
Republic itself, contributing to its eventual demise. In the post-World War II federal 
republic it finally arrived at a similar point as Britain’s had in the 1880s: corruption 
discourse here served to consolidate and defend the existing order against 
digressions from the norms. What these cases all have in common is that debates on 
corruption were not just part of but central to the broader and fundamental 
legitimation discourse of the modern state - on it hinged the success or failure of the 
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newly formed institutions. Just how foundational these legitimation discourses were 
and are for the stability of the political order more generally is discussed in chapter 
two, in which Habermas’ theory of communicative action (1981) provides meta-
theoretical grounding for this assertion.   
Research Questions 
The central research question addressed in this study is: What is the role of 
corruption discourse in the state legitimation processes of Britain in the 19th and 
Germany in the late 19th to mid-20th centuries? More specifically, it looks at the ways 
in which corruption discourse historically was constituted by social and political 
construction processes and their underlying conflicts of interests and ideologies on 
the one hand, as well as the ways in which it then, through the dynamic process of 
discourse and its transformative power to shift perceptions of legitimacy, shaped and 
constituted the social and political world it was part of.  
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds through seven chapters: This introduction, chapter one, is 
followed by theoretical considerations in chapter two, research design and 
methodology in chapter three, corruption discourse in 19th century Britain in chapter 
four, corruption discourse in late 19th to mid-20th century in Germany in chapter five, 
further comparative analysis and theory-building in chapter six, and a conclusion in 
chapter seven. 
Chapter two lays out, in two parts, the theoretical foundations of the study. Part one 
reviews the leading political science literature on corruption, and starts with a 
discussion of a range of conventional research approaches that have been used over 
previous decades. Heidenheimer’s (1970) distinction of public-office, public-interest 
and market-centred definitions is used to organise this section, and the three, as well 
as the distinction itself, are critically discussed. This helps map out the field of 
corruption research more generally and enables me to locate my own social 
constructionist approach in relation to these older approaches. My suggestion for 
visualising this is to put Heidenheimer’s typology aside and instead order the 
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different approaches on a range that runs from objectivist to subjectivist definitions. 
This is then followed by a short excursion to the contextual approaches mentioned 
above, which discuss corruption in the contexts of integrity, quality of governance, 
ethical universalism and deep democratisation. This in my view forms a bridge to the 
social constructionist approaches that follow, in the sense that all these approaches 
point towards different kinds of institutional, historical and ideational contexts. Part 
two of this theory chapter then addresses directly the foundations of the social 
constructionist discourse analysis of this study. It first elaborates on the social 
constructionist part of the equation – the ways in which understandings of corruption 
are subject to processes of social and political construction and reflect underlying 
power struggles. Bratsis’ (2003) approach is further elaborated here, and building on 
Granovetter’s (2004) work, different potential applications of a social constructionist 
approach are discussed. Attention then turns to the discourse side of the equation, 
which looks not just at how corruption discourse is socially and politically constituted 
but also how it in turn constitutes the social and political framework it is constituted 
by. This is a newly developing field in the study of corruption, and some of the latest 
work by Breit (2010, 2011a, 2011b), Kajsiu (2013, 2015) and Zurnić (2013, 2014, 2017) 
is introduced. The conclusion of the theory chapter provides a focal point for this 
thesis, in what I believe is, for the purposes of this study, a comprehensive definition 
of corruption discourse, building on the theories discussed, and pointing towards the 
analysis to follow. 
Chapter three looks at the different decisions taken in the research design of the 
study, and discusses some of the practical considerations of the data collection and 
analysis. First, I argue the logic of comparing Britain and Germany and their two very 
different histories of modern state formation. Despite their differences they both 
have achieved high levels of corruption control, and this makes the two fruitful for 
the kind of comparison Skocpol and Somers (1980) have called contrast of contexts. 
The idea here is to contrast how one common factor – corruption discourse – has 
been shaped by very different contexts. The study also has elements of a parallel 
demonstration of history (ibid.), in that it allows the testing of some of the theoretical 
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ideas developed, mostly, in chapter two, and an examination of whether they apply 
across these very different circumstances. Secondly, closer attention is paid to the 
three case studies that were selected for each of the countries. The 
desynchronization of the time frames of comparison – looking at Britain in the 19th 
century and Germany much later from the late 19th to the mid-20th century – 
represents a focus on those periods of time in which corruption discourse could 
indeed be observed to interact with state formation processes. I argue that in both 
histories, different phases of corruption discourse can be observed, starting with 
what I call a discovery phase, moving through a phase of contestation and finally 
settling into a phase of consolidation. This part of the chapter also explains what 
these phases each represent, and the rationale for selecting the case studies that 
represent the different phases. Finally, some practical considerations regarding the 
data collected and the archives used are discussed, and the approach to data analysis 
explained. The analysis of the documents followed a three-level approach that looked 
at the micro-level of the text, the meso-level of the immediate context and the 
macro-level of the wider context of state formation. Of particular importance here is 
the concept of ‘framing’ as it bridges the three levels and shows, for example, how 
different state formation processes are expressed in corruption text. 
Building on the theoretical and methodological foundations of chapters two and 
three, the fourth chapter presents the three case studies selected for Britain, and the 
historical trajectory of corruption discourse more generally throughout the 19th 
century. The first case study is on the Duke of York scandal in 1809, in which the then 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces was embroiled in a scandal about his 
misconduct in office by selling officer patents through his mistress Mary Clarke. As a 
discourse, this case sees an initial attack on the person of the duke transformed into 
a more fundamental critique of the parliament that had acquitted him of wrong-
doings, and the electoral system that had produced the parliament. It is thus 
representative of a discovery phase in which political campaigners discovered the 
potential of the allegation of corruption as a powerful challenger to authority. The 
second case study is concerned with the Electoral Reform Act debate of 1830 to 1832, 
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leading up to the passing of the corresponding parliamentary bill. The discourse here 
shows how the signifier of corruption was strategically used as part of a wider reform 
discourse, to brand the existing political institutions as corrupt, and demand that they 
be reformed. This is representative of a contestation phase in which corruption 
discourse was used politically to challenge the existing order and contest its 
institutions. The third case study in this chapter is on the passing of the 1889 Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act. While a significant piece of legislation that consolidated 
anti-corruption laws and remained valid until 2010, it was accompanied by little 
discourse, and little political controversy more generally. This is thus representative 
of a consolidation phase in which corruption discourse was no longer politicised and 
used to attack the state, but quite the reverse, it was used to defend its institutions 
against those who might try to subvert them by acts of what was now universally 
seen as ‘corruption’. 
Chapter five accordingly looks at corruption discourse in Germany, the three cases 
studies selected and how they, too, represent phases of discovery, contestation and 
consolidation, albeit in very different ways. The first case study is the Tausch scandal 
of 1896 and 1897 in which a system of press manipulation by a senior officer in the 
political police was exposed, a corruption of corruption discourse if one likes. In the 
context of other authoritarian interventions into the press sector, this shows the 
difficulties corruption discourse was encountering in its early development. There 
was some level of discovery, however, in that the worker’s movement in particular 
was able to see the potential of corruption allegations for undermining the legitimacy 
of state actors. This case thus represents a discovery Phase in which corruption 
discourse was somewhat inhibited, but despite this, there was also its discovery as a 
weapon for political contest. The second case study looks at the Erzberger versus 
Helfferich trial in 1919 to 1920 in which the right-wing politician Helfferich through a 
newspaper campaign publicly accused the centrist politician Erzberger of corruption, 
and the latter then decided to sue him for libel. As a discourse, this case displays 
many of the problems that would continue to plague the Weimar Republic and lead 
to its eventual collapse in 1933 - the struggle with the defeat in the Great War and 
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the Treaty of Versailles, the polarisation of political debate, the political violence and 
the use of corruption allegations to attack not just political adversaries but the 
political system in general. This case is thus representative of a phase of hyper-
contestation in which corruption discourse did not merely attack political institutions 
and demand reforms, but more fundamentally aimed at the overthrow of the 
democratic system as a whole. The third case study looks at the details of the Spiegel 
Scandal in 1962, in the context of the magazine’s role as one of the main drivers of 
corruption discourse in the preceding years. Strauss’s attempt to shut down the 
magazine can thus be seen as an attempt to shut down corruption discourse. This, 
however, failed, and the newspaper discourse surrounding it showed unanimous 
support for the magazine, even from publications that had previously criticised the 
Spiegel and its methods. This case is thus representative of a consolidation phase in 
which corruption discourse had ceased to be politicised and, similar to Britain in the 
late 19th century, was now used to defend the existing legal and political order against 
those who transgressed its norms.    
Chapter six then conducts a systematic comparison of the two countries and its six 
case studies. It does this in two parts, one that uses the historical comparison as a 
contrast of contexts, building mostly on the differences of the cases, and one that 
uses it as a parallel demonstration of theory. This builds mostly on the commonalities, 
and connects the findings from the comparison to some of the theoretical tenets 
developed in chapters two and three. In each part, three propositions are developed. 
Proposition one suggests different ways in which corruption discourse in the two 
countries was constituted by a range of state-formation related factors that can be 
categorised into three groups: factors concerning the legal and institutional 
framework, factors emerging from societal cleavages and conflicts, and endogenous 
factors such as geopolitical conflicts. Proposition two elaborates on how then, in turn, 
corruption discourse had influences on its context, and analyses this along the three 
groups of factors identified. Proposition three further conceptualises these variables 
and suggests ways in which this can potentially be applied to future research and 
more contemporary cases. The second part of the chapter, in a parallel 
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demonstration of theory approach, then discusses some of the theoretical tenets 
developed in the theory and methodology chapters, and considers their applicability 
to the case study analysis. Proposition four aims to show the ways in which historical 
analysis matters, and the importance of taking corruption discourse’s historicity into 
account. Proposition five examines some of the claims put forward by discursive 
institutionalism and suggests some critical reflections on them. And proposition six, 
connecting back to the social constructionist considerations developed in this 
introduction and in chapter two, attempts to further elaborate on the ways in which 
a social constructionist ontology helps illuminate the centrality of ideas of corruption 
for the modern state.  
The conclusion finally, chapter seven, provides a summary of the main points of the 
thesis, and makes further comments on some of the themes established in this 













Chapter Two: Theoretical Considerations 
This chapter consists of two parts pursuing two different objectives: First, it aims to 
give an overview of some of the more established corruption literature, some of its 
accomplishments, some of its limitations, and how more recent literature has started 
to address some of these limitations. Part one thus uses Heidenheimer’s popular 
distinction (1970) between three conceptualisations of corruption, centred on public 
office, on its market character, or on public interest, as a starting point. I discuss these 
in turn and critically assess their strengths and weaknesses, and their uses and abuses 
over the years. To further conceptualise these definitions, my suggestion is then that 
rather than distinguishing between three types of definitions, it makes more sense 
to rank them on a spectrum ranging from objectivist to subjectivist approaches. In 
the former, corruption is defined in a factual manner, its definition seemingly 
independent of social and political context, and in the latter, it is conceptualised in 
relation to its various political, social and institutional contexts. Secondly, part one 
looks, albeit briefly, at a recent ‘contextual turn’ in corruption research, in which its 
discussion has been increasingly embedded within the context of different forms of 
non-corruption, namely of good governance, integrity, universalist ethical norms and 
deep democratisation.  
In part two of the chapter, I sketch out the theoretical foundations on which my own 
study builds, and look at not corruption itself, but the concept of corruption as 
socially constructed, politically shaped and historically developed through discourse. 
Social constructionism provides the ontological foundations for this. I argue that this 
ontological re-orientation if coherently applied has the potential to add another layer 
to the ‘contextual turn’ in the study of corruption, the context of its ideational 
foundations, intricately connected with some the most foundational ideas of the 
modern state itself. Secondly, building on these ontological premises, part two of this 
chapter is then focussed on how these social constructionist foundations manifest 
themselves in discourse, and how discourse on the one hand is shaped by societal 
and political processes as well as having the potential to shape them on the other. A 
handful of recent studies that have looked at corruption discourse in the very 
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different settings of Norway, Albania and Serbia are relevant here, and are used for 
developing some more general theoretical suggestions of how discourse interacts 
with political institutions. I conclude the chapter with a definition of corruption 
discourse for the purposes of this study, taking into account the different facets 
discussed in this chapter.  
Part One: Conventional Approaches 
Corruption in three Conceptualisations 
For better or worse, Heidenheimer and Johnston’s reader Political Corruption (with 
various subtitles for the updated versions, 1970, 1978, 19891 and 2002) has for a long 
time been the first point of call for any student of corruption. In 1970, it brought 
together what had been a relatively new field of research, and in the decades since 
has updated its range of topics and approaches in line with new developments, 
growing from its initial 582 pages to 970 in its 2002 edition. In its introduction in the 
1970 first edition, Heidenheimer established the distinction between the three 
approaches, relatively untouched over the subsequent editions2. Corruption research 
thus followed either of three definitions (2002: 7ff): (a) a public office centred 
definition that refers to the duties of the office and conceptualises corruption as a 
deviation from them, (b) a market-centred definition that is based primarily on 
concepts of economic theory, and (c) a public-interest focussed definition with an 
emphasis on the distinction of public and private interest. This three-way 
categorisation is still commonly referred to in contemporary corruption literature, 
although it rarely goes beyond a dutiful mention and nod to the old master3. One 
particularly insightful analysis is provided by Blendi Kajsiu (2015: 11-30) who 
approaches the three conceptualisations with the tools of discourse analysis and 
                                                          
1 The 1989 edition included the editorship of LeVine. 
2 Heidenheimer discusses why this distinction has remained stable, what other options he chose not 
to include, and some elements that forthcoming typologies could incorporate (2002: 13f.). Other 
attempts of classifying corruption research are e.g. von Alemann (2004), who suggest to distinguish 
between corruption as social decline, corruption as deviant behaviour, as a logic of exchange, as a 
system of measurable perceptions and as shadow politics.  
3 Exceptions to this are e.g. Heywood 1997: 5ff and, in more detail, Philp 1997: 24f. which do discuss 
the distinction rather than simply mention its existence. 
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examines what function the different definitions served within the different 
perspectives (ibid.: 11). In his interpretation, each of the concepts points to an ideal 
that is seen as undermined by corruption, that of an ideal bureaucracy, a perfectly 
functioning market and the values of democracy (ibid.). The following looks at these 
three approaches in turn, and I will return to Kajsiu’s perspective on all three of them. 
 
The public office-centred definition (Heidenheimer 2002: 7f.) focuses on the duties of 
the public office holder. Nye (1967) provides this often-cited definition:  
Corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role 
because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-
regarding influence (1967: 419)4 
Included in this definition are behaviours such as bribery, nepotism and 
misappropriation (ibid.: 419). The ideal upheld here, as Kajsiu observes (2015: 12, 
16ff.), is that of the flawless behaviour of the public official, and their sense of duty 
towards the authority of the rational-legal bureaucracy (cf. Max Weber’s famous 
discussions, 2002 [1921/22]). Much in contrast to public-interest definitions, public-
office concepts are thus quite narrow in scope, and deliberately designed to be so. 
Nye indeed emphasises the importance of excluding any moral or relativistic aspects 
of corruption:  
[The definition] avoids the question of whether non-Western societies regard the 
behaviour as corrupt, preferring to treat that also as a separate variable. To build 
such relativism into the definition is to make specific behaviour which can be 
compared between two countries, difficult to identify. (1967: 419) 
The focus here is on the clear-cut and measurable categories as prescribed by the 
behaviourism of the 1960s. And only in defining corruption in this objectivist manner, 
independent of context, can it be compared across different countries. It should be 
                                                          
4 Quoted in Heidenheimer (2002: 8), but also in numerous academic and non-academic work such as 
Theobald 1990, Rocca 1992, Johnston 1996, Williams 1999, Andersson 2002, Simelane 2012, 
Chiodelli/Moroni 2015, to name but a few examples of an extensive range. While not all these studies 
use Nye in a favourable way, the mention of his work alone demonstrates a certain durability of the 
concept, and the influence it still has today.  
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noted here that Nye does not advocate for refraining from comparisons with non-
Western countries. He advocates for imposing ‘Western’ standards on the 
comparison, and some further examples below show how this was the norm in the 
1960s rather than the exception. This raises some first concerns with this approach. 
Michael Johnston – a proponent of the public interest approach - argues: 
We never will devise a definition of corruption as a category of behaviour that  will  
travel  well  to  all  such  places  or  times  –  or  even,  realistically,  to most of them. 
Moreover, such approaches will often tell us little about the development or 
significance of corruption in real societies. I propose that in such instances we study, 
not a category of behaviour, but rather the issue or idea of corruption, and the social 
and political processes through which it acquires its meaning and significance (1994: 
3, also cited in v. Alemann 2004: 28). 
Von Alemann adds: 
Corruption is as manifold as the societies and political systems it contaminates. 
During some historical phases bribery, the purchase of office and votes is a normal 
phenomenon known to the population but not condemned by it. In other countries, 
e.g. in Cuba, even tipping is forbidden as a form of corruption. In Singapore bribery 
is punishable by death. The phenomenon of corruption is as polymorphic as are the 
attempts to stamp it out. (2004: 28) 
An objectivist perspective, in this narrowly conceived version at least, is thus of 
questionable applicability despite claiming universalism. It upholds an essentially 
‘Western’ concept of corruption that fails to account for the many ways in which 
corruption is interpreted in different contexts. 
This becomes even more problematic when considering some of the applications of 
the public-office approach in its 1960s heydays. According to Heidenheimer (1970: 5, 
2002: 7), some of the other protagonists of this approach were Bayley (The effects of 
corruption in a developing nation, 1966), Myrdal (Corruption: its causes and effects. 
Asian drama: An inquiry into the poverty of nations, 1968) and McMullan (A Theory 
of Corruption based on a Consideration of Corruption in the Public Services and 
Governments of British Colonies and ex‐Colonies in West Africa, 1961). 
It is a similar picture with functionalist approaches5. Corruption in this reading was 
seen as a dysfunction for whatever organisation or system it appeared in. However, 
                                                          
5 See Kajsiu 2015: 14f. for a more detailed discussion of functionalism applied to corruption. 
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these dysfunctions could sometimes be functional in other respects. In his influential 
1968 reflections on the political machine and bossism in American cities, Robert K. 
Merton argued that corruption and patronage fulfilled specific functions that the 
official structures of the state were not able to address. In his words, “the functional 
deficiencies of the official structure generate an alternative (unofficial) structure to 
fulfil existing needs somewhat more sufficiently” (2013 [1968]: 76). The party 
machine thus was functional in a positive sense for subgroups of society which were 
otherwise disadvantaged – they provided for a more personal point of contact than 
the anonymous state bureaucracy (ibid.) and opportunities for social mobility for 
those of disadvantaged class position or ethnic background (ibid.: 78). Corruption 
thus aided social mobility. Other functionalists applied similar ideas to developing 
countries, such as Leff (1964) in his programmatically titled monograph Economic 
development through bureaucratic corruption, Huntington (1968) and Scott (1969). 
Similar to Merton’s claims, the argument here went that specific groups in society 
were able to use corruption to access resources they would otherwise be denied. In 
particular, ‘free enterprise’ and business could use it to circumvent the inefficient 
bureaucratic processes of the state. 
It could hardly be clearer then why Kajsiu in his discourse analysis sees here a political 
project at work. In times of decolonisation, Western scholars invoked an ideal of the 
fully functional bureaucratic apparatus of the ‘West’, and used the newly de-
colonised countries as a template against which its ‘purity’ could be contrasted. 
Corruption in this reading “marked the distance between the traditional and the 
modern, between the First and the Third World, between the particular and the 
universal” (Kajsiu 2015: 16), and reiterated the ‘First World’s’ perceived superiority. 
Most examples of this public-office approach listed here are from the 1960s. This is 
no coincidence – indeed it was then the dominant form, and with its behaviourist and 
functionalist versions – en vogue in the 60s but in decline soon after - they provide 
the starkest examples of this objectivist approach. However, this should not conceal 
the fact that in one way or another, a focus on public office is still an important part 
of much of contemporary corruption research, and in the ‘contextual turn’ section 
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below, some of these newer approaches will be discussed in more detail. From the 
mid-1970s, however, corruption scholarship in general became less active (Johnston 
2015: 633). And the trend from the mid-70s into the 90s was firmly towards market-
centred definitions (Kajsiu 2015: 18).  
Market-centred definitions focus on corruption as a form of economic exchange. In 
this rational-choice inspired view, a corrupt civil servant, as van Klaveren puts it, 
“regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will […] seek to 
maximise” (1970 [1957]: 39, quoted in Heidenheimer, 2002: 8). In his view, this 
applies mostly to historic cases of corruption, or corruption in non-Western 
countries:  
This comparison between the office and the business is particularly apt if, first, the 
civil servant does not obtain a salary, and, second, if he himself has to finance the 
costs of his administration, an extreme situation, rarely found in modern times. 
(1970: 39) 
A slightly dated but still insightful discussion of the sale of public office and, resulting 
from it, its conception as private property is thus provided by Swart (1970 [1949]). 
He applies this perspective to a diversity of examples, such as the Inca kingdoms of 
South America, Dutch and German city administrations in the Middle Ages, the 
French state under King Louis XIV and the Prussian bureaucracy of Frederick I and II. 
In this reading, corruption revolves around intermediary groups such as public 
officials or royal civil servants, as well as landlords and urban patricians, whose aim 
is to use their position towards the maximisation of profits.  
Other market-centred approaches have put the principal-agent model at the centre 
of corruption research. This model is derived from neo-institutional economics and 
has been developed by authors such as Banfield (1975), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978), 
Klitgaard (1988), Alam (1995), Groenendjik (1997) and della Porta/Vanucci (1999, 
2005, 2012). The focus here is on the relationship between a principal and an agent 
who is supposed to act in the interest of the principal. In della Porta and Vanucci’s 




In formal terms, corruption […] is defined as: 
(i) the illegal and therefore hidden violation of an explicit or implicit contract 
(ii) that states a delegation of responsibility from a principal to an agent who 
has the legal authority, as well as the official and informal obligation to use 
his discretionary power, capacity and information to pursue the principal’s 
interest; 
(iii) the violation occurs when the agent exchanges these resources in a (corrupt) 
transaction 
(iv) with a client (the briber), for which the agent receives as a reward a quantity 
of money - the bribe – or other valuable resources  
(della Porta/Vanucci 2012: 4, emphasis in original) 
 
The merits of this model are in its attention to detail: Compared to public office 
approaches it spells out the nitty-gritties of the underlying contractual and normative 
obligations the office holder has, as well as their relationship to the principal. The 
model can be applied to any organisation, economic, political or otherwise. In 
political corruption generally the principal is the state, in a democracy specifically the 
citizenry, whereas the agent is the public office holder entrusted to act on behalf of 
the state (ibid.). The purpose of corruption research of this type is then to determine 
“how non-co-operative behaviour by an agent can occur, and which factors, in terms 
of different costs, condition such behaviour” (Groenendjik 1997: 210). In other 
words, the emphasis is here on the incentives and disincentives for corrupt 
behaviour.  
There is no doubt that identifying these factors can make an important contribution 
for effective policy-making. As Heywood observes, “[…] market-centred approaches 
[…] tend to be more concerned with the mechanics of political corruption […], and 
the circumstances under which it becomes possible” (1997: 6). The focus on rational 
choice decisions thus helps illuminate the conditions under which individuals engage 
in corrupt acts, and also, as for example Cartier-Bresson (1997) illustrates, how 




There are some overlaps between market-centred and public-office approaches to 
corruption, in particular the functionalist studies discussed above. They have in 
common that corruption is not conceptualised along the categories of 
moral/immoral, but presented in a relatively value-neutral way as just another form 
of social organisation or transaction – albeit an illegal one according to the laws of 
the state. Leff for example, listed above among the functionalist approaches, with his 
Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption (2002 [1964]) is also an 
example of a market-centred approach. Corruption for him is “an extra-legal 
institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the 
bureaucracy” (ibid.: 307, see also Heidenheimer (2002: 8) who lists his work in the 
market-centred category). 
These overlaps are no coincidence. Questions indeed need to be asked about 
whether market-centred approaches, as Heidenheimer stipulates, actually provide a 
distinct definition of corruption. Philp argues that this claim is problematic: “[Market-
centred definitions] may […] provide a fruitful model for the explanation of the 
incidence of corruption, but they are not a way of defining it” (1997: 28). Instead, 
their own definitions, too, relied on an understanding similar to public-office centred 
approaches, only here they were implicit rather than explicit: “Both Leff and van 
Klaveren are implicitly appealing to public-office conceptions of corruption in 
defining corruption, even if their subsequent accounts of the conditions for its 
emergence and persistence might differ substantially […]”, a claim that applies to 
other economic definitions such as the principal-agent model as well (ibid.). 
Fundamentally, they built on definitions that could equally be found in public-office 
models, and often referred simply to what was defined by law as being corrupt. 
Philp’s recommendation is thus to discard of this category as a definitional one, and 
collapse the two into one (ibid.: 29).  
Kajsiu (2015: 21ff.) analyses these approaches as an Economic Paradigm, and in his 
discourse analysis focuses on how they were used to promote neoliberal ideas 
against state intervention in the economy. While this did not apply to all market-
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centred approaches, a significant number saw in the state an obstacle to economic 
development: 
[F]rom a public choice perspective, rules and regulations were put in place by 
government officials in order to maximise bribe levels: ‘the sluggishness of 
bureaucratic procedures … must be seen in part as creations of corrupt governing 
elites’ (Alam, 2000, p.202). As a consequence, state intervention into the economy 
became synonymous with corruption as it created corrupt incentives. (Kajsiu 2015: 
22) 
Again, scholarly research on corruption was thus used to pursue political agendas. 
While public office approaches formed a discourse that emphasised the superiority 
of the developed world, market-centred approaches more often than not were used 
to delegitimise the state and emphasis the superiority of the market. Kajsiu’s entire 
study on instituting neoliberalism against corruption in Albania is an example of this. 
Public interest-centred definitions emphasise the distinction of public and private 
interests and the responsibilities of power holders regarding the public interest 
(Heidenheimer 2002: 8f.). Essentially, they are less on “corruption in democracy”, as 
public-office centred definitions are, but on “corruption of democracy” in a more 
fundamental sense (Kajsiu 2015: 24, my emphasis, see also Warren 2004: 329). In 
Friedrich’s 1966 definition,  
[a] pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is 
charged with doing certain things, that is who is a responsible functionary or office 
holder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take 
actions which favour whoever provides the reward and thereby does damage to the 
public and its interests. (Quoted in Heidenheimer 2002: 9) 
Taken without its context, this definition seems very similar to both public-office 
centred and the principal-agent definitions (with the addition that principal and agent 
here are specified). The difference, however, lies in the emphasis on the underlying 
interest that is served by corrupt and non-corrupt acts, the public versus the special. 
This becomes clearer when consulting older versions of Heidenheimer’s discussion of 
the three definitions. In the 1970 edition (1970: 6) he quotes Rogow and Laswell 
(1970 [1963]: 54): 
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A corrupt act violates the responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic 
order and is in fact compatible with (destructive of) any such system. A system of 
public or civic order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the 
common interest for special advantage are corrupt.  
The emphasis thus shifts, from the focus on concrete individual-level action to the 
destruction corruption can cause to a public interest-based political system. And it 
allows for a more flexible definition of what acts specifically are corrupt. Their 
defining trait is the violation of the public or common interest, and what forms this 
takes can vary depending on context. Other authors who have used this broader 
approach are for example Dobel who in his 1978 article The Corruption of a State 
looks at the “decay of a political order” itself (ibid.: 959); Warren who in his excellent 
2004 discussion What does corruption mean in a democracy? goes into great 
theoretical depth on how corruption entails what he calls “duplicitous violations of 
the democratic norm of inclusion” (ibid.: 328) that “undermine the culture of a 
democracy” (ibid.); Johnston who in his unfortunately named but otherwise brilliant 
2005 book Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy6 connects 
corruption to ideas of social and economic justice; or Girling (1997) and Sullivan 
(2005) who provide a critical Marxist analysis of the compatibility of democracy and 
capitalism.7  
In an extreme case, corruption can occur when individual actors are not even in 
violation of any of the rules of the seemingly democratic state, but the rules 
themselves are corrupt, in the sense that they sabotage the public interest. 
Thompson in his study on the Keating Five (1993), a case involving five US Senators 
and their campaign donor Charles Keating, develops the concept of mediated 
corruption: 
This form of corruption involves the use of public office for private purposes in a 
manner that subverts the democratic process. It may be called mediated corruption 
because the corrupt acts are mediated by the political process. The public official's 
contribution to the corruption is filtered through various practices that are otherwise 
legitimate and may even be duties of office. As a result, both the official and citizens 
                                                          
6 The title falsely implies that the one causes the others. 




are less likely to recognize that the official has done anything wrong or that any 
serious harm has been done (1993: 369) 
Thompson’s point here, however, is that this is “still a form of corruption” (ibid.) and 
that the analysis merely “links the acts of individual officials to the qualities of the 
democratic process”. This adds an intriguing layer to the study of corruption. Rather 
than following one interpretation of what corruption is, Thompson contests different 
versions: His own, based on a deliberative conception of democracy (ibid.: 377), and 
that of others who base their verdict on legal norms (Thompson discusses two such 
interpretations in his monograph). This, then, is quite a departure from the 
objectivism of other approaches. And while not a study in social constructionism, it 
takes into account typical considerations of the approach – the notion that corruption 
can be defined in different ways and that there is not always a shared understanding 
of what it is. 
In fact, taking a closer look at Friedrich’s work on Corruption Concepts in Historical 
Perspective (2002 [1972]), hailed by Heidenheimer as a prime example of public-
interest centred approaches, a number of implicit social constructionist 
considerations become apparent. The study explores the different meanings of 
corruption in different historical contexts, as voiced by political thinkers in these eras, 
from Aristotle (ibid.: 17) to Machiavelli (ibid.: 18) to Rousseau (ibid.: 19). As he 
unfolds his historical narrative, Friedrich makes a number of observations that could 
have been taken right from the social constructionist textbook. On Francis Bacon’s 
high profile 1621 case he remarks:  
As High Chancellor he accepted bribes in order to favour certain parties before the 
court. […] But what is of interest is that he and his friends essentially defended his 
case on the ground that he was not doing anything that was not generally done. 
(ibid.: 18)  
This description has strong echoes with one of the social constructionist cases 
discussed in the following section of this chapter, Chibnall and Saunders 1977 study 
on the Paulsen and Pottinger scandal, which deals with conflicting interpretations of 
allegedly corrupt acts.  
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On the reform movement in Britain in the 19th century – central to my own studies – 
he observes: “By the second half of the 19th century what had been considered 
‘normal behaviour’ had become corruption sharply condemned by the majority of 
Britons” (Friedrich 2002: 21) – an acknowledgment of the changing nature of what 
corruption means, and the social and political processes that underlie these changes. 
There are a number of significant differences to social constructionist approaches, 
however, and they can be found in the ontological foundations surfacing throughout 
the text. On Bacon Friedrich states, “[…] he was a corrupt man” (ibid.: 18), implying 
that corruption existed in an objective sense, regardless of what Bacon’s friends 
thought. And he concludes that “[c]orruption then has become a particular form of 
political pathology […]. As such it can be defined in behavioural terms, and the 
activities objected to can be outlawed” (ibid.: 20). While the ‘activities objected to’ 
might be another nod to social constructionist ideas, the fact that he conceptualises 
corruption as a pathology again points to objectively defined norms that this 
pathology deviates from. 
This is typical for many of the public interest-centred approaches to corruption 
research. While there is an engagement with social constructionist considerations, it 
tends to happen within a theoretical framework that is not social constructionist. 
Public interest approaches thus tend to go further than public office and market-
centred approaches in integrating subjectivist concerns, but they are far from the 
subjectivist end of the spectrum of possible approaches. 
This stopping short of a more thorough deconstruction is not just conceptual, it is 
also political. In his analysis of what he calls the Political Paradigm (2015: 23ff.), Kajsiu 
discusses the dangers he thinks this entails. Scholars who follow this paradigm have 
thus propagated different ideas of the ideal state, defining to various degrees the key 
characteristics it needs and that are under threat from corruption, but fail to justify 
them. In Kajsiu’s observation, “[t]he problem was that the focus on corruption tended 
to shift attention from the critical analysis of a given ideal or political system towards 
the necessity of its implementation” (ibid.: 26). Through the backdoor of what was 
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explicitly corruption research, political ideologies could thus implicitly be propagated 
without being critically scrutinised. 
From Types to Range: Questions have been asked as to whether Heidenheimer’s 
distinction is worth persevering with. Philp argues that it is “conceptually muddled” 
(1997: 28), and that, as discussed above, the distinction between public office and 
market definitions in particular is problematic (ibid.: 29). In his view, there is pressure 
to reduce this typology even further, and that even the remaining two-way 
distinction is flawed. Both public-office and public interest-centred definitions 
essentially boiled down to common points of reference:  
The open character of much public office is structured by principles and expectations 
that demand office holders be guided by considerations of the public interest. To ask 
whether a politician acts corruptly we must be aware that the characterisation of 
public office will inevitably point beyond the compliance with rules to the principles 
underlying those rules […] (ibid.: 29) 
This begged the question of what exactly it was that was being corrupted. Different 
definitions of corruption were thus an expression of different underlying ideas of 
what the opposite of corruption was, this “naturally sound condition” (ibid.). Philp’s 
conclusion then is to leave behind the idea of “one-line definitions”, and instead, “we 
are forced to accept that to identify political corruption we must make commitments 
to conceptions of the nature of the political and the form of the public interest” (ibid.: 
30). The approaches discussed in the next section on the “contextual turn” follow this 
advice.  
However, should we really give up on thinking about the different ways in which 
corruption is conceptualised, and how this has consequences for the kind of research 
that is produced? For the purpose of my own study at least, it makes sense to 
conceptualise these different approaches along the extent to which they take social 
constructionist considerations into account. This is a classification along the 
theoretical foundations on which corruption research is built, not so much on the 
definitions used – although the latter are always an expression of the former. On one 
end of the spectrum, objectivist conceptions treat corruption as an objectively 
definable phenomenon. Public office as well as economic approaches tend to use 
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legally codified definitions or rely on the researcher’s legally informed 
understandings. Nye for example is rather assertive in specifying a catalogue of 
behaviours - bribery, nepotism, misappropriation and so forth – that fall within the 
definition (1967: 419). Public-interest approaches on the other hand allow to various 
degrees elements of subjectivism into the ways they either conceptualise corruption 
or the ways they discuss it. Public-office approaches thus tend to be located closer to 
the positivist end of the spectrum, public-interest ones slide further towards 
subjectivism. 
However, and this is what makes this scalar approach so relevant here, this only goes 
to show the incompleteness of Heidenheimer’s categories. Public office definitions 
consider some subjectivism, yet on the scale of possible approaches they are 
somewhere in the middle. This means that Heidenheimer’s distinction only captures 
part of the whole range, and a whole body of literature has been excluded, namely 
the social constructionist and discursive approaches that are discussed in the second 
part of this chapter8. Johnston in his 2015 reflections asks “What have we missed?” 
(2015: 638). One of his answers is that “a promising approach is to question basic 
distinctions between the public and private” (ibid.: 643), referring to Bratsis’ (2003) 
social constructionist analysis (discussed below). Re-arranging the different 
approaches on the continuum gives expression to and visualises Johnston’s 
observation. What has been missed is the subjectivist end of the spectrum. 
Why this omission has taken place is a matter of speculation. Two factors, however, 
are likely to play a role: On the one hand, strongly subjectivist research is rare, and 
most of it has been published only in recent years, after Heidenheimer and Johnston’s 
2002 edition of the handbook – the literature referred to in the second part of this 
                                                          
8 Subjectivist approaches should not be mistaken with what Heidenheimer discusses as a potential 
fourth category, that of public opinion-based definitions (see Heidenheimer 2002: 13, also Heywood 
1997: 8). Conceptualising corruption as socially constructed makes ontological statements about what 
the thing fundamentally is, whereas an opinion-based approach merely takes into consideration what 
a greater number of people think corruption is. Public opinion constitutes a further move towards 
subjectivism, but it can still be conceptualised within theoretical frameworks that are not subjectivist. 
The point of the objectivism-subjectivism spectrum is to point to underlying ontological stances, to 
most fundamental statements about the theoretical nature of ‘corruption’, not to how it is empirically 
defined by e.g. public opinion. 
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chapter provides ample illustration of this. On the other hand, it is quite possible that 
there is a subject area bias. Most corruption research is conducted in either law 
departments, in economics and business or, and this is Heidenheimer’s starting point, 
political science. Unlike sociology, neither of these subject areas has particularly 
strong traditions of subjectivist research. It is therefore not surprising that, firstly, 
little subjectivist research has been conducted from within these departments, and 
secondly, that relatively little attention has been given to the few approaches that 
did exist, lying as they do outside the ontological comfort zone of many a researcher 
whose subject area is not rooted in this tradition. 
 
 
Thinking of corruption research on a spectrum from objectivism to subjectivism thus 
serves three purposes: First, it points to a wider range of possible corruption research 
than Heidenheimer’s typology does. Secondly, it helps me locate and put into context 
my own research with other commonly used approaches. And thirdly, it points to the 
different emphases of research that different academic disciplines have. Figure 1 is 
an attempt to visualise these three purposes. It follows Philp’s (1997) advice to 
collapse public office and market concepts into one, on the basis that they follow 
essentially the same kinds of – objectivist – definitions. Public interest approaches 
are located in the middle of the spectrum as they take some subjectivist 




Objectivist                                                                                                                      Subjectivist 
                                                          Economics, Law 
       Politics 
Subject Areas               Sociology 
Public Office 
Market 
Public Interest Social 
Constructionist 
Figure 1. Concepts of corruption from objectivist to subjectivist 
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subjectivist end of the spectrum. Regarding subject areas, while this is not true for all 
research that is produced in the respective university departments, the literature 
considered in this first part of the chapter does suggest certain tendencies: 
Economics and law tend to work primarily with objectivist approaches, political 
science approaches range from objectivism to taking some subjectivist concerns into 
account, and the few sociological studies that do exist tend to take subjectivist 
considerations seriously, to varying degrees9. 
 
The Contextual Turn in Corruption Research 
At the time of writing, corruption research is going through a phase of critical 
introspection. As Johnston writes in 2015:  
Both despite and because of all that has been accomplished, a reassessment of sorts 
is now under way. Recent published research is often reflective and critical of the 
past generation’s work. […] Whether we think of the current phase as a new realism, 
pessimism or just an opportunity to stop and catch a breath, it is both likely and 
desirable that the next stage of research will be substantially different from what we 
have seen so far. (Johnston 2015: 634f.) 
The reasons for this introspection lie in the “anti-corruption movement’s indifferent 
track record”, in questions about the “interests and assumptions shaping its 
worldview” and what Johnston describes as a “nagging sense of incompleteness” (all 
ibid.: 635). The following outlines some more recent approaches in corruption 
research, which are borne out of these doubts and which try to address the issues 
raised. The trend here is to take a broader view of corruption and to see it in the 
context of that which is not corrupt, of what Philp in his 1997 discussion called the  
“naturally sound condition” (1997: 29). What does corruption corrupt?  I discuss in 
turn approaches that refer to integrity in office, the quality of government (QoG), 
ethical universalism as a principle of governance, and deep democratisation. As I will 
                                                          
9 ‘Sociology’ here refers to contemporary sociology, i.e. after its subjectivist and culturalist turns in the 
1960s and 70s. A number of the approaches discussed in the objectivist public office paradigm were 
indeed from sociology, but from the pre-turn sociology of the 1960s. 
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argue, in a specific ways these approaches further point towards the importance of 
more subjectivist research. 
Instead of the negative of corruption, a growing body of literature in recent years has 
advocated looking at the positive of integrity in public office. Heywood and Rose 
(2013) point to the limitations that a narrow focus on corruption has:  
 “Corruption” is conceptually limited, relative to a proper understanding of integrity, 
and can be difficult to measure adequately. However, the research conducted using 
these imperfect measures remains genuinely useful, even if limited. Yet, the 
historical lock-in that favours work on corruption ought not to be allowed to define 
research in this area of the discipline indefinitely. The hard work—conceptually and 
empirically—of designing and implementing new measures remains incomplete 
(Heywood/Rose 2013: 152) 
This limitation becomes particularly clear when anchored to a broader concern for 
good governance. Corruption alone is only part of the bigger picture: 
 […] [L]evels of integrity may vary significantly even within groups of countries that 
have apparently similar levels of corruption. […] To pose the question in basic terms, 
should we focus more attention on curbing corruption or on seeking to increase 
integrity? This is a question of practical importance for politicians and state officials, 
as well as for development aid agencies and civil society. (Heywood and Rose 2015: 
103)  
The ‘integrity-rather-than-corruption-approach’ has been in development since the 
late 1990s (for example Anechiarico/Jacobs 1996, Klitgaard 1997), and has been rising 
to increased prominence in the 2010s, most notably with the special edition The 
Global Anti‐Corruption Discourse—Towards Integrity Management? of Public 
Administration and Development (2012) and a reader compiling different 
perspectives edited by Hardi, Heywood and Torselli (Debates of Corruption and 
Integrity: Perspectives from Europe and the US, 2015). The ‘contextual turn’ here 
consists of integrating the narrower concept of corruption into the broader category 
of integrity. Corruption is thus no longer seen in relative isolation, but as part of a 
bigger question, in the context of the overall integrity of public office holders 
specifically, and how well societies are governed more generally. Notable here is also 
the wide spectrum of theoretical approaches, from the more objectivist management 
perspective (e.g. Heywood 2012; Collins 2012; Webb 2012; Scott and Leung 2012) to 
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a number of decidedly subjectivist studies (Torsello 2015, Pardo 2015, Prato 2015, in 
Hardi, Heywood and Torselli’s reader, 2015). 
In similar vein, the concept of ‘quality of government’ (QoG), a slightly rebranded 
version of the older ‘good governance’ has risen to prominence. Indeed, the QoG 
Institute in Gothenburg, founded in 2004 by Bo Rothstein and Sören Holmberg, has 
become one of the leading corruption research centres in Europe. This approach, too, 
is rooted in the concern that the study of corruption in isolation is problematic. 
Rothstein and Teorell argue: “At least three problems may be identified with existing 
definitions [of good governance]: Either they are extremely broad, or they suffer from 
a functionalist slant, or they deal only with corruption” (Rothstein/Teorell 2008: 
167f.). Instead, the authors of this school suggest that four indicators are needed for 
a coherent conceptualisation of QoG: In addition to the level of corruption these are 
democracy, economic growth and the rule of law (Holmberg, Rothstein and 
Nasiritousi 2009: 136). The unifying principle that underlies good governance 
according to this approach is ‘impartiality’ (Rothstein/Teorell 2008). Like integrity 
approaches, QoG thus integrates corruption in the wider context of what makes the 
behaviour of public officials good and legitimate. Levels of corruption are thus seen 
as part of a bigger picture, and the project is to look at the picture as a whole, not 
just one part of it. While integrity approaches focus primarily on the more micro-level 
of the behaviour of public officials, governance concepts are thus more interested in 
the macro-level of the political organisation, and the quality of institutions. 
Finally, two approaches that take a decidedly historical perspective deserve 
attention, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi’s work on how societies develop corruption control 
(2006, 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2015) and Michael Johnston’s discussion of how 
successful anti-corruption measures are embedded in processes of ‘deep 
democratisation’ (2014). Mungiu-Pippidi argues – again starting with the 
shortcomings of older approaches - that the reason for the failure of many anti-
corruption strategies in so-called transition and developing countries is their 
assumption that corruption there is the same phenomenon as in developed 
countries. However,  
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[i]n the latter [developed countries], the term corruption usually designates 
individual cases of infringement of the norm of integrity. In the former, corruption 
actually means “particularism”—a  mode  of  social  organization  characterized  by  
the regular  distribution  of  public  goods  on  a  non-universalistic  basis  that mirrors  
the  vicious  distribution  of  power  within  such  societies. (2006: 86f.) 
Building on the classic work of Parsons and Shils (1951), the question then becomes 
how societies develop from particularism to universalism. Mungiu-Pippidi suggest a 
historical development model in which patrimonialism – an unelected monarchy or 
autocracy - is typically followed by competitive pluralism – in which elections do take 
place but universalist values are missing - which is then – ideally – followed by 
universalism – typically a liberal democracy (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006: 88ff.). Developing 
and transition countries thus tend to fall into the competitive pluralism category10: 
Unlike  in  traditional  societies,  where  only  a small  group  of  people  are  above  
the  law,  in  these  regimes  multiple groups compete for this privileged position. 
Moreover, the unaccountable  behaviour  of  rulers  legitimates  unlawful  behaviour  
by  citizens,  and the distance between formal institutions (rule of law) and informal 
ones (real  practices)  grows.  (ibid.: 90)  
Corruption levels are typically high in patrimonialism, highest in the different manifestations 
of competitive pluralism and lowest in universalism (ibid.: 89). To achieve effective and 
lasting control of corruption, a higher level of ethical universalism thus needs to be 
established. The very power structures that organise societies thus need to be 
changed, a task that cannot be achieved by simply implementing anti-corruption 
measures that were designed for the developed world in the first place (ibid.: 86).  
Michael Johnston follows a similar line of argument. In his Corruption, Contention, 
and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization (2014) he advances, similarly, the 
idea that democratic institutions alone are not adequate for reducing corruption. He 
asks:  
But maybe the real question is not why there is so much corruption, but rather why 
there is not much more of it? Maybe we should ask how it was that the powerful and 
wealthy were ever brought within limits, and how the idea that rulers should be 
answerable to others took root and became credible. (2014: 29) 
                                                          




The answer to this can be found in “deep democratisation”, which Johnston sees “in 
the sense of broadening the range of people and groups with some say about the 
ways power and wealth should – and should not – be pursued, used, and exchanged” 
(ibid.). Reforms should therefore target issues of fundamental societal organisation 
rather than simply implementing isolated legislation against corruption: “The 
fundamental challenge, I will suggest, is to help create situations in which citizens can 
control corruption in the course of asserting their own interests and defending their 
own well-being” (ibid.: 30). 
Both Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston contextualise corruption within a more 
fundamental notion of how societies are organised, and of how power and authority 
are distributed within the state – a turn to the typical ideas used in political sociology. 
And both contextualise this within a long-term historical development, pointing to 
century-long developments that have taken place in the so-called developed world – 
a turn to history.  
All these approaches - integrity, quality of government, ethical universalism and deep 
democratisation – have two features in common: Firstly, they are rooted in a sense 
of disillusionment and soul-searching as to the lack of efficacy of anti-corruption 
movements across the globe and the role corruption research has played in it. They 
try to address this by breaking new grounds and developing new directions of 
research. And secondly, they do so by heeding Philp’s advice (1997) and focus not on 
the negative of corruption but on different versions of the positive of non-corruption. 
How then, does this point towards social constructionist approaches and corruption 
discourse? To answer this question, Luhmann’s distinction between first and second 
order observations is helpful (Luhmann 1993). First order observations are the 
observation of some object, phenomenon, some ‘thing’. Second order observations 
are an observation of the observation of the thing. In our case, the ‘thing’ is 
corruption defined in objectivist terms, in other words defined as if it was a thing that 
objectively existed. The observers of this are corruption researchers (more precisely 
those who follow objectivist definitions) on the one hand, and any other observers, 
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such as politicians and newspaper commentators (those who also follow similar 
definitions) on the other. In other words, the first-order observers are those who 
produce a discourse, academic or political, on corruption. Second-order observers 
are those who observe and analyse this discourse11.  
My contention here is that the recent approaches of the contextual turn are rooted 
in a disillusionment of first-order observations of corruption. The doubts Johnston 
describes about the “interests and assumptions shaping its [the anti-corruption 
movement’s] worldview” and the “nagging sense of incompleteness” (2015: 635) are 
themselves the beginnings of a second-order observation. They reflect on past 
analyses of corruption that treated it as a ‘thing’, and the limitations this has had for 
understanding and explaining the phenomenon in all its complexity and 
completeness. One answer to this problem, the answer these approaches have been 
following, is to turn towards corruption’s opposite, to integrity, governance, 
universalism, deep democratisation, and conceptualise corruption within these wider 
contexts. Another answer to this disillusionment, however, is to turn towards a 
second-order observation: To look at how ‘corruption’ is a “free-floating signifier” 
(Kajsiu 2015: 37ff.) and a “negotiated classification of behaviour rather than […] an 
inherent quality of behaviour” (Chibnall/Saunders 1977: 139). It is in this sense that 
the contextual turn points towards social constructionist approaches: Both are 
rooted in a growing suspicion of first-order observations, and both seek to address 
its shortcomings, albeit in different ways. My own study looks at how the ‘corruption’ 
signifier has been used in different historical and political contexts for strategic 
purposes. In its own way, it too is thus a turn towards context. 
 
 
                                                          
11 In turn, they too produce discourse and become first-order observers at the same time as being 
second-order observers, a point very much acknowledged by Luhmann. 
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Part two: Corruption as Discourse 
Part two of this chapter looks at the approach chosen for this particular study. It, too, 
represents a turn to the context within which corruption is embedded, and in this 
sense can be seen in a line with the more general ‘contextual turn’ of recent years. 
However, while the approaches discussed above broaden out in the sense that they 
look at corruption in the broader context of other values, behaviours and practices, 
corruption discourse that builds on social constructionist premises goes into depth: 
It looks at the meaning of corruption in more detail, and how its meaning has been 
historically produced. The context explored here is thus of the contingencies, social, 
political and historical, of what corruption means in the first place, and why it means 
what it means. 
Before going into more detail on social constructionist foundations and discursive 
applications, it is worth sketching out the differences between the two as I use them 
for the purposes of this study. As I understand it, social constructionism is more 
concerned with how ideas of corruption are constituted in the first place. 
Understandings of corruption here are the dependent variable, social construction 
processes the independent one. Corruption discourse goes a step further: it 
integrates this first step, too, but also looks at the effects that these ideas and 
understandings can then in turn have on political processes, effect changes in 
institutions, and influence the formation of politics and the state. Ideas of corruption 
here are treated primarily as the independent variable. Social constructionist 
approaches are thus mostly concerned with how ideas of corruption are constituted, 
discourse approaches more about how they in turn constitute changes in other areas 
of politics and the state. In addition to this, a focus on discourse as the key 
epistemological unit to be analysed is better at capturing the dynamic of debates, 
scandals and controversies, in a way that a social constructionist metaphor cannot. 
Social Constructionist Foundations 
To state that corruption is socially constructed is to state the obvious. Indeed, even 
the most objectivist definitions routinely acknowledge this, only to then assert that 
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they are not interested in engaging with it any further. Surprisingly little has indeed 
been written on the social construction of corruption (perhaps because it is so taken 
for granted). Among the more serious attempts are Chibnall and Saunders’ (1977) 
study on the Poulson and Pottinger court case in Leeds (discussed below), Pavarala’s 
(1993) look at elite constructions of corruption in Andhra Pradesh, Gupta’s (1995) 
ethnography of corruption discourse in Indian bureaucracy and Kayes (2006) analysis 
of organisational corruption as theodicy.12 
A good starting point, however, is provided by Bratsis’ 2003 essay the construction of 
corruption, or rules of separation and illusions of purity in bourgeois societies. Bratsis 
deconstructs some of the conventional conceptions of corruption, and in particular 
the public and private distinction fundamental to most corruption definitions. He 
argues that historical studies such as Friedrich’s (2002 [1972]) influential work falsely 
evoke a sense of continuity in the meaning of corruption from antiquity to modernity. 
Rather, there are two different meanings of corruption, on the one hand a traditional 
one that means mainly decay and regression: “This understanding contained the idea 
that through disease, old age, the influence of vice, or any other reason, the ability 
to seek the good and virtuous is decreased and possibly destroyed” (Bratsis 2003: 
15). On the other hand, the typical modern understanding is built on the distinction 
of private and public interest. Unlike the traditional one, it does not evoke a 
dichotomy of good and bad, leading Bratsis to ask “How, then, can two things, public 
and private interests that are in themselves seen as proper and good, come to 
constitute something that is bad and improper?” (ibid.). The answer can be found in 
the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas (Purity and Danger, 1966):  
Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-table; 
food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the bedroom, or 
food bespattered on clothing; similarly, bathroom equipment in the drawing room; 
clothes lying on chairs; out-door things in-doors; upstairs things downstairs; under-
clothing appearing where over-clothing should be, and so on. In short, our pollution 
                                                          
12 Another prominent work that that claims to use social constructionism is Tänzler, Maras and 
Giannakopoulos’ reader The social construction of corruption in Europe (2012). However, their 
understanding of social constructionism is rather different to my own (it is based on system theory 
and methodological individualism, Tänzler, Maras, Giannakopoulos, Rogowski 2012: 21), and 
therefore is not applied here. 
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behaviour is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely to confuse 
cherished classifications. (Douglas 1966: 36f., cited in Bratsis 2003: 15) 
Modern and traditional understandings of corruption are thus fundamentally 
different, and this raises the question of why they are so routinely seen as, more or 
less, one and the same. Bratsis sees here “a normative political project that posits 
what the good is and on this basis is able to establish what is corrupt or bad” (ibid.: 
17). This section of his essay is worth quoting in length: 
Since the modern concept of corruption does not function as an explicitly normative 
construct but rather as an articulation of categories of bourgeois political ontology, 
it has the effect of constituting and reaffirming the dominant public/private split 
through its application and subsequent categorization of phenomena as corrupt or 
uncorrupt, as pathological or normal. In so doing, the normative dimension of the 
modern concept of corruption becomes manifest precisely because of its way of 
categorizing social phenomena. By establishing the division between the normal and 
pathological in the public/private split, the modern understanding of political 
corruption is at once making a statement of fact and presenting us with the political 
goal of fully realizing the normal. […] In this way, the modern concept of corruption 
repeats the normative-political emphasis of the traditional understanding of political 
corruption but does so in an essentialist and apolitical manner. (ibid.) 
This deconstruction of political science approaches to corruption presents a radical 
departure from the approaches discussed in part one of this chapter, and lands us at 
the heart of what this study is about: not observing and analysing corruption itself, 
but observing and analysing those who observe and analyse corruption, and who in 
doing so produce and reproduce certain understandings of what corruption is and is 
not, and who do these for underlying reasons that need to be observed and analysed.  
If Bratsis helps us deconstruct ideas of corruption, how can we reconstruct them, and 
make sense of them with an eye on the processes of social and political construction 
that underlie them? Two studies in particular are helpful for this purpose: Chibnall 
and Saunders’ 1977 study Worlds Apart: Notes on the Social Reality of Corruption 
applies Berger and Luckmann’s 1967 [1966] work on The Social Construction of 
Reality to lay important theoretical foundations for what a constructionist approach 
to corruption could look like. Secondly, Mark Granovetter’s aptly named 2004 paper 
The Social Construction of Corruption attempts an overview of different areas of 
research that this approach could cover.  
38 
 
Chibnall and Saunders’ essay discussed some of the details of a 1972 corruption case 
at Leeds Crown Court, in which the architect John Poulson and senior civil servant 
George Pottinger were tried and found guilty for engaging in corrupt practice. What 
interested the researchers in particular was the disagreement between the law’s 
definition of corruption and the interpretation of those who had violated the law. 
This was a case of what Berger and Luckmann (1967) had described as ‘sub-universes 
of meaning’ that conflicted with the ‘core universe’ inscribed and codified in law 
(Chibnall/Saunders 1977: 138f.). In their own interpretation, the accused had been 
the benefactors of the construction industry and the local economy more generally. 
Poulson lamented that he was going to be “the first man to be jailed for generosity” 
(ibid.: 149), and Pottinger complained: 
The British have this hypocritical idea about things. It's wrong, it's illegal, but who 
cares?-that's what they're saying. And I've been a pawn in the works-a victim of 
hypocrisy and the system. Somebody is going to have to sit down and work out just 
what is entertaining and what is corruption so that everybody will know where they 
stand (quoted in ibid.: 139) 
A sub-universe of meaning seemed to have evolved, with its own shared standards, 
interpretations and expectations that were different to the dominant ‘core universe’:  
They [the alternative classificatory procedures] reflect the values, experiences and 
practical purposes of the [sub-] collectivity, providing a framework of meaning within 
which the routine activities of members can be made sense of, and supplying 
informal rules of legitimacy for these activities. (ibid) 
Whether the presents, niceties and favours Poulsen had given to Pottinger were 
classified as corruption or not therefore depended on whose criteria were applied, 
and whose framework of meaning was used. Corruption was thus, in Chibnall and 
Saunders’ classic social constructionist definition,  
a negotiated classification of behaviour rather than […] an inherent quality of 
behaviour. […]Thus the same act may be open to a variety of interpretations 
according to which set of criteria is considered appropriate in a given situation. The 
development of alternative classificatory procedures is an integral part of the 
emergence of distinctive sub-universes of meaning, and such unexplicated 
procedures are generated as ad-hoc solutions to the problems shared by members 
of a particular collectivity. (ibid.: 139) 
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Chibnall and Saunders were interested primarily in the relationship between a 
dominant universe of meaning and one that resists this dominance. It is not difficult, 
however, to see how this connects to Bratsis’ discussion above. The ‘particular 
collectivity’ he referred to was what he summarised as the ‘bourgeoisie’. The ‘variety 
of interpretations according to which set of criteria is considered appropriate’ 
resonates with the bourgeois inappropriateness of the mixing of private and public 
interest.  
This definition then, a ‘negotiated classification of behaviour rather than an inherent 
quality of behaviour’, lands us at the subjectivist end of the spectrum of definitions. 
Rather than determining quasi-objectively what kinds of behaviours are included in 
‘corruption’, as for example Nye does in his (1967) catalogue of offences, the 
emphasis here is on corruption’s quality as a label, a characterisation, a classification. 
And this classification is ‘negotiated’, meaning it is subject to processes of social and 
political construction, not a ‘thing’ that can simply be defined by law or by a social 
scientist. 
How can this theoretical approach be applied in practical research? Mark 
Granovetter’s 2004 paper (reproduced 2007) goes into less theoretical detail 
regarding social constructionism or a sociology of knowledge perspective. Rather, he 
provides an overview of different ways in which the perspective can be applied, and 
thus explores the possibilities of how a social constructionist perspective on 
corruption can contribute to a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.  
Four themes showcase the role of ideas and meanings (i.e. social constructions in a 
more loosely defined sense): First, Granovetter looks at “aspects of corruption in 
exchange within dyads, and between individuals and organizations” (ibid.: 3ff.). This 
is similar to Chibnall and Saunders’ case study, in that the emphasis here is on how 
different social actors make specific sense of specific acts in different ways. However, 
Granovetter approaches this from an exchange theory perspective, and the central 
question of what determines the legitimacy of an exchange (Granovetter 2004: 3). 
Building on a variety of authors such as Darr (2003), Liebow (1967), Ditton (1977) and 
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Dalton (1959), he elaborates on how these ‘corrupt’ exchanges, their meaning and 
their legitimacy are the subject of social construction processes. Unlike in the Leeds 
Crown Court case, however, these examples show how different universes of 
meaning are not always clearly delineated. Particularly intriguing in this sense are 
cases in which formally existing rules were ‘typically unenforced’ or their breach even 
encouraged (such as employees helping themselves to left-over company food), but 
in certain, strategically opportune moments were enforced by management. This 
usually happened for reasons unrelated to the practice itself, and allowed managers 
to discipline their employees (Granovetter 2004: 4, building on Liebow’s 1967 and 
Ditton’s 1977 work). What can be seen here is the use of different classificatory 
schemes for strategic purposes, underlining that the construction is not just a social 
one but also political, dependent on hierarchy and power. 
Building on this, Granovetter’s second set of examples examines the role social status 
plays in how corrupt acts are played out, in particular how the acceptance or paying 
of a bribe mirrored the status of the participants. Accepting a bribe was thus “to 
acknowledge social inferiority” (2004: 5, building on the work of Lomnitz 1971 and 
1988), and the process of graft was generally subject to complex social rules and 
codes that needed to be understood.  
His third range of examples has a focus on ‘conflicts of interest and ideology’ (2004: 
8f.). As he sets out:  
Whether the activities of patrons and clients, or other sets of individuals engaged in 
exchange, come to be considered “corrupt” depends on whose interests are hurt by 
their activities, and also by the conceptual and ideological framework in which those 
interests are described. (ibid.) 
This emphasis on the political factors behind constructions of corruption forms one 
of the core tenets of the theory developed here, and indeed resonates perfectly with 
Bratsis’ deconstruction of modern concepts of corruption and their rootedness in 
what he calls the ‘bourgeois political ontology’. Granovetter illustrates this with three 
examples: First, conflicting ideas of what constitutes corruption, based on a study by 
Lomnitz (1971) in the Chilean civil service. On the one hand, the idea of meritocracy 
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here prescribed that all the dealings in the civil service had to be based on formal 
rules and impersonal relationships. On the other hand, personal relationships and 
solidarity were highly valued among the middle class Chileans in these civil service 
positions. According to Lomnitz, the rules imposed by the state were thus seen as the 
‘values of the elite’ (1971: 100) that conflicted with the middle class values of the civil 
servants.  
His second example looks at one of our earlier cases (Merton 1968 in the functionalist 
approaches), the party machines forming in US cities at the turn of the 20th century, 
referring to Hofstaedter’s famous 1955 study. While these machines provided 
patronage and clientelism to newly arrived immigrants, middle class Americans felt 
under threat and formed the ‘progressive’ movement that campaigned against the 
‘corruption’ that was helping immigrants gain status (Granovetter 2004: 9). It was 
thus status anxiety and a struggle for power between different socio-economic 
groups over who was in charge of the local branches of the political parties and local 
government. Again we can see here how the label of ‘corruption’ was employed for 
strategic reasons, to delegitimise the challenge of the rival political group. 
Granovetter’s third example for conflicts of interest and ideology is the relationship 
between centre and periphery. It is the famous ‘no taxation without representation’ 
conflict of the American War of Independence, applied here to an example from 
China, the corruption case of the Xiamen port authority. As Wank (2002) describes, 
the port in Southern China generated enormous profits, yet had to pay much of them 
to the central administration in Beijing. A complex network of local government and 
customs officials with the company director ‘Boss Lai’ at its centre devised a system 
of tax evasion that diverted revenues into the pockets of Lai’s Yuanhua Corporation. 
Granovetter concludes that the functioning of this extensive network was only made 
possible by what was perceived by Xiameners as “excessive demands on local 
revenues” by the central government (2004: 9). Moral scruples about the scheme 
were thus effectively neutralised (ibid.), and again, we can see that whether this 
scheme was seen as corrupt or not was influenced by political factors. 
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Social Constructionism thus lays the ontological foundations for a corruption 
discourse analysis. Building on Chibnall and Saunders’ definition, it shows how the 
use of the label ‘corruption’ is merely a classification of certain kinds of behaviours 
rather than it being an objectively existing reality. Granovetter demonstrates with a 
range of examples how this classification is dependent on a number of social and 
political factors. Whether a specific act is labelled ‘corrupt’ or not is the result of an 
ongoing process of social and political construction, and is subject to (on a more 
micro level) class and cultural background, and (on a more macro level) conflicts of 
interest and ideology. Bratsis deconstructs the modern notion of corruption and 
argues how it is rooted in a bourgeois ontology that has at its core the distinction of 
public and private interest, and the postulation that the two shall not be mixed. Our 
modern understanding of corruption is merely an expression of the power 
relationships that underlie the modern state. Taking a closer look at how corruption 
discourse accompanied the formation of this modern state is thus an attempt to 
further unpack the processes that have led to the emergence of both, and the ways 
in which they are intricately entwined with one another. 
 
Corruption Discourse  
It is worth noting at this point that social constructionism, for example in the way 
Berger and Luckmann devised it in their 1967 theory, was in fact an attempt to bridge 
the structure-agency divide and to take into account both subjective and objective 
realities. It is not supposed to stop, as I have done here, at the point where the 
structure, or as they called it, the institution has been constructed. Berger and 
Luckmann went to some length to show how institutions – which in this case would 
be commonly agreed and thus institutionalised ideas of what corruption is - also had 
effects on the social actors who were involved in the process or constructing and 
reconstructing the institution in the first place. Social constructionism is not just 
supposed to look at the construction as the dependent variable, but also at how it 




However, there are two reasons why I think it makes sense to depart from the 
language of social constructionism and conceptualise the following as corruption 
discourse. On the one hand, while it might not have been the intention of the 
inventors, most studies that headline themselves ‘social constructionist’, and this 
includes the ones on corruption, do indeed focus on the initial construction 
mechanisms, and how these led us to the end-product, an institutionalised idea of 
corruption. Little tends to be said on how these institutions then have effect on its 
constituters. So while theoretically, social constructionism could lead us on to the 
next step, empirically there is little social constructionist literature that could be 
enlisted to support this. Secondly, I would argue that the metaphor indeed invites 
this limitation. While the theory intends to examine both parts of what was so 
poignantly expressed by Winston Churchill - “We shape our buildings, thereafter they 
shape us” – social constructionism as a metaphor really only addresses the first part, 
the construction of the building. What happens thereafter is not construction any 
longer, it is architecture. 
At the time of writing, corruption discourse analysis is a slowly emerging but 
constantly growing field of study. Some earlier works exist, such as Akhil Gupta’s 1995 
ethnography Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, 
and the imagined state that discusses how villagers in Northern India had made 
corruption talk part of everyday conversation. Hans Krause Hansen’s 1998 study 
Governmental Mismanagement and Symbolic Violence: Discourses on Corruption in 
the Yucatan of the 1990s finds that “discourses about corruption help people to 
construct the state symbolically and to define themselves as citizens” (ibid.: 369). The 
key theoretical contributions to corruption discourse, however, can be found in more 
recent publications. The following will look in turn at Eric Breit’s work on Norway in 
the 2000s, Blendi Kajsiu’s analysis of Albania in the 1990s and early 2000s, and Marija 
Zurnić study of Serbia 2000 to 2012. To round off these theoretical deliberations, 
some speculation as to how they might play out practically in modern state formation 




Breit’s (2010, 2011a, 2011b) empirical focus is on a range of high-profile corruption 
cases that took place in Norway in the years 2003 to 2008, and he analyses the 
newspaper texts of some of the leading publications. In his definition, corruption 
discourse is a “form of social practice that allows people to make sense of activities 
throughout the scandal” (2010: 619f.). This definition – rather different to the one I 
suggest at the end of this chapter – corresponds with the aim of the study to 
“illuminate important discursive processes and dynamics of corruption at the very 
micro level in texts” (2011a: 4, cf. also 2010: 620). His 2011a doctoral thesis thus 
focuses on four key questions: 
 What are the specific discourses and discursive strategies mobilised in media 
discussions of alleged corruption? What kinds of struggles are taking place in debates 
around its perceived legitimacy or illegitimacy? What are the implications of these 
struggles for representations of corruption or ‘non-corruption’ in the media, as well 
as for the power positions of the participants involved? And what kinds of discursive 
dynamics are involved in the emergence and evolution of mediatized corruption 
scandals?” (2011: 3) 
While Breit’s work focuses on the micro-level of individual sense-making and my own 
on the macro-level of state institutions, these questions demonstrate a compelling 
overlap of research themes: An emphasis on questions of legitimacy, a consideration 
of underlying struggles, and attention to the power positions of the participants 
involved. Breit goes on to conceptualise corruption discourse as “socially constituted 
as well as constituting” (2010: 621), further resonating with the theoretical 
deliberations of this chapter. As the discussion of social constructionist approaches 
has shown, ideas of corruption are constituted by social and political construction 
processes, and as this section on discourse demonstrates, they also have effects and 
constitute their contextual social and political institutions. 
Breit with his clear-cut definitions and focussed research aims is in my view an 
excellent entry point to corruption discourse conceptualisations. Kajsiu and Zurnić on 
the other hand contribute further theoretical backbone to the debate. And while 
Kajsiu’s work is particularly strong when looking at the first part of the equation – 
discourse as socially and politically constituted – Zurnić provides a solid theoretical 
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framework when it comes to the second part – discourse as constituting. The 
following therefore looks at the two with this emphasis in mind. 
Kajsiu’s discourse analysis (2013, 2015) builds on the poststructuralist foundations of 
a number of French theorists. Following Laclau and Mouffe (1990: 100) he sees 
discourse as “not just a linguistic formation but a meaningful totality” (Kajsiu 2015: 
32) that encompasses all and any objects that contribute to the discourse. Building 
on Foucault (1972: 49), he sees the object of discourse as constituted by discourse, 
rather than existing independent of it. Corruption in this sense is similar to mental 
health, or specifically the way Foucault (1972: 32) thought of mental health as 
“constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, 
described it, explained it, traced its developments […]” (ibid., quoted in Kajsiu 2015: 
32). Without their discourse, neither corruption nor mental health would thus exist. 
This is a rather different theoretical tradition to the social constructionist ideas this 
study builds on, the conclusions, however, are very similar:  
The task of discourse analysis is therefore to examine the historical construction and 
functioning of a given discourse (Howarth, 2000, p.5). In the case of corruption this 
means that instead of looking at corruption as a given object of analysis I will focus 
more on its process of objectification (ibid.) 
 
One of the key elements in Kajsiu’s analysis is Saussure’s distinction between signifier 
and signified (Kajsiu 2015: 37ff.). That which is signified are in this case the different 
kinds of behaviours – following the modern concept of corruption these include 
bribery, extortion, and generally the abuse of public office for private interest. The 
signifier is ‘corruption’, or more precisely, as Kajsiu explains in detail, the sound image 
/kəˈrʌpʃn/ (ibid.: 37). This distinction of signifier and signified thus allows a specific 
focus for the analysis: 
 
By looking at corruption as a signifier I can avoid the illusion that corruption sustains 
a given essence that can be traced across time and space, as would be the case if I 
approached corruption as a concept. Instead, I can focus on the different ‘signifieds’ 
(i.e. meanings, contents, concepts) that the signifier corruption has stood for in 




‘Corruption’ thus becomes a ‘floating signifier’ that attaches itself to different 
signifieds. Indeed, it becomes a subject of political struggle, in which rivalling groups 
will try to attach certain meanings to certain signifiers, such as ‘corruption’, 
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ etc (ibid.: 38). Again, while building on different theoretical 
foundations, the research aims of this approach are rather similar to the social 
constructionist efforts discussed above. Bratsis’ deconstruction of traditional and 
modern concepts is essentially, in the language of French poststructuralism, an 
analysis of how the signifier ‘corruption’ attached itself to a different signified with 
the emergence of modernity and the bourgeois ontology.  
 
This points to another of Kajsiu’s core theoretical tenets, the role that power plays in 
the constitution of knowledge, and vice versa. Building on Foucault’s (1977, 1984) 
discussion of the intricate connections between power and knowledge and the ways 
they constitute each other (Kajsiu 2015: 39f.), he goes on to look at the different ways 
in which corruption discourse was used in Albania by different political actors for 
their respective political goals. His analysis thus focuses “on the way in which a given 
articulation of corruption serves to legitimize, institute, or expand certain power 
relations” (ibid.: 46). The empirical analysis of corruption discourses in Albania is thus 
particularly designed… 
 
…to trace the ruptures rather than continuities in the concept of corruption. I identify 
how the articulation of corruption in Albania changed from the local discourses of 
the early ’90s […] to the international discourse of the late ’90s […] and finally to the 
local political discourse after 1998 until 2005 […]. The focus of my exploration is to 
show how underneath its apparent continuity the concept of corruption concealed 
a number of transformations that enabled it to function differently in different 
contexts.(ibid.) 
 
Corruption discourse thus is constituted by power and also constitutes power. This is 
similar to Breit’s ‘socially constituted as well as constituting’, but with a more explicit 
emphasis that this ‘social’ includes power and hierarchy. For my own analysis, I refer 
to ‘socially and politically constructed’ discourses, so as to reflect the theoretical 
roots of social constructionism as well as the political nature of its construction. 
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How do corruption discourses then go on to shape the institutions – social, political, 
legal - in which they are embedded, and by which they are shaped in the first place? 
Zurnić’s study of Serbia from 2000 to 2012 (2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2017) introduces the 
ideas of discursive institutionalism (DI) to corruption discourse. This term was first 
coined by Campbell and Pederson (2001)13 and has since been theoretically 
elaborated and methodologically applied by a number of authors, most notably 
Vivien Schmidt (Schmidt/Radaelli 2004, Schmidt 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b,). 
It seeks to address what Schmidt identifies as the big weakness of other 
institutionalisms, their ability, or lack thereof, to explain change: 
The  three  traditionally  recognized  ‘new  institutionalisms’  of  political  science  
rational choice institutionalism (RI), historical institutionalism (HI), and sociological 
institutionalism (SI) – have one thing in common: they have been much better at 
explaining continuity than change. In all three frameworks for analysis, institutions 
serve primarily as constraints. (2010: 1f.) 
According to Schmidt, these institutionalisms tended to conceptualise change as 
exogenous, coming through outside shocks, rather than as endogenous, from within 
the institutions. It was only by turning to the role of ideas – the core of discursive 
institutionalism – that change could be effectively conceptualised (ibid.: 2). While this 
is a matter of a larger debate on the different kinds of institutionalisms that I am not 
able to engage with here, the distinction between exogenous and endogenous 
change is an important one, which indeed keeps surfacing in my own analysis of the 
case studies of this thesis. 
While sociological institutionalism shares with DI an emphasis on ideas, values and 
norms, discourse takes a look at how ideas develop, values shift and norms change 
over time, and how they do so in a dynamic process:  
[…] DI  scholars […]  have  gone  farther  to  formalize  the  interactive  processes  of 
ideas  generation,  deliberation,  and  legitimization. […] The term itself, however, 
used generically to describe not only what is said, or the ideas that are the 
substantive content of discourse, but also who said what to whom where and why, 
                                                          
13 This point needs emphasis as Schmidt seems to imply that she coined the term herself (e.g. 
Schmidt 2008: 304, similar in 2010: 2). 
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as the interactive processes of discourse […] is of great help  in  explaining  the  
dynamic processes of institutional change. (2010: 15, see also Schmidt 2008) 
In the case of Serbia post-2000, Zurnić observes a parallel development of both anti-
corruption discourse and anti-corruption institutions:  
The nature of the discussions, involving intensive media reporting, public 
accusations, demonstrations and so forth, were a new way of discussing corruption. 
At the same time, the number of anti-corruption institutions suddenly increased, 
which cannot be explained as a result of the historical legacy or the rational decisions 
of political actors (Zurnić 2013b: 70) 
The question thus became whether these institutional changes could be explained by 
the transformative power of discourse. There was correlation, but was there also 
causation? At least in this case, Zurnić finds this not to be the case (ibid.: 250ff.), and 
that changes were mostly caused by exogenous factors, in particular policy transfer 
from the European Union and compliance with anti-corruption conventions from the 
United Nations and the Council of Europe. 
In some ways, my own study can be seen as an example of Discursive Institutionalism, 
albeit in a loosely defined way. It, too, has an important emphasis on the dynamic 
interaction processes between discourses and political institutions. It looks at how 
institutions – social, legal, political – shape corruption discourse, and how in turn 
corruption discourse shapes them. However, there are two differences to the DI 
approaches discussed here: In comparison to Zurnić’s work, my own institutional 
focus is broader. While she looks very specifically at anti-corruption institutions, my 
interest lies in the grander institutional framework of the political system more 
generally, such as the electoral system in 1832 Britain, the authoritarian governance 
of 1896 Germany and the legal institutions that framed corruption cases in the 
different historical contexts. Secondly, my approach does not share the theoretical 
assumptions of Schmidt’s DI. Institutions here are seen very much in the manner of 
Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) social constructionism. While they might appear as an 
‘objective reality’ to social actors, they are still subject to the same constant 
processes of social and political construction, reconstruction and deconstruction, and 
discourses are part of this process. In other words, while Schmidt suggest that 
49 
 
institutions somehow exist outside of discourse, my own view is that they themselves 
are constituted by discourse. And while I do make the same distinction between the 
two, I see it merely as a distinction between different levels to which the two have 
been institutionalised in a social constructionist sense.  
How does this look in practice? How do institutions shape discourse and discourse 
shape institutions? While these questions will be addressed in detail in the case 
studies of this thesis, some recent historical literature on corruption debates under 
the conditions of modernising states is worth a look. This, too, is an emerging and at 
the time of writing constantly growing body of literature, spearheaded by a handful 
of German historians, and mostly yet to be translated into English. Some of the 
protagonists here are Jens Ivo Engels (2006, 2008, 2011, 2014) and Frank Bösch 
(2005, 2008, 2009a, 2009b 2011), and among the focal points are a special edition of 
Historische Zeitschrift in 2009, edited by Engels, Fahrmeir and Nützenadel, and a 
reader on historical approaches to corruption edited by Grüne and Slanicka (2010).  
These writings do not use the concept of discourse or of social constructionism. 
However, they do look at ‘scandals’, at ‘debate’ and more generally at corruption 
‘communication’. Some of the leading approaches contextualise these themes within 
the evolving institutions of the emerging modern states of Europe in the 19th century. 
Engels summarises this programme in his aptly named 2010 chapter Political 
Corruption and Modernisation Processes. Theses on the Significance of Corruption 
Communication in Western Modernity (my translation, as are the following quotes). 
He argues that corruption debates not only reflected processes of modernisation but 
in fact that studying them offered ”privileged access to certain modernisation 
phenomena” (ibid.: 36, my emphasis). Corruption communication was thus “a mirror 
as well as an agent of modernisation processes” (ibid.). Engel’s main interest here is 
in how the changing meaning of corruption reflected as well as helped drive some of 
the most fundamental modernisation processes, such as increased societal 
differentiation, the pursuit of ordering the world in clearly defined categories, the 
developing of a consciousness of a ‘public’ driven by the growing role of the media, 
and increasing demands for political participation among others (ibid.: 35f.). It is clear 
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to see here how an understanding of ‘corruption’ in Engels’ reading is located right 
at the heart of modernisation processes. 
Other authors such as Bösch (2009a) focus on the role of political scandal. In his view, 
a historical analysis of corruption scandals and the debates surrounding these 
scandals  illuminates the change of public norms and the patterns of interpretation 
that keep shifting and changing over time (ibid.: 5). Building on Foucault, he argues 
that corruption scandals served as places of confrontation in which underlying 
conflicts could be expressed (ibid.: 13).  
A glimpse at this historical literature gives us a first indication of how corruption 
discourses might have played out in the developments of the modern states in Britain 
and Germany, to be examined in the coming chapters. Engel’s work suggests that 
indeed discourses were shaped by as well as shaped the institutions in which they 
were embedded. And Bösch emphasises the role of corruption scandals as places of 
confrontation. This resonates with the notion that interests and ideological conflicts 
underlie corruption construction processes. But it also points to the potential that 
allegations of corruption have for creating scandal, for mobilising emotion, and thus 
destabilising the legitimacy of political personnel or institutions (see also Williams 
2000a who discusses the potency of corruption discourse in political conflict).  
How, then, can this be conceptualised within a grander theory of society? History 
provides us with practical illustration, but what are the more general forces at work? 
What role does corruption discourse play in the bigger picture of societal stability, 
the social order and social change? Above, I made a distinction between corruption-
related values on the one hand, and corruption discourse on the other. While the 
former is a more static concept concerned with shared understandings and ideas, the 
latter describes a process in motion, a dynamic of action, reaction and interaction. 
This differentiation is mirrored when comparing the work of Talcott Parsons and 
Jürgen Habermas. Addressing the Hobbesian problem of social order, of what 
essentially held society together and made it orderly and predictable, Parsons (1951, 
1970) famously emphasised the role of culture for ‘pattern maintenance’ as well as 
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‘pattern change’. In this reading, the social system (of which the political system was 
part) could only be fully functional if it was supported by the norms and values of the 
cultural system that gave it legitimacy. Habermas (1981) takes a similar view, but is 
indeed – and this makes his work particularly relevant for this thesis - more interested 
in the communicative processes through which these understandings, ideas and 
values are shared, in discourse14. It is thus through what he calls communicative 
action that the legitimacy of social institutions and arrangements is constructed in 
the first place, and with it the very stability or instability of the social and political 
order. Within this meta-theoretical context, Habermas specifically addresses 
questions of legitimacy. As he defines it: 
Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order’s claim to be 
recognised as right and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy 
means a political order’s worthiness to be recognised. This definition highlights the 
fact that legitimacy is a contestable validity claim; the stability of the order of 
domination (also) depends on its (at least) de facto recognition. Thus, historically as 
well as analytically, the concept is used above all in situations in which the legitimacy 
of an order is disputed, in which, as we say, legitimation problems arise. (1979: 178f., 
emphasis in original) 
As the case studies in the following chapters show, corruption discourse does this 
particularly well. In both Britain and Germany, it was used to challenge, undermine 
and delegitimise existing political arrangements. Using the framework of Habermas’ 
theory, the centrality of corruption discourse for the very order, and orderliness, of 
society, becomes particularly evident: As an organiser of legitimacy it is at the heart 
of social order itself, and by challenging existing institutions it can be central to what 
Habermas has called a legitimation crisis (1975), leading to shifting perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the existing order and ultimately its transformation. 
Building on the ontological foundations of social constructionism, a discussion of the 
existing work on corruption discourse thus further lays the theoretical foundations 
for the study. Breit offers an initial definition of corruption discourse and sets out 
some clearly defined research goals that illustrate the kinds of questions an analysis 
                                                          
14 A useful discussion of how Parsons and Habermas address the problem of social order – in German 
- can be found in König 2012, 6ff. 
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can apply. Kajsiu’s poststructuralist version adds theoretical thickness to the debate 
and discusses the ways in which corruption discourse is politically constituted as well 
as constituting. Zurnić contemplates ways in which discourse interacts with 
institutions, and how change in the institutional framework might be related to the 
transformative powers of discourse. Recent historical literature adds illustration to 
these theoretical deliberations, and hypothesises about how corruption 
communication has been intrinsically connected with modernisation processes in 
19th century Europe. Habermas’ theory of communicative action finally provides 
some meta-theoretical deliberations that can help integrate the topic in a more 
general theory of societal stability and change. Writing in 2016, I thus have the great 
privilege to be in the first generation of corruption discourse students that can build 
on this growing and expanding body of research. 
  
Conclusion 
The conventional definitions of corruption, expressed through Heidenheimer’s three-
way distinction, do the jobs they have been assigned to do. Public office and market-
centred definitions build on essentialist definitions of corruption and seek out those 
acts and behaviours that fall within the parameters of the category. Public good-
centred definitions are more interested in the underlying ideals of the democratic 
state and the common good that said state is supposed to promote. Corruption is 
then seen as a violation of these principles of the state, not just an isolated act that 
happens to break the law. To illustrate how my own research relates to these 
conventional approaches, I have suggested to re-organise them along a spectrum 
that runs from objectivist approaches to subjectivism. This rearrangement shows a 
certain short-sightedness that was built into Heidenheimer’s typology, and 
importantly makes space for more subjectivist approaches such as the social 
constructionist one followed here.  
More recent corruption research has turned to the context in which corruption is 
embedded, and connects its negative with the positive of anti-corruption, expressed 
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in such concepts as integrity, quality of governance, ethical universalism and deep 
democratisation. While these constitute a ‘turn to context’ in the sense of broadening 
our understanding of corruption and placing it in the wider context of governance, I 
have argued that social constructionist approaches themselves provide a turn to 
context, but in the sense of deepening our understanding of what corruption is and 
why it is what it is. 
The theory of corruption discourse as advanced in this study starts with the 
acknowledgment that corruption is a socially constructed concept, a classification of 
behaviours rather than a specific behaviour itself. What counts as corruption and 
what does not depends on a shared understanding of it, and my interest here is to 
look at the factors behind this shared understanding, the different interests and ideas 
that underlie it, and in particular the struggle over legitimacy that lies at its heart. 
This social constructionist approach is the foundation on which corruption discourse 
can then be conceptualised. 
Building on this foundation, the concept of corruption discourse itself, in the way I 
understand it, is more focussed on the dynamics that these construction processes 
take. ‘Corruption’ is subject to social and political construction processes, a 
dependent variable if one likes, but it then also becomes an independent variable, 
and as a discourse can have an influence on institutions – social, political, legal – and 
contribute to change. As the following chapters will show, these dynamics become 
particularly evident when taking a longer-term view and applying an historical and 
comparative perspective.  
Building on the theoretical considerations of this chapter, the following definition can 
be advanced for the purposes of this study: Corruption discourse is a form of social 
practice in which political actors use the signifier of ‘corruption’ to signify the  
illegitimacy of either (a) types of behaviour, (b) political personnel and/or (c) political 
institutions. Corruption discourse is made up of the total of what is written and said 
on corruption within the public sphere it takes place in. It is socially and politically 
constructed through the interactive communication of whoever takes part in the 
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discourse. It moves beyond a mere socially constructed social phenomenon and 
becomes a discourse by developing its own communicative dynamic in which political 
actors react to one another’s use of the signifier corruption. This dynamic can trigger 
shifts in perceptions of legitimacy, which can lead to calls for change, which can then 
lead to actual social and political change. Within corruption discourse, corruption 
allegations can be used strategically to undermine the perceived legitimacy of 
political opponents or political systems or institutions one opposes. Corruption 




















Chapter Three: Research Design and Methodology 
This chapter deals with the research and methodology decisions taken in the 
planning, designing and carrying out of this study. It proceeds from the more general 
to the more specific, from the comparative framework to the case selection within 
the framework to the data collection and analysis within the case studies. The first 
section thus discusses the choice of the two countries and the reasons for a focus on 
Britain and Germany. In what ways can this particular comparison add insight to the 
debate? Part two then goes into more detail on the three case studies that were 
selected for each country. What is their function for the overall investigation and how 
do they fit into the bigger picture of the paired comparison? The third part goes into 
the details of data collection, the archives used and the data selected from the vast 
material available. Finally, in a fourth part, this chapter is rounded off with a 
discussion of how the data was analysed in line with the theoretical approaches 
illuminated in the previous chapter. 
 
Why Britain and Germany? 
In her 2014 Falling Walls speech to an audience of researchers, politicians and civil 
society activists15, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi argued that there were essentially two ways 
in which corruption control could be achieved, and particularism be transformed into 
ethical universalism: On the one hand, an enlightened authoritarian leader could take 
the initiative and implement top-down reforms of the state’s bureaucratic apparatus, 
in what she called an authoritarian/traditional path. Denmark in the 18th century 
provided the blueprint for this (expanded in Mungiu-Pippidi 2013b and 2015: 57-82).  
Botswana, Bhutan, Qatar and Rwanda served as contemporary examples of this path. 
On the other hand, anti-corruption reforms could be implemented through a 
democratic path, in which some level of democratic representation and pluralism 
existed, and increased corruption control was the result of a shift from particularist 
                                                          
15 Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3EMHk7EBqDQ (last viewed 06/06/2016) 
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pluralism to universalist pluralism. Some contemporary examples of this were 
Uruguay, Estonia and Taiwan.16  
Britain and Germany indeed represent examples of these two poles. The various 
states that pre-dated Germany, in particular Prussia and Bavaria, as well as Austria, 
were among the early adopters of a centralised and well-drilled bureaucracy that 
served the purposes of the monarchy. Prussia’s development in particular shows 
strong parallels to Denmark’s: In both cases, by the time they introduced first 
elements of democratic representation in the second half of the 19th century, as 
Mungiu-Pippidi states for the Danish case, “the fundamental elements of control of 
corruption were already in place by the absolute monarch” (2013b: 1273, drawing on 
Frisk Jensen 2008). As early as the end of the 18th century, Prussia had established 
an elaborate, hierarchically ordered civil service, with the king seen as the “first 
among a vast number of officials” (Poggi 1978: 76, for a general overview see ibid.: 
74ff.). Indeed, the Germanies and Austria can be seen as “leading examples” of early 
bureaucratisation (Anderson/ Anderson 1978: 92). And as in the Danish case, this 
“was done in a top-down manner in an effort to strengthen the state” (Mungiu-
Pippidi 2013b: 1273). 
Britain on the other hand is an example of a democratic path towards corruption 
control. Indeed, some of the anti-corruption measures taken here were directly tied 
in with democratisation processes, such as the 1832 Electoral Reform Act that forms 
one of the case studies discussed in this thesis. As Mungiu-Pippidi puts it, “Under […] 
representative democracy, where the size of both government and the citizenry 
increases exponentially, the solution chosen is the modern state […]” (2013: 1280). 
In Britain, this was achieved through a succession of reforms, of the electoral system 
on the one hand, to control what was perceived as electoral corruption, and to the 
                                                          
16 While this speech was delivered to a (partly) lay audience, in her academic publications Mungiu-
Pippidi adds a third type, republicanism (2013: 1278ff. and 2015: 80ff.), which to an extent is situated 
between the poles of absolute monarchy and representative democracy, with some specified 
additions. Examples of this third type are the city states of Italy and the Netherlands in the 16th to 19th 
centuries (ibid.). I decided to follow the two-way distinction laid out in this speech, however, as it 
nicely contrasts the different paths that Germany and Britain did indeed take. 
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administration on the other hand, with reforms to the Civil Service from the 1780s 
onwards (cf. ibid.: 1274, Cohen 1965 for a comprehensive overview). The 1889 
Corrupt Practices Act, also one of the case studies in the succeeding chapters, forms 
the end point of this development.  
Thus, while the administrative reforms implemented in the 18th century Germanies 
served to strengthen and enforce state power against the population, in Britain they 
were driven by a movement for democracy, and the desire for a fairer administration. 
In this contest it is interesting to note the symbolism of the fact that the German 
equivalent of ‘Civil Service’ is ‘Staatsdienst’ – ‘State Service’, a telling linguistic 
reflection of how the administrative apparatus of the state was historically 
implemented in the two countries, and whose interests it primarily served.    
More than just being a top-down versus a bottom-up implementation, the two state 
developments differ in another important aspect: While Britain evolved in a more or 
less linear way from constitutional monarchy to democracy – albeit the intricacies of 
the ‘more or less’ are subject to intense historical debate – Germany presents one of 
the least linear and most ruptured developmental paths of any modern state in 
Western Europe. And indeed, the three case studies chosen for Germany are situated 
in three very different state systems, from the pre-World War One Kaiserreich to the 
failed democratic attempt of the Weimar Republic to the successful democracy of the 
Federal Republic after World War Two. The British cases in contrast are part of an 
evolving sequence of corruption discourses that unfold over time, and take place 
within the same, although equally evolving institutional framework.  
The choice to focus on the role of corruption discourse adds another layer of 
difference to the comparison. As the analysis will show, corruption discourse in 
Britain went hand in hand with, and became one of the driving forces of the 
implementation of measures against corruption. In Germany on the other hand, the 
relevant legislation was already in place when press freedom was implemented in the 
1870s, and thus corruption discourse could take off. The comparison is thus between 
corruption discourse under the conditions of an initial lack of existing legal framework 
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and a subsequent development of anti-corruption laws alongside discourse on the 
one hand, and a pre-existing comprehensive legal framework on the other.  
Britain and Germany are interesting case studies in their own right. But it is their 
historical comparison, their juxtaposition, their contrasting and measuring up against 
one another that opens new lines of inquiry: Did for example the different legal 
frameworks make a difference in how corruption claims were typically presented and 
framed in public discussions? Did this in turn change the ways in which these debates 
were able or not to shape subsequent political processes? Did the top-town and 
bottom-up histories of state institutionalisations have an impact on the relationship 
of state officials and the nominally free press? These are just a few questions that 
arise from the comparison, but that would not necessarily arise from looking at just 
one of the countries on its own. 
There are two ways in which the comparison can thus be made fruitful. One lies in 
what Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers (1980: 178ff.) call a contrast of contexts. 
The aim here is to find cases that are maximally different but which have one factor 
in common. The purpose then is to “bring out the unique features of each particular 
case included in their discussions, and to show how these unique features affect the 
working-out of putatively general social processes” (Skocpol/Somers 1980: 178). 
Examples for this are Clifford Geertz’s Islam Observed (1971) which looked at how 
the same religion, Islam, manifested itself in the most different contexts of Morocco 
and Indonesia, or Reinhard Bendix’ Kings or People (1980) which examined the 
common theme ‘power and the mandate to rule’ across the very different cases of 
Germany, Russia, Japan and Britain (see Skocpol/Somers 1980: 178ff.). In my own 
study, Germany and Britain have in common, first, that they produced at some point 
in their history corruption discourse, and second, that they both historically achieved 
a relatively strong control of corruption. They did this, however, in very different 
contexts. The point of the comparison as contrast of contexts is thus to observe how 
these common themes interacted with and developed alongside these very different 
institutional contexts, how they were shaped by them and in turn shaped them. 
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However, the comparison also has elements of Skocpol and Somers’ parallel 
demonstration of theory. With this strategy, ”the reason for juxtaposing case histories 
is to persuade the reader that a given, explicitly delineated hypothesis or theory can 
repeatedly demonstrate its fruitfulness” (1980: 176). Indeed, as they continue, these 
studies “intend above all to convince their readers of the validity of certain 
theoretical arguments” (ibid.). Examples of this are S.N. Eisenstadt’s Political Systems 
of Empires (1969) which argues that ‘The Rise and Fall of Historical Bureaucratic 
Societies’ can best be explained with a structural functionalist theory, or Jeffery M. 
Paige’s Agrarian Revolutions (1975) which develops theoretically a typology of four 
kinds of rural class conflict and then uses a large-N comparison to demonstrate that 
this model applies universally. The theoretical claims put forward in my own thesis -  
as elaborated in the preceding chapter - are that corruption discourse is socially and 
politically constructed and can be used for strategic purposes to undermine the 
legitimacy either of political personnel or institutions, and that corruption discourse 
thus can have an effect on the development of institutions and lead to change. 
Implied in the choice of a longue durée historical comparison is also the hypothesis 
that looking at the longer term historical developments of social and political 
phenomena adds new insights to the debate. These are general theoretical 
statements, and the point of the comparison as parallel demonstration of theory is to 
show that they hold true across the cases chosen. The comparison chapter of this 
thesis will revisit these two strategies, and look at their achievements within the 
comparative research design of the cases. 
On a final note, this section would not be complete without an autobiographical 
statement. The author of this study is indeed culturally rooted in the two countries 
he is examining, and has a long-standing special interest in understanding and 
explaining these particular two countries and their institutional set-ups. I hope, 
however, to have argued the merit that lies in comparing the two states and their 




Case Study Selection 
This section looks at the three different case studies that were selected for each of 
Germany and Britain, and the rationale that lies behind the choice of each. Due to 
the different structure and availability of data for the two countries, the selection of 
case studies proceeded in quite different ways. In Britain, any 19th century newspaper 
that might be relevant for the investigation has been made available in fully digitised 
online archives. Significantly, these allow for word searches, produce numbers, and 
consequently even permit a quantitative analysis of corruption discourses. The 
German data on the other hand, is much thinner. Although there have been 
digitisation projects in a number of archives in recent years, these have been selective 
both in the publications as well as the time frames chosen. And while this still allows 
for in-depth studies of the different cases themselves, it makes it significantly more 
difficult to arrive at a global and comprehensive overview as compared to the British 
data. As a result, UK case selection has been mostly data-driven and German case 
selection has been mostly literature-driven. The following looks at them in turn.  
 
Britain 
The case selection for Britain starts with an explorative quantitative analysis of the 
frequency of keywords. Figure 2 shows the frequency of the expressions ‘corruption’, 
‘public interest’, ‘public office’ and ‘public good’. This word selection is based on the 
typical definitions given to corruption in the literature, as an abuse of either public 
office or the public interest, and I have added ‘public good’ as a commonly used 
related term. The archive used here is the British Library’s online Newspaper 
Database which includes 48 publications selected for their representativeness, 
political and regional, of newspapers in 19th century Britain more generally.17 I have 
chosen to use absolute numbers in this graph and throughout the thesis whenever 
the help of quantitative data was enlisted. This has the advantage of representing the 
growth of public discourse more generally. It shows that for example the signifier 
                                                          
17I go into more detail on this below, in the discussion of the different archives used. 
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‘corruption’ indeed started floating around the public sphere in increasing frequency 
from around 1830, and with slowly declining frequency from its peaks in the 1850s 
and 60s. The alternative would have been to work with weighted data that takes into 
account what percentage of documents contain the search words rather than taking 
the absolute numbers at face value. This would have been better if the aim was to 
represent how much relative attention was paid to issues such as the Duke of York 
affair in 1809, relative to other issues at the same time. My focus, however, is the 
absolute attention paid to corruption, and therefore absolute numbers make sense. 
  
 
Figure 2. Corruption, Public Interest, Public Office, Public Good, 1800 to 1900 
Before going into detail on how this quantitative exploration aided my case study 
selection, a quick look at some correlations is instructive. Over the century as a whole 
and on a year-by-year basis, corruption correlated with public interest at 0.64, with 
public office at 0.79, and with public good at 0.7318. This means that in years in which 
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corruption featured prominently in newspapers, there was also a prominent 
discussion of matters of the public good, interest, office, and vice versa. And while 
these high correlation values are to some extent due to the general intensification of 
discourse over the 19th century – all the terms were mentioned more frequently in 
absolute terms as the circulation of newspapers increased – these high scores should 
not be dismissed easily. A look at the graph more locally, at the up and down 
movements within shorter time periods, does show that the trajectories mirror each 
other significantly, at least in some sections of the graph. This therefore adds 
empirical substance to the theoretical idea that corruption is generally understood 
as the abuse of public office at the expense of the public interest. 
For the case study selection, however, the shape of the ‘corruption’ variable is of 
particular interest. Clearly visible here is a change around 1830, which saw an 
explosion of corruption debate, with little abating in the following years. This seems 
like the manifestation of what some historical institutionalists, building on Max 
Weber, refer to as a ’critical juncture’ (Lipset/Rokkan 1967) – a watershed moment 
that sets the direction for a number of years of what is to come, and forecloses other 
avenues of development, leading to an effect that is often labelled ‘path dependence’ 
(David 1985). Closer qualitative inspection of some of the newspapers of this time 
reveals the reason for the explosion – 1830 is when a big debate takes off over the 
electoral system of the House of Commons, leading to the 1832 Electoral Reform Act. 
This is then our first case study, and at this point it is interesting to note that the 
critical juncture in discourse preceded the critical juncture in institutional 
development. A first, superficial look at the numbers thus gives us a first indication 
of how at least this particular discourse seems to have had an effect on this specific 
institutional development towards a modern democratic state. The qualitative 
analysis in the following chapter will go into more detail as to if and how exactly this 
was the case. 




Looking at 1830 to 1832 as a critical juncture in corruption discourse, however, begs 
the question of what was before. Discourses of corruption did not suddenly emerge 
out of nowhere, and to understand where 1830 came from, what ideas it was building 
on and how it compared to preceding discourses, an earlier case study is needed. The 
period from 1800 to 1830 offers few, and comparatively low peaks in Figure 2. One 
spike can be seen in 1809, however, and a closer study of some newspaper articles in 
this year offers a glimpse of what in my view is a particularly intriguing case, the Duke 
of York scandal. The then commander-in-chief of the armed forces – this was during 
the Napoleonic wars – had been caught selling officer patents through his mistress, 
Mary Clarke. The historian Phillip Harling discusses this case at some length (1996a), 
but concludes that it is not of particular historical importance but for one aspect: It 
illustrates the role of patriotism in times of war and the regime-stabilising effect it 
has (1996a: 984). However, re-examining the case as an example of corruption 
discourse unearths some fascinating aspects previously neglected: It serves as an 
excellent snapshot of the growing cleavage between  the emerging middle and 
working classes with their reformist and radical movement on the one hand, and the 
‘old elites’ and what was then called ‘old corruption’ (Harling 1995, 1996b) on the 
other. Corruption discourse was indeed the arena in which this conflict was played 
out. As the qualitative analysis of this case in the next chapter shows, whether the 
Duke was seen as unforgivably corrupt or had simply committed a forgivable act of 
folly depended to a great extent on what side of this cleavage one was on. The House 
of Commons voted decisively against disposing of the commander-in-chief, but 
significantly the vast majority of newspapers wanted to see him sacked. The Duke of 
York case thus illustrates how the institutions of the state were still firmly in the hands 
of the aristocracy and their patrimonialism, while outside parliament, the 
newspapers were rattling at the gates. 
The year 1809 thus sees an early example of how corruption discourse became a 
battleground for the implementation of what Bratsis (2003) called a bourgeois 
ontology, based on the distinction between private and public and the assertion that 
the two shall not be mixed. 1830 to 1832 then brought reforms to the electoral 
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system that allowed more people from the middle classes to cast a vote in general 
elections. Further reforms followed that made the institutions of the state more 
democratic and accountable, in an era known as the Age of Reform, lasting from ca. 
1815 to around 187019. It thus makes sense to choose a third case study that comes 
at the end of this long and drawn-out process. How did corruption discourse look 
after the fights and conflicts of the 19th century and the resulting bourgeois takeover 
of the state? 
One notable piece of legislation in the last third of the 19th century is the Public Bodies 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1889. It formed the centrepiece of anticorruption legislation 
for UK state institutions, and with its update in 1916 was valid until 2010, when 
replaced by the Bribery Act. In many ways, the Act was the endpoint of a half-century 
of anti-corruption legislation, and repealed a number of more limited corruption acts 
to unite them into one that applied to all Public Bodies. Unlike the 1809 and 1832 
cases, this was not triggered by a specific scandal but rather by a concern in 
government and Parliament about how to better regulate the Civil Service and 
prevent corruption in the different ranks of the administration. Unlike the earlier case 
studies, this piece of legislation was not subject to contest, and the Bill passed both 
Houses of Parliament with almost no opposition. And unlike those cases, the press, 
too, had little to write about the Act, and it hardly seemed to register as more than 
an everyday occurrence. It is precisely this lack of discourse that makes this case 
interesting. While in 1809 the anticorruption movement was mostly an outer-
parliamentary opposition movement, in 1832 it contested the political institutions, 
took over the House of Commons and eventually pressured the Lords into 
submission, in the later 19th century anti-corruption is uncontested. Bratsis’ 
bourgeois ontology is now well established, and Mungiu-Pippidi’s ethical 
universalism the accepted standard for governance.  
What then, is the bigger picture in this development over time? The three case 
studies show a snapshot of discourse, but as I argue in the case study discussions in 
                                                          
19 The different definitions of this Age, how long it lasted and the kinds of reforms it included are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3. 
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the following chapters, they also represent specific phases of corruption discourse: 
1800 to 1830 saw the discovery of corruption allegations as a weapon in political 
conflict. While these allegations were not used very extensively, the examples in 
which they were showed the beginnings of a weaponisation of corruption discourse, 
and an expression in them of underlying societal cleavages. This period of time can 
therefore be conceptualised as a discovery phase. It was followed by an era of intense 
political upheaval and conflict from 1830 to around 1867 (the date of the second 
Electoral Reform Act). Corruption discourse here was routinely mobilised to 
undermine the existing political institutions and call for reform. This can therefore be 
thought of as a contestation phase. With it came reform, and with reform came the 
institutionalisation and consolidation of the modern, semi-democratic state towards 
the end of the 19th century. The question of anti-corruption measures was now not 
of whether there should be any, but of how they should be implemented. This I 
suggest to call a consolidation phase. 
These three phases built onto one another. Contestation, at least in the case of 
Britain, was not possible without being first discovered, and consolidation was not 
possible without prior contestation. Corruption discourse thus came as a sequence 
of different phases that developed gradually over time. Whether or not this was or is 
also the case in other places is a matter of debate (and future research). Germany in 
particular, with its breaks and ruptures, has the potential to critically challenge this 




The structure and easy availability of digitised newspaper archives in Britain allows 
for an explorative quantitative analysis of discourse that helps identify different 
phases and highlight case study candidates. For the German cases, however, this 
archival splendour does not exist. The German case studies were hence selected on 
the basis of historical considerations, based on a review of some of the relevant 
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literature. Case study selection here follows the same line of questioning though: 
What periods of time, and what case studies within these periods of time best 
illustrate the ways in which corruption discourse was shaped by and in turn shaped 
contextual political processes? How do they connect to one another, and is there a 
sequential development similar to the one in Britain, despite the very different 
macro-historical developments?  
Identifying a starting point for German corruption discourse is relatively 
straightforward: It was only in the newly formed 1871 state of Germany that wide-
ranging press freedoms, the indispensable precondition for public corruption 
discourses, were granted by the state, regulated through the Reichspreßgesetz 
(Imperial Press Law) of 1874. If there was such a thing as a discovery phase, a critical 
juncture at which corruption discourse was first instated, the early Kaiserreich had to 
be it. Indeed, this period of time boasts a number of prominent corruption cases that 
were widely discussed in the media: In the 1870s, Bismarck’s private banker Gerson 
von Bleichroeder (who also happened to be involved in public financing – a typical 
breach of the public-private distinction) came under the crossfire of large sections of 
the press. In particular, the secret – through its discovery less secret - Welfenfonds 
(Welf fund) he was administering came under scrutiny. This was a large sum of money 
that had been confiscated from the House of Welf by the Prussian state in 1868 to be 
used against ‘Welfian conspiracies’ (Welfische Umtriebe) – code for any political 
activities the government disapproved of (Stöber 1996). One section of this fund in 
particular was controversial, the so-called Reptilienfonds (reptile fund). This was 
established to pay secret agents and journalists, for providing information on the one 
hand and for influencing public opinion through benevolent reporting on the 
government on the other (Stern 2008 [1978], see also Engels 2006: 337f.). Its name 
was derived from Bismarck’s publicly stated comment on its use for “pursuing 
malicious reptiles right into their caves so we can see what they are up to”20 – a rather 
                                                          
20 My translation. The often-quoted excerpt from this statement, addressing the House of Welf, is “I 
believe we owe you gratitude when we dedicate ourselves to the purpose of pursuing malicious 
reptiles right into their caves so we can see what they are up to.” (“…ich glaube, wir verdienen Ihren 
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telling quote in regards to Bismarck’s view of the free press and opposition to his 
regime more generally.  
Further prominent scandals of the empire were the allegations against the railway 
baron Strousberg in 1873 (Borchart 1991) and the Kornwalzer21-affair in 1912/13, 
involving the arms manufacturer Krupp and the Imperial Ministry of War (Boesch 
2005). According to Engels, by around 1900, corruption discourse had become “code 
for a general critique of society” (2006: 339, my translation), with an emphasis on the 
“moral degeneration due to greed and unlawful enrichment” (ibid.: 340). From the 
1890s onwards, this increasingly contained anti-semitic elements (Boesch 2009a: 
447, also Engels 2006: 340). 
The case selected to represent this first phase of corruption discourse, the Tausch 
scandal of 1896/97, showcases some of the problematic features of press 
interference that could already be seen in the in the Reptile Fund controversy: The 
secretive manipulation by state authorities of what in theory (i.e. according to law) 
should have been the emergence of a free press sector, public political discourse and, 
if Britain was taken as the yardstick, the development of the press into a ‘Fourth 
Estate’ that could hold government to account.  
The Reptilienfonds itself would be worthy of a closer look (and indeed has been the 
subject of a number of studies such as Philippi 1959 or Brosius 1964). However, it is 
also worth showing that this pattern of authoritarian manipulation – of power 
trumping legality - was not just manifested in the Reptile Fund but materialised in 
other instances as well. In addition, the Tausch case provides a more focussed and 
less secretive case study than the Reptile Fund, and can be assessed in its entirety 
with an analysis of two court cases and the surrounding newspaper discourses. I refer 
to it as the Tausch case or affair for simplicity - in the literature it is usually listed as 
                                                          
Dank, wenn wir uns dazu hergeben, bösartige Reptilien zu verfolgen bis in ihre Höhlen hinein, um zu 
beobachten, was sie treiben.").  
21 This roughly translates as ‘granulating roller’ 
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the Tausch-Leckert-Lützow scandal (discussed in detail in Bösch 2009a: 329 – 364, 
Fricke 1960, Hall 1977).  
Eugen von Tausch was a high ranking officer in the Politische Polizei, a domestic 
intelligence branch of the police, and responsible for gathering information on 
opposition movements and dissidents. In the 1890s, however, unbeknownst to his 
superiors, he made it his calling to spread false information through his network of 
journalists about political figures and official dignitaries. This could for example be 
reports about the ill health of the Kaiser or indiscretions of politicians. These dealings 
came to light in a spectacular and widely reported court case in 1896/97. As many of 
Tausch’s inventions were allegations of corruption, what can be seen here is the 
manipulation, and if one wants, ‘corruption‘ of corruption discourse by authoritarian 
intervention. While the discovery phase in Britain saw the early blossomings of a free 
and largely uninhibited corruption discourse, in Germany its expression was thus 
deliberately manipulated. This connects to a wider concern with the Kaiserreich, as it 
was authoritarianism, and the failure of the state to implement reforms to modernise 
and democratise that eventually contributed to its downfall, and led to its destruction 
and dismantling in and through the Great War. 
For a second case study, a look at the Weimar Republic is instructive. This first 
attempt in Germany at a full-blown democracy failed for a number of different 
reasons. The factors typically listed are: (a) It was a democracy without democrats. 
The political actors did not understand the rules of the game, and instead of valuing 
pluralism, political opponents were routinely vilified (e.g. Bulla 1973). (b) The defeat 
in war, the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty and the war reparations Germany was 
supposed to pay into the 1980s further fanned the flames of radicalisation (Price 
1999). (c) This radicalisation led to paramilitary groups in the streets of cities across 
Germany, and to attempted coups from both left and right-wing organisations (Diehl 
1977). (d) The judiciary, still wedded to the idea of the authoritarian Kaiserreich, 
failed to deal with right-wing violence and was ‘blind on the right eye and overly clear-
sighted on the left’ (Jasper 1982). (d) While suffering from economic problems before 
(in particular the 1921 to 24 hyperinflation), the eventual downfall of the Republic 
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came with the global economic crisis triggered in 1929. The National Socialists came 
to power in 1933 and abolished any democratic freedom and pluralism that had 
existed (for all these points, cf. e.g. Abraham 1986, Kolb 1988, Nicholls 1991, Peukert 
1993). 
The role of corruption discourse in this period of extremism is in some ways the 
opposite of the role it played in Britain’s contestation phase. While in the UK, 
corruption discourse was a driving force behind reforms towards a more universalist 
state and the development of new democratic institutions, in the Germany of 
Weimar it played an important role in bringing down these institutions, and leading 
the bourgeois state to failure. Allegations of corruption, whether justified or not, 
became the weapon of choice in the radicalised political disputes of the era (cf. Klein 
2011, 2014). And not just political opponents were seen as corrupt, but society as a 
whole, and in particular the political system that had been borne out of defeat and 
national humiliation in the Great War. This culminated in the National Socialist 
propaganda that promised to rid the country of the ‘corrupt’ and ‘degenerate’ system 
that had been stifling Germany since 1919 (Ludwig 1998) . It is thus clear that the 
Weimar Republic has a particular significance when looking at the connection 
between corruption discourse and state formation. 
The Erzberger-Helfferich case of 1919/20 offers a microcosm of many of these 
problems. Indeed, coming at the outset of the Weimar Republic, it can be seen as a 
prototype (and possibly a critical juncture) in the development of corruption 
discourse in this particular period of time. Matthias Erzberger as the new Republic’s 
Minister of Finance was one of the most prominent members of the then Bauer 
government. However, as he had played a prominent role in the peace process 
towards the end of the war, he was extremely unpopular with right-wing press and 
politicians. Karl Helfferich on the other hand was a prominent right-wing politician 
and had been vice chancellor in the war-time government from 1916 to 1917. The 
dispute started with a range of articles in the newspaper Kreuzzeitung in the summer 
of 1919, summarised in a pamphlet named ‘Erzberger Must Go’ in August of the same 
year. Helfferich accused the minister of mixing private business interests with his role 
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as a wartime minister. This triggered a sequence of events: Erzberger sued Helfferich 
for libel. The court found Helfferich guilty of some of the points raised but not of 
others, effectively confirming that some of Erzberger’s actions constituted corrupt 
behaviour. Erzberger consequently resigned from office in March 1920. He was later 
assassinated by the right-wing terrorist Organisation Consul in August 1921.  
Manifested in this case is therefore almost the entire catalogue of problems that 
would haunt the Weimar Republic throughout its history, the legacy of defeat in the 
Great War, the radicalisation and violence, the problematic role of the judicial 
system. Corruption allegations here were used to attack the person of Erzberger, but 
through him, the entire new order of the state and its political system. This too is thus 
a contestation phase in which corruption discourse was used to contest the 
legitimacy of existing political structures. However, compared to Britain the conflicts 
were sharper, and the demands were not for reform to some of the state’s 
institutions but for the overthrow of the entire system. It thus makes sense to think 
of this as a phase of hyper-contestation. 
While historians have documented that the Third Reich (1933 to 1945) was rife with 
corruption (most notably Bajohr 2001), due to the Gleichschaltung of the media (lit. 
synchronisation, a euphemism for censorship), little corruption discourse was 
allowed to take place. And while this phase in German history is certainly an 
interesting case study of how the clientelist structures of the Nazi Party helped 
stabilise the regime (ibid.), it offers little in terms of understanding how corruption 
discourse manifested itself22. 
The Bundesrepublik (Federal Republic) finally represents Germany’s successful 
attempt at a liberal democracy. It, too, has had its fair share of high-profile corruption 
cases. The 1970s saw the Lockheed scandal involving the ill-fated Starfighter plane 
procurement, and the 1980s Flick Scandal uncovered illegal donations to the major 
political parties by the Flick consortium. As a case study for this period, however, I 
                                                          
22 An interesting analysis here might lie in looking at outsiders’ discourses such as the German services 
of the BBC, the American Broadcasting Station in Europe or Radio Moskau. Did they use corruption 
allegations strategically in an attempt to undermine the regime’s perceived legitimacy? 
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decided to take a slightly different approach, by focussing not so much on one 
isolated corruption scandal itself, but on the role of a news magazine in uncovering 
scandals more generally, and the way authorities attempted to stamp down it. The 
Spiegel-Affair of 1962 is widely known and recognised as one of the turning points in 
the young Bundesrepublik towards a more decisively democratic state (cf. Gimbel 
1965, Bunn 1966, Schoenbaum 1968). The weekly magazine had published a report 
on the German armed forces that documented its lack of preparedness in the case of 
an attack – the famous headline bedingt abwehrbereit loosely translates as ‘limited 
capacity to defend’. This led the Adenauer government to order the raid of the 
Spiegel offices in Hamburg and Bonn, as well as the arrest of several of the 
responsible editors. In the end, however, the Bundesgerichtshof found no grounds 
on which to prosecute, the government’s actions were declared unlawful, and the 
minister for defence, Strauss, who had pulled the strings in this persecution, was 
sacked. In 1966, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Germany’s Supreme Court, 
reiterated in the so-called Spiegel Ruling the important role of the Free Press in the 
democratic process. On its 50th anniversary in 2012, the Spiegel-Affair was celebrated 
as a ‘Milestone of Democracy’, and featured in many special broadcasts and 
publications (e.g. BPB’s special edition23 and Doerry / Janssen 2013 book), as well as 
earning its own TV drama in 2014, featuring Sebastian Rudolph as Rudolf Augstein 
and Francis Fulton-Smith at Franz Josef Strauss.  
The Spiegel-Affair is not a corruption affair in itself. Yet it is best understood if seen 
in the context of a number of much lesser known corruption scandals that preceded 
this showdown with the government. Der Spiegel had been instrumental in the 
Capital Scandal in 1950, uncovering vote-buying in the decision to move the German 
seat of government to Bonn rather than Frankfurt, in the 1952 Schmeißer affair 
surrounding a French secret agent allegedly connected to chancellor Adenauer, in the 
1958/59 Leihwagen scandal that brought to light the all-too-close links between the 
federal government and the car industry, and finally in the Fibag affair in 1962 that 
                                                          




exposed Strauss’s involvement in a bid to win a multi-million dollar construction 
contract with the US armed forces in Germany. The magazine with its investigatory 
journalism tactics was the key driver of corruption discourse in the Federal Republic, 
and the 1962 events were an attempt to shut down this discourse. There are certain 
parallels here to the Tausch case in 1897, and the Reptile Fund of the Kaiserreich 
more generally. Once again, an authoritarian government attempted to manipulate 
corruption discourse. The difference here, however, is that it failed rather 
spectacularly. Like the third case study of the UK, this case is thus representative of a 
consolidation phase. The institutions of the modern democratic state had been 
stabilised, and the rule of law could be defended against the attempt by power to 
overrule it. Similarly to Britain in 1889, corruption discourse here had become the 
defender of the existing political system, rather than attacking it.  
 
Data Collection 
One of the practical challenges of this self-funded part-time PhD has been to make 
the best use of a limited budget in both time and money. Luckily for this researcher, 
the project has taken place in an era of digitisation, in which more and more libraries 
and archives have discovered the value of digitising their catalogues, and making 
them available online for researchers worldwide. This section discusses the data 
collected both for the British cases – a more straightforward operation - and the 
German ones.  
British Cases 
The broad aim at the outset of looking for data in Britain was to get an overview of 
how corruption was discussed both in newspapers as well as in Parliament, 
throughout the 19th century. This proved to be spectacularly easy and 
straightforward. The British Library had then (2010) recently digitised and published 
its ‘Nineteenth Century Newspapers’ database – by today (2016) expanded to ‘British 
Newspapers 1600 to 1950’. According to the Library, the 19th century section of this 
database contains “[…] 48 titles […][that] comprise 2.2 million pages in total. The 
73 
 
selection follows a logical mix of UK-wide coverage with nationals and regionals, and 
includes 17 national and 29 regional newspapers from North, South, East, West and 
central England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, and one specialist sub-cluster.”24 This 
database formed the backbone of the research and served as the starting point for 
any enquiries into case studies, as well as providing the quantitative data that has 
been used in some places. However, two important newspapers are not featured in 
this catalogue: The Manchester Guardian, and significantly, as one of the most 
prominent newspapers in much of the 19th century, The Times. Both, however, are 
also available in similarly digitised archives, and were consulted in addition to the 19th 
century database whenever necessary. 
All these archives were easily accessible through the Edinburgh University Library 
website, and as discussed above, allowed not just for searching by keyword but also 
listed the numbers of hits, which could then be further processed into analytical 
statistics. While this was done ‘by hand’ in the early stages or my research, 
transferring the numbers meticulously into Excel files, the British Library at some 
point decided to provide this service itself, and now allows the option to download 
search results as Excel files from its website. This is only possible for year-by-year 
data, however, and in the cases where I have looked at monthly variations of 
discourse, numbers were still compiled ‘by hand’.  
In terms of parliamentary debates, a similar picture of abundance quickly emerged. 
Hansard Online offers easy internet access to its archives under its section ‘Historic 
Hansard 1803-2005’25. This contains all parliamentary debates and like the 
newspaper archives can be word-searched. Using Hansard became almost 
unnecessary in some cases, however, as newspapers in the 19th century routinely 
reproduced verbatim the official reports of the Parliamentary debates. Hansard 
mostly helped me with cross-checking these reports. Some additional information 
was obtained mostly for the 1889 case that did not feature strongly in newspapers. 
                                                          
24 Available at http://find.galegroup.com/bncn/bncn_02.htm (last accessed 13/06/2016) 
25 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/ for the House of Commons and 




The archives used for the three German case studies are different from one another. 
I therefore discuss them case-by-case. 
The Tausch Affair is centred on a court case. In addition to newspaper debates, it was 
therefore important that, rather than parliamentary proceedings, court proceedings 
could be accessed. These were provided by the Berliner Gerichtszeitung available in 
the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin – Preussischer Kulturbesitz. This official newspaper was 
published three times a week and specialised in verbatim reports of court 
proceedings. Its records of the Tausch case are comprehensive. In addition to this, I 
was able to find online a small but significant number of publications located in a 
number of different archives. The Teltower Kreisblatt can be found in the 
Staatsbibliothek Berlin, the Henneberger Zeitung has its own archive in the 
Stadtarchiv Suhl, and the Staufener Wochenblatt and Freiburger Zeitung can be found 
in the Universitaetsbibliothek Freiburg. To my delight, while I proceeded with my data 
collection, the Staatsbibliothek Berlin made available a number of further 
publications (such as Volkszeitung, Berliner Boersenzeitung, Berliner Tageblatt und 
Handelszeitung), and their online newspaper collection continues to be in a state of 
growth. 
For the Erzberger/Helfferich case the archival situation was significantly more 
comprehensive and accessible. This is owed to the efforts of the Deutsche 
Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz- Informationszentrum 
Wirtschaft (Central Library for Economic Sciences, Leibniz Information Centre 
Economy) which curates an archive on numerous personalities of the economic 
sciences and of economically relevant politicians. One of them is the erstwhile 
Finance Minister Erzberger. Their collection includes a great number of newspaper 
articles written on him, and covers both the newspaper dispute and the Helfferich 
court case extensively. 
The Spiegel-Affair and the different corruption scandal discourses that preceded it, 
finally, were the easiest to reconstruct. Most of the print media main players in the 
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1950s and 60s were the same as today, and current newspapers such as Der Spiegel, 
Die Zeit, Die Sueddeutsche, Frankfurter Allgemeine or Die Welt have their own 
archives, easily accessible and searchable on their respective websites. The same 
goes for the various court proceedings of the Federal Republic, which have been 
digitised and are available in the various archives of the Bund and the Lander. 
 
Data Analysis 
In some ways, my analysis of the data is akin to what is widely known as critical 
discourse analysis. According to van Djik (2001: 352), “[c]ritical discourse analysis 
(CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social 
power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by 
text and talk in the social and political context.” Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-
80, summarised in van Djik 2001: 353) identify as the main elements of CDA:  
(1) It addresses social problems, (2) Power relations are discursive, (3) Discourse 
constitutes society and culture, (4) Discourse does ideological work, (5) Discourse is 
historical (6) The link between text and society is mediated, (7) Discourse analysis is 
interpretative and explanatory, (8) Discourse is a form of social action. 
While this study shares a focus on the power relationships that constitute the 
discourse, and aims to deconstruct and unmask the power struggles behind it, there 
are some differences: The CDA project, and the many studies that are produced 
under its banner, mostly focus on the use of discourse by social and political elites to 
manipulate top-down what the wider public think. In this sense, they are primarily 
wedded to Marx’s notion of domination knowledge (Marx 1970 [1846]). However, 
many of the examples in this study relate more to what Marx called ‘revolutionary 
knowledge’ (ibid.), ideas that were not produced by the ruling classes but by whoever 
was challenging them. Corruption discourse as a means of delegitimising existing 
power structures is in fact a stand-out example of an effectively revolutionary idea. 
There are also overlaps with the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse 
(SKAD) propagated by the German sociologist Reiner Keller (2011). Like this study, it 
builds on the social constructionist premises of Berger and Luckmann, and combines 
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it with elements of (in his case Foucauldian) discourse analysis. SKAD claims “to  take  
seriously  Foucault’s  interests  in  discourse  as  practice  of power/knowledge” (ibid.: 
63), emphasising that discourses are not just manifestations of social construction 
but take on a life of their own, with their own “practices and dispositifs” (ibid.: 64). 
While this is similar to the ideas developed in this study, of corruption discourse both 
shaped by as well as shaping political processes and institutions, there are some 
notable differences: Keller rejects the critical approach of CDA as building on a 
“hermeuneutics of suspicion” (2011: 61, referring to Ricoeur 1970: 32-35), which 
“locates the ‘true’ meaning of a text  (e.g.  a  book)  in  something  outside  the  text:  
as  the  class  position  or  habitus  of  its  author,  or,  in psychoanalysis, in its unsolved 
early childhood development experiences” (Keller 2011: 62, footnote 11).  
In many ways, my own analysis is thus located somewhere between these two 
approaches, or more precisely, combines different elements of both. It builds on the 
ontological assumptions of social constructionism. Unlike SKAD, however, and more 
akin to CDA, it does focus its analysis on ways in which these social constructions are 
manipulated and influenced by power struggles, something that is indeed ‘outside 
the text’. It then moves back to SKAD, and looks at the ways in which discourses are 
not just shaped by, but in turn shape political processes, by facilitating shifts in the 
perceived legitimacy of existing power structures and political personnel. 
Another departure from these two approaches, and from what usually runs as 
‘discourse analysis’ is a stronger focus on the context of the discourse, and less focus 
on the text itself. This is owed to the macro-historical ambition of this study, which 
makes it important not to get too lost in the details, and to keep a steady eye on the 
bigger picture, the context emerging in the background. But it is also owed to a 
mistrust of the jargon that is all too often employed in discourse analysis, to identify 
and categorise and dissect the different elements of a text or utterance, but all too 
often simply states the very obvious and dresses it up as something out of the 
ordinary. This study thus does not trade in such things as deontic modalities, 
transitivity in Systemic Functional Grammar or instrument-for-agent metonymies. 
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The analysis of the documents typically follows a roughly three-step-process, moving 
from text to context to wider context. Step one involves reading what the text says: 
What acts and behaviours were classed as corruption? What kind of language was 
used to present the story? How was the argument framed? In the sensationalism of 
the Duke of York case for example, there is initially a strong focus on the moral failing 
of the individual, and only little attention to any idea of reform. This, however, 
changes over time, and the dynamic of this discourse indeed develops from an 
individual ‘moral failure’ frame, to a more systemic ‘reform’ frame that blames 
aristocratic power more generally. The 1830 to 32 discourse on the other hand, starts 
off as systemic critique, and ends in an almost unanimous condemnation of the 1832 
reform as not going far enough. The Spiegel affair of 1963 sees an almost universal 
condemnation of the German government, and is framed more widely as an attack 
on democracy and the freedom of press. The concept of frame is thus of particular 
importance here. In Nelson, Oxley and Clawson’s definition, “framing is the process 
by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and 
constructs a political issue or public controversy" (1997: 221). As the above examples 
show, framing can serve as a connection between the micro-level of the text and the 
macro-level of the political framework, by using elements of that framework for 
making sense of the ‘political issue or public controversy’ at hand. The text itself thus 
already points to the wider context, to reforms that should be initiated, laws that 
should be respected and democracy that should be defended. This goes to show that 
the three steps of the analysis – text, context, wider context - cannot entirely be 
separated, and indeed their separation – like the one of micro and macro levels – is 
merely an analytical one. 
Step two goes into more detail on the immediate context, and what could be called 
the meso level: Who is the accuser? Who the accused? Who defends the accused? 
And, moving beyond the single publication, what do the others say? This step is about 
identifying the political affiliations of the different papers, and any agendas they 
might be following, and putting them in relation to the political constellations that 
can be found for example in Parliament. It is significant that with one exception, all 
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the newspapers in 1809 called for the Duke of York to resign, but the parliamentary 
motion was crushed decisively. This points to how the political institutions were still 
firmly in the hands of the aristocracy and their supporters, who defended the Duke, 
while the newspapers were becoming a mouthpiece for the reformist movement. 
This second step thus maps out the political constellations within which corruption 
discourse was produced, and also has an eye in what kinds of changes, if any, it 
contributed to. 
Step three finally looks at the wider context, the political and legal institutions, the 
macro-historical developments taking place at the time. As discussed above, this 
often finds its expression in the frames employed on the text level. But it can also be 
observed in the different ways in which scandals are played out. In the Duke of York 
case for example it is curious that the papers at the outset of the scandal limited 
themselves to a series of relatively neutral reports on parliamentary proceedings and 
largely refrained from publishing opinion pieces. This is easily explained by the fact 
that at the time, newspaper editors were routinely charged and imprisoned, in 
particular for insulting the monarchy. This is therefore an example of an effect the 
legal context had on the shape of the discourse. Another example of the effects of 
the political and legal institutions on discourses can be seen in the coincidence that 
all the German case studies are played out in a court of law, whereas all the British 
cases are staged in the Houses of Parliament. It is no coincidence, it is a reflection of 
the fact that anti-corruption laws were firmly in place when German discourses 
started – cases of corruption could thus be brought before the courts. In Britain on 
the other hand, this legislation developed alongside discourse, and this is reflected in 
discourses that are enacted in the arena of the legislative branch of government, not 
the judiciary. 
It is in this consideration of all the three levels, micro, meso and macro, and an eye 
on how they are connected and combine, where in my view this discourse analysis 
has its strongest potential, and where insights can be gained from comparing the 





A number of decisions needed to be taken that inform the ways in which this study 
has been designed: Firstly, a comparison of the two countries Britain and Germany 
was deemed appropriate as they have both historically achieved a relative strong 
control of corruption, but the ways in which they have done so has been very 
different. While in Germany, anti-corruption legislation was implemented top-down 
by the various predecessor states in the 18th and early 19th centuries long before 
democratic pressure and the corresponding public corruption discourses had any 
significant influence, in Britain it was the opposite. Reforms to the state system and 
legislation against corruption were implemented here in a more bottom-up fashion, 
throughout the 19th century and as a result of continued pressure from an ever-
expanding public on the governing elites. The two thus represent what Mungiu-
Pippidi calls an authoritarian/traditional and a democratic path towards corruption 
control. The historical comparison of the two countries thus allows what Skocpol and 
Somers (1980) call a contrast of contexts in which the common theme of corruption 
discourse can be analysed within two very different contexts. But it also makes 
possible a parallel demonstration of theory in which some of the theoretical tenets 
of the preceding chapter, most notably the hypothesis that corruption discourse is 
shaped by contextual social and political factors as well as shapes these contexts, can 
be put to the test in these very different scenarios. 
Within Britain and Germany, three case studies each were selected, and the claim 
has been developed that they represent distinct phases that build onto one another 
in a sequence of gradual development. In Britain, the Duke of York affair was chosen 
to represent a discovery phase of corruption in which political actors started to 
experiment with corruption allegations as a weapon in political contest. The 1830 to 
1832 Electoral Reform Act debate was selected for its rich illustration of a 
contestation phase in which corruption discourse became the weapon of choice to 
undermine the legitimacy of the political system and build pressure on governments 
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to implement reforms. And the 1889 Corrupt Practices Act was chosen to show how 
towards the end of the century, in line with a more democratic and impartial state, 
anti-corruption was well established, and the role of discourse was to consolidate the 
existing order rather than challenge it. Similar phases could be observed in Germany, 
however, the ways in which these phases manifested themselves was very different. 
The Tausch scandal of 1896/97 represents a discovery phase in which public 
discourses were routinely manipulated by the authoritarian state. The Erzberger 
versus Helfferich case brought to light the radicalisation and violence that was to 
plague the Weimar Republic throughout and eventually led to its downfall, a phase 
of hyper-contestation. And finally, the Spiegel affair of 1962 - on a more positive note 
- represents the failure of authoritarian state actors to manipulate media discourse, 
and the settling out into a consolidation phase in which, like in Britain, corruption 
discourse’s role was to defend the existing democratic state rather than undermine 
it. 
The data available for the analysis of the cases varied significantly. While for the 
British cases, both newspaper and parliamentary archives had been fully digitised and 
were accessible online through one centralised search portal, this was not the case 
for the German data. While some of it was available in digitised form, it lacked both 
the coherence and the comprehensiveness of the UK data. And while it did allow for 
in-depth study of the cases themselves, the bigger picture of corruption discourses 
more globally was compromised. 
The analysis of the texts followed what can be seen as a combination of some aspects 
of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and a sociology of knowledge discourse analysis 
(SKAD). While it worked with the ontological foundations of the sociology of 
knowledge, it also paid ample attention to power struggles and hierarchy that was 
expressed in discourses, following more closely the CDA model. The data was 
approached with a three-level analysis that looked at the micro-level of text, the 
meso-level of context and the macro-level of wider context, and how the three were 
connected. In particular, attention was paid to how the macro-level of political and 
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legal institutions manifested itself on the micro-level of what was written, in the form 



























Chapter Four: Corruption Discourse in Britain 
This chapter maps out and analyses corruption discourse in the United Kingdom 
throughout the 19th century, exemplified by the three case studies chosen to 
represent it, the Duke of York scandal of 1809, the Electoral Reform debate of 1830 
to 1832 and the Corrupt Practices Act of 1889. I argue that the three cases are 
representative of three different phases through which corruption discourse 
develops, from discovery to contestation to consolidation. For each of the phases, I 
discuss how discourses manifested themselves, and how the case studies are 
representative of them. They also represent different arenas of corruption discourse, 
in the sense that they address legitimacy questions in different areas of the state: The 
Duke of York case, representative of the discovery phase, starts as a person-centred 
corruption case, in which one individual of the political elite is singled out. It then, 
however, broadens out into a more general critique of the electoral system. The drive 
for what became the Electoral Reform Act of 1832, representative of the contestation 
phase, is an example of a system-oriented corruption discourse, aimed at the 
institutions of democratic representation. And the 1889 passing of the Corrupt 
Practices Act in Public Bodies, symbolising a consolidation phase, represents the end 
point of a number of anti-corruption reforms in the administrative sector, targeting 
the behaviour of public officials. All three areas, political leaders that adhere to some 
notion of integrity, electoral systems that allow democratic representation, and a 
state administration that is impartial, are important elements of  what is today seen 
as a ‘modern democratic state’. The three cases thus show not just the different 
phases through which corruption discourse developed over the century but also how 
it shifted ideas of legitimacy in these important arenas of the state. Through re-
organising ideas of what constituted legitimate behaviour and what did not, it thus 
functioned as an important driver of modernisation processes.  
Discovering Corruption Discourse: The Duke of York Case 1809 
The Duke of York case was not the case in which modern corruption discourse was 
literally discovered for the first time ever (this accolade probably goes to Sir Francis 
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Bacon’s 1621 case, at least as far as Britain is concerned). Rather, it should be seen in 
context with other prominent corruption cases of the early 19th century, and indeed 
with an overarching discourse on what contemporary radicals such as William 
Cobbett or John Wade called ‘Old Corruption’ (Rubinstein 1983, Harling 1995, 1996a, 
2003). It is here where Harling’s observation, quoted in the introduction, becomes 
relevant: 
During and after the Napoleonic wars, popular radicals such as William Cobbett 
routinely drew attention to what they called ‘Old Corruption’ or simply ‘Corruption’ 
or ‘The System’ or ‘The Thing’. They used such words interchangeably to describe a 
parasitic political system that took an unprecedented amount of tax money out of 
the pockets of Britons and transferred it to those of a narrow band of well-connected 
insiders through a wide variety of nefarious means (Harling 2003: 98) 
This referred to…  
…the widespread use of pensions, sinecures, and gratuitous emoluments  granted  to  
persons  whom  the  British  government,  between the earlier eighteenth century  
and the Age of Reform,  wished to  bribe,  reward  or  buy.  It  was  an  all-pervasive  
feature  of  British politics  in  this  period […](Rubinstein 1983: 55).  
In other words, Britain’s constitutional monarchy at the turn of the 19th century was 
largely still organised along the lines of clientelism and patrimonialism. What is new 
here is that the voices calling for change were increasing, and, among others, they 
were now gathering around the flag of ‘Old Corruption’. Political reformers were thus 
discovering corruption allegations as a means of challenging the legitimacy of 
traditional authority. Further putting pressure on this situation was the fact that 
Britain was at war with France, and in the course of the Napoleonic wars, taxes had 
increased four-fold, to reach a level of over 30% of national income (Harling 2003: 98, 
see also Mann 1986: 115f.), increasing the stake taxpayers had in the expanding 
central state. 
It is in this context - the growing state, the War effort and the Radical challenge - that 
the Duke of York affair, but also other scandals of the time need to be understood. 
On a quick side note, the Henry Dundas case of 1805 for example showed interesting 
parallels: It too was centred on the military, and in this case indeed on the 
misappropriation of tax money (whereas the Duke of York case was more concerned 
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with the incompetence of military leadership). Lord Admiral Dundas was forced to 
resign due to his complicity in what was seen as the misappropriation of public funds 
for private purposes by one of his subordinates. And while it triggered some 
corruption debate, it did not have the impact of the Duke of York case.  
The Duke’s case routinely earns a nod, indeed a side note, in historical volumes that 
cover the era more generally, but monographs or book chapters that focus explicitly 
and in detail on this case are few and far between. Most prominently, Harling (1996b) 
looks at how the case demonstrates the complexities of war-time patriotism, and 
Spence (1996) analyses it in the context of the Romantic Radicalism movement and 
the reforms it was advocating. Spence’s reading of the case is thus of particular 
relevance here: For him, the Duke of York case proved to be “a final confirmation of 
the romantic radical agenda, and as a result radicalism rebounded with a vitality and 
popular degree unmatched since at least the days of the Corresponding Societies” 
(Spence 1996: 109). The following analysis provides further illustration as to how and 
why this was the case. 
While there had been rumours as to the conduct of the Duke before, the scandal 
proper was triggered in January 1809 by the Welsh Member of Parliament Gwyllym 
Lloyd Wardle who claimed to have evidence that one of the Duke’s mistresses, Mary 
Clarke, had been running a thriving business in army commissions in the years 1803 
to 1806. The Duke had awarded the commissions, and Clarke and he had shared the 
profits from the sales. Frederick Duke of York at the time was the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, and thus one of the most important 
public personae entrusted with running the country’s war machinery, which at the 
time was on the brink of defeat to the French (Spence 1996: 109). Yet, the case rose 
to such prominence that, as Harling observed, it “virtually monopolised public 
attention for nearly two months” (1996: 963).   
According to Winterbottom, in his somewhat biased pro-Duke of York biography, the 
“disastrous” decision to hear the whole case in the House of Commons rather than 
in a private inquiry, was due to the House Leader Spencer Percival’s assumption that 
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the allegations were so “ludicrous” they would be quickly thrown out. Thus, 
Winterbottom continues, “[…] the House of Commons switched from being a 
legislative body to its other function of a high court of law. The rules of an ordinary 
law court did not apply: the accused was neither present nor represented, and 
evidence was not taken on oath” (2016)26. While some might find this regrettable, 
however, for corruption discourse it was favourable. The decision provided the forum 
on which this corruption case could unfold as a public debate.  
For the following, I have found it helpful to divide the Duke of York corruption 
discourse into three distinct phases: Firstly, the time from the publication of the 
allegations until the vote in the House of Commons on March 15. In this period, 
newspapers restricted themselves mostly to reporting what had been said in 
Parliament. The second phase starts with the vote in the House of Commons on 
March 15 in which the Duke was acquitted of the charges by a significant majority. 
However, the vote itself was seen as a scandal by a large majority of press 
publications, and this period saw an outpouring of corruption allegations against both 
the Duke and the parliamentarians who had supported him. The resignation of the 
Duke on March 25 somewhat ameliorates the situation, and this phase of outrage 
slowly – there is no fixed date that marks the transition - gives way to an only slightly 
more measured debate that focuses on electoral reform more than on the Duke of 
York. In the third phase of this scandal there are large-scale public meetings across 
the country that congratulate Wardle and his fellow campaigners, and increased calls 
for reforms to the electoral system that had produced this Parliament.  
Figure 3 shows how this manifested itself in the frequency of the words ‘corruption’, 
‘reform’ and ‘Duke of York’ in newspapers between January and July 1809, broken 
down into 15-day cycles. The different phases as I see them are demarcated by 
vertical lines. Phase one, starting with the breaking of the scandal on January 26th, 
sees and explosion of ‘Duke of York’ discourse. It is notable, however, how 
‘corruption’ only shows a very slow increase. This reflects the reluctance and restraint 
                                                          
26 No page number provided in this e-book version, quote can be found through word-search. 
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of many papers to brand the Duke as corrupt. There is no increase in ‘reform’ at this 
stage. In phase two, starting with the Commons vote on March 15, ‘corruption’ peaks 
for the first time in the two-week period following the vote, while ‘reform’ at this 
stage still lags far behind. As a quick look at some individual-level data reveals, 
corruption discourse at this stage is indeed mostly attached to the Duke of York case: 
76% of articles that problematize corruption in the period between March 16 and 
March 31 – corruption’s first peak - also have a mention of the Duke of York in it. 
Reform at this stage only occurs in 20% of corruption articles. 
It is only after the Duke’s resignation on March 25th that ‘reform’ takes off properly, 
while interest in the Duke himself wanes. As mentioned above, the transition to this 
next phase cannot be pinpointed to one exact date. However, the graph does suggest 
a potential cut-off point, namely the point where ‘reform’ becomes more important 
than ‘Duke of York’. I have drawn the line in figure 3 there, but it is not a demarcation 
in absolute terms. The focus of critique shifts slowly from the Duke of York to those 
MPs who defended the Duke, and the electoral system that made them Members of 
Parliament in the first place. This shift in emphasis is again reflected in individual 
article-level data: At corruption’s second peak between May 1 and May 15, 74% of 
‘corruption’ articles also feature ‘reform’, and only 12% are still concerned with the 
Duke – a clear reversal of ‘fortunes’. It is also not clear when exactly this period ends. 
On the graph, I have chosen to go for the point at which the three terms go back to 
pre-scandal levels, around July 1 to 15. 
It is this switch of emphasis, the transition of the Duke of York into a reform debate 
that underlines the significance of the case: The Duke of York scandal was not a stand-
alone event but fed into, and was utilised by newspapers specifically, and by 
reformers in the streets and meetings more generally, to demand changes to the 
political system. And while Harling rightly concludes that the pressure for reform was 
not substantial enough and had little effect (1996: 964), the very fact that it did 
materialise and found strong popular support, at least in the short term, in my view 
is in itself significant. What figure 3 illustrates is the weaponisation of a corruption 
scandal to be used in the battle for more general systemic chance. The free-floating 
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signifier ‘corruption’ with its potential for challenging legitimacy was first used 
reluctantly, then attached to the Duke, and then to the electoral system – what is 
visualised here is thus the discovery of corruption discourse in action.  
 
Figure 3. Corruption, Reform and Duke of York, January to July 1809 
It is notable that these three phases to some extent mirror those of the macro-phases 
of corruption discourse that were premised for the 19th century as a whole in chapter 
three. An initial, slightly reluctant discovery phase is followed by a phase of 
contestation and conflict. There is a difference in phase three, however, as rather 
than settling into consolidation, here we can see a second contestation phase, one 
that contests the electoral system not just the person of the Duke. This 1809 
discourse thus moves from discovery to contestation-of-personnel to contestation-







































































































Mr. Gwyllym Lloyd Wardle rose, pursuant to his notice, and spoke to the following effect: 
Fully aware, Sir, of the great importance of the subject I am about to submit to the 
consideration of the House, I most sincerely lament that my abilities are unequal to do it 
complete justice. — But yet I trust that an ardent zeal for the welfare of my country, 
supported by facts strong and incontrovertible, will enable me to surmount every 
difficulty, and eventually to rescue the state from the baneful influence of a power which 
has long been exercised for the worst of purposes, and which, in fact, tends to endanger 
our ultimate security. To stand forward the public accuser of a man so high in rank and 
so strong in influence as the Commander in Chief, may very naturally be deemed no less 
a bold than an arduous undertaking. (Hansard, 27/01/1809) 
As these parliamentary minutes record, reproduced in almost any press publication 
either verbatim (e.g. Morning Chronicle 28/02, Cobbett's Weekly Political Register 
04/02/1809) or summarised in detail (e.g. Morning Post 28/01, Examiner 29/01, 
Caledonian Mercury 02/02/1809), Colonel Wardle was fully aware of the gravity of 
his accusations. In the same session, he presents in some detail a handful of cases in 
which commissions had been sold, and concludes by calling for the “appointment of 
a Committee to investigate the Conduct of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, the 
Commander in Chief, with regard to Promotions, Exchanges, and Appointments to 
Commissions, in the Army and in raising Levies for the Army” (Hansard, 27/01/1809).   
During the rest of the debate, fully recorded in Hansard’s report (ibid.) (but 
significantly shortened in most newspaper reports as they tended to focus on the 
more sensational accusations), it becomes evident that there is little sympathy for 
Wardle’s accusations, at least from those MPs who speak. Most contributions to the 
debate come to the defence of the Duke and question Wardle’s motives (such as 
William Wilberforce’s or the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s, Spencer Percival). As the 
minutes further show, there grows a consensus, however, that the matter should be 
dealt with in public, due to the importance of the person accused, and the gravity of 
the claims. The impression is that indeed Members of the House seemed convinced 
that the claims were unfounded. Whether they really were, or only paying lip service 
to His Majesty, or secretly looking forward to the drama that was to unfold, is a 
matter of speculation. What followed was a spectacle that had all the hallmarks of a 
21st century tabloid scandal, and thus generated interest wide and far. Key to this was 
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the main witness to the case, the Duke’s former mistress Mary Clarke, who did not 
hold back with details. As Spence observes, “Perceval’s hopes that this [committee] 
would end the accusations directed at the commander-in-chief were dashed by 
Wardle’s key witness, Mary Anne Clarke […][who] captivated the House of 
Commons” (1996: 118). 
The committee went through a number of initial sessions to gather evidence and hear 
witnesses (documented in Hansard: The Conduct of the Duke of York, 15/02, 03/03). 
The findings of the committee were then presented on March 8, and discussed in the 
subsequent days (ibid.: 08/03, 09/03, 10/03, 13/03, 14/03, 15/03). In the end, the 
vote on March 15 squashed Wardle’s motion for the Duke’s dismissal by 364 votes to 
123. The committee hearings, however, had exposed the dealings of the Duke and 
Clarke to the public, and the wide reporting of the parliamentary proceedings in 
newspapers up and down the country had triggered an outrage and fury against the 
behaviour of the commander in chief, discussed below in the second phase of this 
discourse. 
In this first phase, however, almost all the newspapers showed remarkable constraint 
and did not position themselves either for or against the Duke. Even radical papers 
such as the Morning Chronicle (London) - one of the leading publications of the time 
that had had some of their editors jailed for being too outspoken on the monarchy in 
previous years (Georgian Index, n.d.) – seemed too reluctant to directly attack the 
commander-in-chief. The Times featured one opinion piece on January 30, three days 
after the allegations were made public, defending the Duke against the ‘unjust’ 
attacks by the press, and questioning recent excesses of the free press more 
generally. Interestingly, this remains the Times’ only opinion piece on the case27. It is 
a matter of speculation why newspapers, especially the more radical ones, remained 
relatively cautious at this stage, but it is likely owed to a combination of trying to 
avoid any ‘seditious libel’ cases that this could potentially entail, and the fact that the 
                                                          
27 And it was well-advised to remain silent. The only other major publication that supported the Duke, 
and did so throughout the case, the Morning Post, according to Harling (1996b: 977), suffered a 
significant loss of readership as a result of its support. 
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case as reported through House of Commons debates, protected against libel 
accusations, was juicy enough. The facts spoke for themselves, and there was no 
need to add much to Wardle’s allegations and Clarke’s witness statements. It is 
therefore no coincidence, that in this first phase, the public discourse was mostly one 
that took place in Parliament, and the role of the papers was merely to transmit 
proceedings to their readerships. This changed radically in the second phase. 
 
Contestation of the Duke of York 
Two more parliamentary sessions were held on the Conduct of the Duke of York on 
March 17 and 20, to pass amendments and decide on details. The damage, however, 
had been done. In Spence’s words, “The parliamentary vote was inflammatory, for 
the popular perception was that the duke was guilty. Hence, parliament was equally 
corrupt to have voted in this way” (1996: 119). It did not help that MPs kept 
defending the Duke, famous for his incompetence even before the scandal. 
Bathurst’s proclamation is exemplary of the sound bites that were still emanating 
from the chamber, and showed how at odds with public opinion the majority of the 
Commons seemed to be: “[T]here is no person more sensitive than I am of the loss 
which the public will experience and sustain by his royal highness the Duke of York 
retiring from the command of the army [his ‘voluntary’ resignation had already been 
decided at this stage]. The many institutions which he was instrumental in 
commencing and promoting, and the regulations which he thought proper to adopt, 
have produced many salutary benefits;” (Hansard 20/03/1809). 
The verdict in the press could not have been more different. The Political Examiner 
(19/03/1809) claims that “one man perhaps in ten thousand [is] in favour of the 
duke”, and sees this as emblematic of democratic misrepresentation:  
It has ever been the opinion of our greatest politicians that nothing could ruin this 
country but its own Parliament; that is to say that when the Parliament was so 
corrupted by the Crown that it should forsake the people, or in other words be no 
longer the representative of the great, active, efficient, and enduring part of the 
nation […]. (Political Examiner, 19/03/1809, emphasis in original) 
91 
 
Clearly identified here is the enemy, the patrimonialism that bound the Commons to 
the Crown instead of serving the good of the wider public.  
The Morning Chronicle takes a closer look at the MPs who did vote for Wardle’s 
motion, but instead of lamenting their defeat in the House, see the motion as a 
success: 
It may be hailed, therefore, as a new era in the history of Parliament, for it is without 
precedent that one hundred and twenty-five gentlemen should thus come forward on a 
question springing from no party, but solely on the conviction of its importance, or 
yielding to the sense of their electors. […] It is a death-blow to the system of corruption, 
and will be felt in all its most secret recesses. (Morning Chronicle, 17/03/1809, emphasis 
in original) 
This stage also sees the beginning of some – at this point still relatively small - 
meetings of political societies for the purpose of thanking Wardle and those MPs who 
had voted in favour of the motion. The organisers of these rallies made sure their 
addresses were publicised, and the following are two typical examples, as they 
appeared in the ‘Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle etc.’ on March 27, 1809, 




Two major points are illustrated here: First of all, while it is clear that newspaper 
discourses are never an exact, if at all a representation of public opinion, there is at 
least a strong indication that public opinion was indeed strongly against the Duke. 
We do not know if only one in 10.000 people supported him, as the Political Examiner 
claimed, but in combination with similar claims from other publications it can safely 
be assumed that this was grounded in some notion of realism. This is further backed 
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up for example through the claims in the two addresses in the Hampshire and Sussex 
that they had unanimously supported the vote for the removal of the Duke.  
Secondly, we can see the emergence of a common framework within which the case 
was interpreted – as the discussion below will show this becomes increasingly 
important in the second contestation phase of this case. The Political Examiner and 
the Morning Chronicle, while arriving at different conclusions, both frame the case as 
a question of democratic representation. The two letters in the Hampshire and 
Sussex make references to the armed forces, and how the Duke’s conduct was bound 
to have an impact on morale – the war-time frame of patriotism. Both praise the 
independence of the voters. The Corporation of St. Pancrass in their address 
emphasises the importance of “public and private virtue” and the Choice Spirits in 
theirs spin a narrative of general decline averted, invoking the “Fall of Rome”. There 
is thus an explicit separation of public and private, and reference here, too, is made 
to the representation of the “people of this country”. What is still missing at this 
point, however, are calls for reforms, and the representation frame is as yet focussed 
on the individuals who did act in the interest of the people, rather than those who 
did not. 
Support for the Duke in the press at this stage is almost non-existent. Harling (1996: 
977) finds only the Morning Post to be supportive, and my own research, apart from 
the early Times article mentioned above, comes to the same conclusion. The British 
press are almost unanimously opposed to the Duke of York staying in power, in stark 
contrast to Parliament, where the large majority supported the commander-in-chief. 
This is a snapshot of the balance of power, of how the institutions of the state in 1809 
were still firmly in the hands of the aristocracy, while the free Press was becoming a 
mouthpiece of the emerging powers - a bourgeoisie whose wealth was based on 
trade and industry, not so much on land, and who were by now making a substantial 





Contestation of the Electoral System 
The second contestation phase of this discourse was heralded by a number of mass 
meetings and addresses all over the United Kingdom. The first of these mass events 
was staged in the City of Westminster on March 29th, and featured prominently in 
most newspapers28. This Westminster meeting sets the tone for this debate, and 
subsequent meetings all seemed to follow a similar pattern. A number of speakers 
addressed the crowd, railed against the corruption of government, and ended by 
calling for reforms. In Westminster for example, a Mr. Sturch addressed the crowd, 
claimed to be voicing “the feeling and conviction of 999 out of every 1000 of all the 
inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland” (Morning Chronicle, 30/03/1809) and 
concluded that 
[…] he [Sturch] would take leave to add that if all the Members of the House had 
been elected in the same free and constitutional manner in which the City of 
Westminster, to its lasting honour, and as an example to the whole nation, elected 
that Worthy Baronet, the decision of that House would have been nearly unanimous. 
(ibid.) 
The object of the scandal had clearly shifted here. Having resigned from office, it was 
no longer the Duke of York who was under fire, but the MPs who had supported him, 
and through them, Parliament itself was now under attack. Jackson’s Oxford Journal 
reports on a similar meeting of the Livery-men of London, and the resolutions they 
passed: 
Resolved unanimously – that it has long been a manner of notoriety, and has lately 
been proved, beyond the possibility of doubt, that abuses of a most corrupt nature 
                                                          
28 E.g. Morning Chronicle and Morning Post on 30/03, Examiner 02/04, Caledonian Mercury 
03/04/1809. The Morning Post featured a neutral report on the meeting but, rather entertainingly, 
also an opinion piece, in which it describes those who attended as  
 
“[…] about 2000 people (at most), composed of strangers who go to such places out of curiosity; fifty 
or one hundred demagogues who are instigators of such assemblages, and a number of idle and 
profligate persons of the lowest orders in society, the scum of the metropolis, who, instead of devoting 
two or three hours usefully to the barrow or the hod, find their noise and folly more usefully employed 
in applauding the speeches from the erected scaffold. […] “Down with the tree of corruption!” is the 
cry; or, in other words, “Down with the British Constitution!” under that pretence. […] we prefer the 
British Constitution with all its faults (though we sincerely wish them speedily rectified), even to a 
National Directory, composed of Burdett and his disciples, supported by all the abilities of their 
admired Goddess of Reason, the virtuous and immaculate Mars. Clarke.” (Morning Post, 30/03/1809, 
emphases in original) 
95 
 
and ruinous tendency have existed and still exist in various branches of the 
administration of Public Affairs […] Resolved unanimously – that these abused form 
only a part of a wicked and corrupt system, which has been long acted upon, and no 
permanent good can arise from the late investigation, unless followed up by a 
general reformation of public abuses in every department of the state. (Jackson’s 
Oxford Journal 08/04/1809) 
Again, the system of corruption rather than any individuals come under attack. And 
what is needed is nothing less than a ‘general reformation‘– not, then, revolution. 
Spence goes into painstaking detail into what seems like a comprehensive list of all 
such public addresses and resolutions all over the country, by local authorities, 
boroughs, counties and self-appointed societies. If I have counted correctly, he lists 
120 altogether (Spence 1996: 123f.). He concludes:  
They all thanked Wardle and his allies for their dedication to their country […]. Every one 
of them noted their loyalty to the Crown and constitution. […] Each went on to condemn 
the corruption that now self-evidently had infected the parliament, so that only a 
minority in the House of Commons had been independent enough to vote against the 
government. (ibid.: 124) 
In this phase, unlike at the breaking of the scandal, newspapers did not just neutrally 
report on these meetings but actively took positions in the debate. The Morning 
Chronicle for example, in an opinion piece on May 17th connects a call for Electoral 
reform with the increasing tax burdens resulting from the war effort: 
We do most sincerely desire to see an end put to that most infamous traffic which is now 
avowedly carried on at the Treasury under every Administration, in the purchase and sale 
of boroughs, by which the taxes paid by the people are first employed to pollute the 
fountain of Representation, and the fruits of corruption afterwards converted into 
instruments of still farther increasing the public burthens. (emphasis in orginal) 
The Chester Chronicle makes a normative argument (12/05/1809): 
No longer can the shield of party be interposed between the public offender and the 
justice due to his crimes, and after the mass of depravity and corruption that has been 
exposed, in so many of the public departments of the state, what honest and upright 
man will not say, that Reform is absolutely necessary to the salvation of the country, and 
the well-being of the commonwealth. 
The metamorphosis from the first to this second phase of contestation is thus 
unmistakeable. While then, the emphasis had been on the individual level of the 
protagonists – the Duke of York on the one side, Wardle, Clarke and anyone who had 
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voted for the motion on the other – this has now decisively shifted. The question has 
now become a systemic one, and while many stress that they are still loyal to Crown 
and constitution, reforms to the political system are seen as necessary to overcome 
this ‘corruption’.    
What was an isolated corruption case at the beginning of the scandal has thus 
broadened out to a more general debate, and has docked onto the prevailing 
contextual issues of the time – the war effort, the growing state and the Radical 
challenge. Wardle was not just seen as a hero, he was seen as a national hero, who 
out of patriotism had brought forward the charges – this ‘war effort frame’ was used 
in many of the resolutions and addresses such as the two addresses in the Hampshire 
Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle etc. (27/03/1809). The growing state and increased 
taxation frame was explicitly used in such pieces as the Morning Chronicle’s May 17th, 
but is also implicit in a number of articles that emphasise representation issues and 
the differentiation between public and private. This differentiation itself points to a 
growing sense of ownership by the wider public of a growing state that it increasingly 
was financing. The radical challenge frame finally can be seen in the growing calls for 
reform. 
 
The Duke of York Case as Discovery 
In what ways, then, does this case overall serve as an example of a ‘discovery phase’? 
As discussed in chapter two, corruption discourse by definition has the potential to 
challenge the perceived legitimacy of political personnel, institutions or the system 
as a whole. And within discourse, allegations can be used strategically by political 
actors to undermine understandings of what is legitimate and what is not. We can 
see this clearly at work here: both the person of the Duke of York as well as the 
institution of the electoral system were put into question, the person successfully 
undermined, the system challenged. The discovery that took place here is the one 
expressed in figure 3, and further illustrated through the qualitative analysis: The 
reformist challengers discovered that they could use the signifier of corruption to 
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attach it not just to the person of the Duke of York but to the political system more 
generally, and that it could be used for their purposes of undermining the legitimacy 
of the existing institutional order. As Harling explained, discussed at the beginning of 
this case study, this had been done before by some Radicals (2003: 98). But as Spence 
asserts, with the Duke of York case indeed “radicalism rebounded with a vitality and 
popular degree” not seen for a long time (Spence 1996: 109). Finally, this discovery 
is further illustrated by the peak that the mention of ‘corruption’ experienced in 1809 
(figure 2 in chapter three). The Duke of York scandal was indeed one of the biggest 
scandals pre-1830, and as the analysis has shown, it set the tone for the contestation 
phase that was to come post-1830, by attaching the free-floating signifier of 
corruption firmly onto the issue of electoral reform.  
 
Contesting the State: The Drive for Electoral Reform 1830 to 1832 
If the 19th century in Britain was a gradual takeover of the state by the middle classes 
from the aristocracy, the 1832 Representation of the People Act, widely known as 
Electoral Reform Act, was one of the main events through which this happened. 
Unlike the Duke of York case, this act is amply covered by numerous books and 
journal articles29. The role that corruption discourse played in the unfolding of events, 
however (to the best of my knowledge) has yet to be directly examined. My  approach 
to the Reform Act therefore does not try to compete with the many detailed historical 
analyses that have been so expertly written, but tries to offer some starting points 
for a different kind of conceptualisation: as an example of a corruption discourse, and 
set into context with other corruption discourses. 
The debates surrounding the Act draw out over a period of close to two years. 
Compared to the Duke of York case study, this is both a longer period of time as well 
as a more complex course of events. To take account of this, it needs a somewhat 
                                                          
29 From Seymour’s 1915 classic to Ferguson 1966, Brock 1973 Evans 1994, Norris 1995, Phillips & 




different approach, and indeed I have found the use of quantitative data to employ 
a pronounced numbers-based content analysis as part of the investigation 
particularly helpful here. The case study of the 1832 Electoral Reform Act thus 
proceeds in four steps: It starts with a summary of how developments unfolded from 
the 1830 French Revolution to the passing of the 1832 Electoral Reform Act. This is 
then followed by a quantitative analysis of newspaper discourses from the period. I 
then go into some of the qualitative details of the case. And lastly, the context of the 
contestation phase more generally, and how the 1830 to 1832 discourse relates to it, 
is considered. 
 
Summary of Developments 
Calls for Electoral Reform had been a prominent feature of political debate for 
decades preceding the eventual reform, flaring up every now and then, as 
exemplified in the Duke of York case. The 1820s had seen a slowly simmering reform 
debate, but it was in 1830 that mentions of reform in newspapers virtually exploded 
(visualised in figure 4 below). One of the main reasons for this sudden increase in 
reform discourse was exogenous: The 1830 revolution in France (Charles X had been 
ousted with little bloodshed in very few days, July 16 to 29) had, in the words of 
Woodward, “caused considerable excitement in England and brought a revival of 
interest in parliamentary reform” (1988: 77). However, as my own quantitative 
analysis below shows (figure 5), this was until later in the year mostly still an elite 
conversation. For it to become this prominent, reform discourse needed the catalyst 
of elections, and the almost accidental Whig government of Earl Grey. The elections 
in the aftermath of the revolution (polling took place from July 29 to September 1) 
had led to another Tory majority, meaning little progress on reform could be 
expected – as late as November 2, two weeks before his resignation, Wellington still 
proclaimed his opposition to any reform (Ertman 2010: 1007). However, the party 
was split, and by mid-November, it became clear that the Wellington government 
had failed, paving the way for Grey to take over. 
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Grey had for some time argued that in order to secure stability at least moderate 
reform was needed (Evans 1994: 59). He thus made it one of his conditions for 
forming a government that electoral reform was to be implemented, triggering what 
can only be described as a two-year tug-of-war: On one side, his government was 
pulling towards electoral reform, spurred on by popular support, on the other side 
Conservatives, aided by some Whig MPs and a significant majority in the House of 
Lords, were pulling against. In an eventful two years, for the Reform Act to become 
reality, several hurdles had to be overcome. The first hurdle to be taken was indeed 
the appointment of the reformist Earl Grey government. Without it, history would 
likely have taken a different turn. Grey was not a committed reformer by any means. 
Rather, as Woodward observes, “he described himself as ‘aristocratic both by 
position and by nature’ and ‘with a predilection for old institutions’” (1988: 79). The 
government he formed with his fellow Whig and a number of collaborating Tory MPs 
is considered to have been one of the most aristocratic of the 19th century (Ertman 
2010: 1007). It was thus the threat of revolution that convinced him and his cabinet 
that reform was necessary.  
In the House of Commons, the Electoral Reform Committee, chaired by John Russell, 
presented its suggestions on March 1, 1831. This is where hurdle number two 
presented itself, the reluctance of many of the MPs to agree with the proposed 
legislation. And while the bill was never formally defeated, it got into so many 
difficulties, both on Chamber and Committee level, that Grey decided to call for early 
elections to seek a clearer mandate for reform (Phillips/Whetherell 1995: 412). He 
got it in the 1831 General Election (28 April to 1 June), which was fought “with all the 
earmarks of a referendum” (ibid.) and produced a landslide victory for the reformist 
Whigs (370 Whig to 235 Tory MPs). 
The third hurdle was posed by the House of Lords. A second attempt to pass the Act 
in the Commons had succeeded with a large majority in July 1831, and after some 
committee work and a number of amendments, the bill had been passed by majority 
of more than 100 votes in September. However, despite hopes that its opponents in 
the Lords would see the necessity of the bill and at least abstain from the vote, the 
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House rejected it. This in turn sparked riots in several parts of England, most notably 
Nottingham, Derby and Bristol (Woodward 1988: 83). Public Meetings were held up 
and down the country, and it saw the emergence of Political Unions (LoPatin 1998: 
66ff.), and an attempt, led by the Birmingham Political Union, to form a National 
Political Union, a kind of extra-parliamentary opposition (ibid.). The unions were 
subsequently declared unconstitutional by the government – underlining its 
credential as being reluctant rather than enthusiastic reformers. However, the 
Unions remained active, and continued to play an important role in the coming 
months, in fact playing an active role in peace-keeping from October to December 
(ibid.: 87ff.).  
In December 1831, the Bill was again put to the House of Commons, and after further 
committee work and amendments was passed in March 1832 with an even larger 
majority. How, then, to win over the Lords? Grey turned to King William IV and 
lobbied him to create additional peerages for reformers so that they could 
outnumber their opponents (Woodward 1988: 85). William refused this request, the 
Whig government resigned, and a minority government led, once again, by the Duke 
of Wellington was instated by the King (ibid.).  
This triggered what later became known as the ‘Days of May’. Various campaigns 
were started, again led by the Political Unions, aimed at undermining the state’s very 
functionality. Among others, citizens were encouraged to stop paying taxes and to 
withdraw money from the Bank of England (Royle 2000: 74ff.). Revolution was in the 
air, and it was in these Days of May, according to some historians (most notably E.P. 
Thompson 1968: 75f. and Eric Hobsbawm 1968: 55), that the country came closest to 
a popular revolution in modern times30. As Hobsbawm notes:  
No period of British History has been as tense, as politically and socially disturbed, as 
the 1830s and early 1840s, when both the working class and the middle class, 
separately or in conjunction, demanded what they regarded as fundamental 
changes. From 1829 to 1832 their discontents fused in the demand for Parliamentary 
                                                          
30 How close the country really was to revolution is a matter of debate. Other historians such as 
Brock (1973) and Cannon (1973) claim that the situation was less dramatic. 
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Reform, behind which the masses threw their riots and demonstrations, the 
businessmen the power of economic boycott. (1968: 55) 
Eventually, King William IV gave in to this pressure from the streets, and recalled Grey 
on May 15. He accepted his demands for creating peerages, but also convinced the 
Lords to pass the Act regardless, making new peerages unnecessary (Woodward 
1988: 86). The last hurdle was taken. The Representation of the People Act was finally 
passed in the Lords on June 4 and given Royal Assent on June 7, 1832. 
The Reform targeted two problems: The so-called rotten boroughs which had tiny 
numbers of electorate, allowing MPs to hold on to them rather too easily, most 
notably by bribing the handful of electors; and the lack of representation, especially 
of some of the newly emerging industrial cities of the North (for details as to the new 
provisions see e.g. Ertman 2010: 1007f.). The electorate in absolute numbers, 
however, was not actually expanded by much (while a rise from about 400.000 voters 
to 650.000 does amount to roughly a 60% expansion, this was still low in relation to 
the overall population of the United Kingdom of around 25 million), and it is therefore 




To understand how corruption discourse was embedded in, and interacted with 
these developments, some quantitative approaches offer some initial insights. The 
data is analysed on three levels, starting with macro-level per-year data, secondly 
breaking this down onto the meso-level of monthly frequencies of key words, and 
lastly looking at how this manifests itself on the micro-level of individual newspaper 
articles.  
                                                          
31 Rather than increasing representation to any significant degree, its merit may lie, as Phillips and 
Whetherell (1995) argue, in producing for the first time a nationally unified system with equal rules 
in each constituency. And subsequently, as they claim, this brought with it some identifiable changes 
in how politics were conceived after 1832 – as a national endeavour rather than a representation of 
provincial interests (ibid.: 414). 
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As demonstrated in chapter three (figure 2), the years 1830 to 1832 appear in the 
year-by-year data as a launching pad for corruption discourse in the 19th century, for 
key expressions such as ‘corruption’, and to a lesser extent, ‘public good’ and ‘public 
interest’. Figure 4 adds ‘reform’ to this equation, and we can see an even more radical 
transformation.  
 
Figure 4. Reform, Corruption and Corruption Cluster, 1800 to 1900 
From being relatively marginal before 1830, ‘reform’ skyrockets, starting in 1830, but 
particularly the year after. To represent corruption in relation to reform, I have 
chosen to cluster a number of key words in what can be called the ‘corruption 
cluster’. This is based on the search combination of ‘corruption’, ‘corrupt’,  ‘bribe’, 
‘bribery’ ‘rotten borough’ or ‘rotten boroughs’, combined as an ‘OR’ search – it 
compiles the number of newspaper articles that contains at least one of these word. 
The particular combination of keywords is derived from the more detailed work on 
the individual-level data below, and here serves the purpose of visualising corruption 
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reform discourse, but not quite as marginal as the sole search word ‘corruption’, also 
included in the graph, would suggest.32 
The correlations between the terms over the century as a whole are highly significant: 
‘Corruption’ and ‘reform’ correlate at 0.78, the corruption cluster and ‘reform’ comes 
in at 0.85. In other words, in those years in which corruption was an important theme 
of newspaper discourse, there were also increased discussions of reform. Narrowed 
down to the time period 1825 to 1840, the correlation of ‘corruption’ and ‘reform’ 
increases to 0.91, and of the corruption cluster and reform to 0.87. The micro-level 
data discussed below goes into further detail on how they were connected. 
On a meso-level, breaking down the year-based data into monthly entities allows a 
more nuanced look at how the Electoral Reform Act debate unfolded over the almost 
two years it took, and the different waves of themes that were prominent in 
newspaper debates. Figure 5 thus shows the frequency of some key terms, broken 
down into monthly units. In addition to ‘corruption’ and ‘reform’, I decided to include 
‘rotten boroughs’, ‘revolution’, ‘democracy’ and ‘representation’, in order to capture 
the main themes of the political discourse of the time and to map them out more 
locally over months rather than in global year-by-year numbers. What this can 
illustrate is the dynamic interaction process of discourse and the events that were 
summarised in the previous section. At first glance, certain patterns become 
apparent: ‘Revolution’ seems to trend relatively independently from the others, 
peaking in August and September 1830, just after the events in France, and then 
flattens out. All the other terms, however, seem connected to one another, and 
follow similar trajectories.  
There are three clearly distinguishable peaks: Firstly, the period from March to May 
1831 – this coincides with the Grey government’s first attempt to get the Bill passed, 
introducing it to the House on March 1, and the subsequent early elections that were 
called due to the difficulties it was encountering, polling from April 28 to June 1. The 
                                                          
32 The correlation of ‘corruption’ with the corruption cluster per year 1800 to 1900 is 0.93. In the time 
period 1825 to 1840, this correlation reaches 0.98. The two can therefore be taken as a very accurate 
representation of one another. 
104 
 
second peak is in October 1831 – this signifies the period of unrest that followed the 
House of Lord’s rejection. The third peak is in May and June 1832 – this coincides with 
both the unrest of the Days of May, as well as the aftermath of the passing of the 
Reform Act on June 4th, in which its effects were still hotly debated.  
 
Figure 5. Corruption and reform terms per month, 1830 to 1832 
What becomes visible here is the dynamic interaction between what was happening 
inside the political institutions and what was happening outside, in the newspapers 
specifically but also in the streets of the country and the public sphere more 
generally. As discussed above, Earl Grey and his government of aristocrats was acting 
out of fear of revolution. This graph however demonstrates that it was not just those 
inside who reacted to outside events, but also vice versa. The highest peaks in the 
curves always followed rather than preceded events in the Houses of Parliament. The 















































the Lord’s refusal to approve it, and the third by the resignation of the Grey 
government. Figure 5 thus, juxtaposed to the course of events as described in the 
previous section, is a visualisation of action and reaction, and the dynamic interaction 
between discourse and institutions. 
A visual interpretation of the graph suggests a connection between the terms, with 
the exception of revolution. To specify the extent of this, I have assembled a table of 
correlations. Table 1 shows that indeed revolution has less, but not insignificant 
covariation with the other search words, correlating at between 0.25 and 0.47 with 
the other terms. All others show a significant to highly significant correlation between 
0.51 (corruption and democracy) and 0.81 (corruption and representation). This 
means that these themes – corruption and rotten boroughs, democracy and 
representation, as well as reform) were indeed discussed together. This points once 
more to the state formation processes that influenced the ways in which corruption 
discourse specifically, and reform discourse more generally were constituted, and 
framed in newspaper debates.  
 Reform Rotten B’s Revolution Democracy Represent. 
Corruption 0.68 0.81 0.40 0.51 0.81 
Reform - 0.73 0.25 0.67 0.76 
Rotten B’s - - 0.47 0.70 0.73 
Revolution - - - 0.33 0.31 
Democracy - - - - 0.51 
Table 1. Correlations of corruption and reform terms, 1830 to 1832 
What exactly, however, was the role of corruption discourse specifically, the focal 
point of this study, in what was primarily a discourse on reform? How central, if at 
all, was it to the idea that the electoral system needed to be changed? If corruption 
allegations could aid in undermining the legitimacy of the old order, how much use 
was made of it? The micro-level analysis that breaks down the data further onto the 
level of individual newspaper articles, helps answer these questions. The aim of this 
is to measure the extent to which the dominant reform discourse was supported by 
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corruption discourse. This can be achieved by looking at articles that feature ‘reform’ 
and determine how many of these articles also featured ‘corruption’ or any of the 
other key words that make up what I call the corruption cluster (corruption, corrupt, 
bribe, bribery, rotten borough, rotten boroughs)33. Table 2 presents the frequencies 
of these keywords for the time period January 1830 to December 1832. The left 
column shows the frequency of the dominant ‘reform’ (A). On the right-hand side, 
the frequencies of a number of different terms associated with corruption are listed 
individually and summarised in the corruption cluster (B). The central column shows 
the intersection of these terms with reform (A ∩ B), flanked on either side by the 
percentages of the search word or search word combination that makes it into the 
intersection. For example line one shows that 19% or newspaper articles that feature 
‘reform’ also include the words ‘corruption’ or ‘corrupt’. On the right-hand side of 
the intersection, we can see that 86% of articles that mention ‘corruption’ or ‘corrupt’ 
also feature ‘reform’.   
A = Reform 
 
% of A in 
intersection 
Intersection A ∩ B 
 











19% 7467 86% Corruption OR 
corrupt 8731 
9% 3882 90% Bribe OR 
Bribery 4308 
5% 2029 95% Rotten Borough 
OR Rotten 
Boroughs 2143 









Table 2. Frequencies and intersections of ‘reform’ and corruption cluster 
                                                          
33 In addition to these terms, I tested whether ‘fraud’, ‘extortion’ and ‘graft’ were part of this cluster. 




Without thorough qualitative analysis, figures like these can only ever offer an 
indication. What they do indicate here, however, is quite powerful: First of all, more 
than every fourth (28%) newspaper article that had the word ‘reform’ in it also 
featured one or several of the key words associated with the corruption cluster. This 
indicates that while corruption concerns did not dominate reform discourse, they 
were certainly an important feature, appearing in 28% of articles that were written 
on reform. On the other side of the intersection, however, it becomes clear that 
corruption discourse was completely dominated by concerns of reform. This is 
expressed in the 92% of the corruption cluster that also feature the key word 
‘reform’. The signifier corruption in this period of time was thus almost exclusively 
used to signify something that needed to be reformed. It denoted an object – the 
electoral system – as illegitimate, and at the same time pointed towards that which 
was legitimate – the reform that led to more representation and democracy (if the 
above table 1 is correct which suggests strong correlations of corruption with these 
terms of democratisation). 
The quantitative analysis of the Reform Act discourse thus suggest three points: (1) 
On a macro-level it shows how the years of 1830 to 1832 indeed served as a critical 
juncture for debates around corruption as well as reform (figure 4). But it also gives 
us an initial idea of the connection of the different debates, expressed in the 
correlation of the key terms ‘corruption’ and ‘reform’. (2) On the meso-level, it 
becomes apparent how newspaper discourse interacted with the events taking place 
within the institutions of the state, in what looks like a two-way dynamic of action 
and reaction (figure 5). It also shows the clustering of key expressions (table 1) that 
combine into a discourse of political reform. (3) A micro-level analysis sheds further 
light on the interconnectedness of the different themes of this discourse. Specifically, 
reform discourse was strongly supported by corruption discourse, and corruption 
discourse was almost exclusively used to argue for the reform of institutions that 




Qualitative Analysis: Selected Newspapers in more detail 
While the numbers tell us something about the overall content of the discourse and 
how it evolved over time, a closer look at a selection of newspapers adds more insight 
into who was arguing what, and why. For this, I have analysed a sample of papers, 
ordered along party lines. Publications that supported primarily Whig positions are 
thus juxtaposed to ones that argued predominantly for Conservative positions. Some 
more radical papers were considered. And an effort was made to represent both 
centre and peripheries of the state. All the publications offer a mix of parliamentary 
protocols, opinion pieces and editorials, and reports from various meetings of 
political unions, societies and town halls. The following is merely an overview of the 
positions of the different papers, and the way they ‘did’ corruption discourse in times 
of the Electoral Reform Act debate. 
As expected, Whig-leaning newspapers, such as the Examiner, Morning Chronicle, 
Caledonian Mercury or Liverpool Mercury, were all in favour of electoral reform. A 
piece in The Examiner (London, June 10, 1832) in the aftermath of its passing through 
Parliament eloquently sums up this position. It saw the Act as a “first step to a greater 
good” and the “axe of authority laid at the roots of corruption” (ibid.). It also 
supported the continuation of political unions, even after the passing of the Act, 
going further than the Whig government which advocated their dissolution. In the 
piece, the connection to taxation is invoked once more, claiming that it should be a 
“constitutional principle, that taxation was not legal while the Commons house was 
confessedly not representative of the people.” The Morning Chronicle (London) took 
a similar stance. While it supported the Bill, it also raised questions as to whether it 
went far enough. In a detailed article on the suggested changes for the district of 
Birmingham, one of the emerging cities to be enfranchised by the Bill, and also one 
of the hotspots of the ongoing Days of May demonstrations, the paper concluded 
that “[e]very person experienced in elections knows that the existing corruption 
[referring to vote buying] is inherent in the system that the Reform Bill will ultimately 
extinguish” (May 7 1832). Up in Scotland, the Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh) 
equally supported the Reform Bill, and equally proclaimed that it did not go far 
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enough. The Mercury went into great detail about what the Bill meant for the 
different districts in Scotland, and reports from the numerous Reform Meetings, for 
example one in Kirkcaldy from which many attendants went home “unsatisfied” 
(Kirkcaldy Reform Meeting, May 3 1832). The Liverpool Mercury sets a slightly more 
radical tone, but takes a similar position. For example in an editorial on the Reformed 
House of Commons (June 22, 1832), the hope is put forward that the House will form 
“a body of freely elected representatives, who will be actually, not virtually, the 
Commons of England” (sic). It then adds calls for further reforms such as legislation 
against bribery. While it is unsurprising that these Whig papers supported reform, it 
is also interesting to note that none of them seemed overly content with the 
outcome, and called for further measures to be implemented. The perception that 
the reform had not gone far enough indeed set the tone for the rest of this 
contestation phase, as I will discuss below. The dominant framing employed in all 
these papers is representation and democracy, further underlining the findings from 
the quantitative analysis.  
The inspection of the Whig papers yields few surprises, but a look at more 
Conservative-leaning newspapers shows a less straightforward picture. The following 
are a mix of leading Conservative-leaning publications from different parts of the 
United Kingdom, the Morning Post, The Times, the Glasgow Herald, the Essex 
Standard or the Royal Cornwall Gazette. The Morning Post (London) indeed and 
predictably opposed the Reform Bill. Their reasons to do so showed the 
defensiveness of the aristocracy, their core readership, as it questioned the motives 
of those who called for reform: “To impute improper or dishonourable motives to 
public men, unless they can be clearly and indisputably proved, is ungenerous and 
unmanly” (Snatches of Thought, 28 June 1832). The Times (London), one the other 
hand, had supported Electoral Reform ever since the Peterloo Massacre in 1819, and 
had since then earned a reputation of being one of the most prominent advocates of 
reform among the papers. This is not, however, contrary to the Times’ general 
political conservatism. Rather, its editor John Walter II insisted on the independence 
of the paper, and consequently it did often not fall in line with Tory party politics 
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(Morison 1952). The Essex Standard (Colchester) took a similar stance to the Morning 
Post’s, and attacked the reformers’ motives for reform. In an article on Earl Grey’s 
proposal to create extra peerages for a reformist Lords majority, the King’s refusal to 
do so and the government’s resignation, it comes to a dramatic conclusion: “The 
proceedings in the political world during the last week have developed many 
circumstances of great interest, and have abundantly proved that a most relentless 
tyranny is the real end and object of those who stimulate the country to disturbance 
in the name of liberty.” (May 19 1832). The Royal Cornwall Gazette (Truro) took an 
equally hard-line position. Based on the assumption that “the revolutionary spirit 
feeds on concession”, it suggest to the House of Lords to take the Bill apart in the 
committee stage (What the Lords should do, May 5 1832). The Morning Post’s frame 
employed for defending the old order is reminiscent of Max Weber’s (1924) ideal 
type of traditional authority. And the Essex Standard’s idea of fending off 
‘revolutionaries’ with motives of ‘tyranny’34, similar to the Cornwall Gazette, seems 
to emphasise stability for its own sake.  
On the more radical spectrum, the Poor Man’s Guardian and Cobbett’s Weekly merit 
some attention. William Cobbett, who had already played an important role in the 
1809 Duke of York discourse, continued here to agitate against government and Old 
Corruption. Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register had the appearance of an extended 
pamphlet rather than a newspaper in the conventional sense. It typically addressed 
the readers as ‘friends’, and directly, for example ‘To the Reformers of Lancashire and 
Yorkshire’ (July 31 1830) or ‘Manifesto of the Industrious Classes of England’ (Sep 18 
1830). Cobbett campaigned for more radical reforms, such as giving the vote to every 
man aged 18 or above, and with no pecuniary restrictions (e.g. Plan of Parliamentary 
Reform, Addressed to the Young men of England, Oct 30, 1830). The Poor Man’s 
Guardian (London) on the other hand represented a radical, working class vision of 
politics, and was indeed an illegal, unstamped underground publication at this time. 
                                                          
34 Earl Grey certainly makes an odd revolutionary leader, as an aristocrat ‘both by position and by 
nature’ (see above, Woodward 1988: 79). 
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For its editors, the reforms could not go far enough. Its reaction to the defeat of the 
bill in the Lords and the resignation of Lord Grey sums up this position:  
We are monarchists, essentially monarchists; but if monarchy can only subsist with 
Wellingtons, Cumberlands, Lyndhursts, ambitious bastards and German women for 
its ministerings and its love, and with rotten boroughs, enormous pensions and 
desolating taxes for its appendages, in the name of all that is just and dignified, and 
free in humanity, let monarchy go to the right-about, and the lesser evil of 
Republicanism become dominant in England. (May 19 1832) 
It is in these kinds of radical publications that working class interests were more 
explicitly proclaimed, from the right to vote for every man, to the removal of the 
monarchy itself, a truly revolutionary pursuit, as compared to the rather vague 
proclamations of the Whig papers that the reforms did not go far enough. Again, the 
frames employed here were concerned with democracy, but in a more radical version 
than in the Whig papers. 
The 1830 to 1832 Electoral Reform discourse thus clearly displays the underlying 
struggles of ideas and interests. While the defenders of the old system invoked a 
sense of traditional entitlement, those critiquing the system challenged it on the 
grounds of not being democratic enough, not allowing representation despite 
taxation, and thus being illegitimate, corrupt. Both used ideas as well as interests (to 
use another of Max Weber’s (1946) distinctions) to justify their positions. 
Traditionalists emphasised the noble motivations of those in power as well as the real 
material threat of instability that a revolution would bring. Reformists on the other 
hand appealed to the idea of fair and equal representation as well as pointing to who 
actually financed the state through their taxes, the material base, if one likes, of its 
existence.   
One interesting difference to the 1809 case is that unlike then, newspapers here 
showed support for a range of different positions. With the Duke of York, all papers 
(except the Morning Post) seemed to be against him, and then also either supported 
reform or at least did not voice any opposition to it. This difference might be owed 
to the fact that 1809 came hot on the heels of a very concrete corruption case in 
which the Duke had been found guilty (by popular opinion) of what was seen as an 
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undeniable case of misconduct. The debate in 1830 to 32 did not have this emotional 
trigger, and was more general - possibly it was this that allowed for a wider spectrum 
of opinions to be expressed, without fearing the backlash of an angry mob. 
 
Outlook: The Contestation Phase post-1832 
As discussed in chapter three, the research design of this thesis premises that the 
Electoral Reform Act discourse is representative of a contestation phase that runs 
from 1830 to roughly the second Reform Act of 1867. To understand in what ways 
this is the case, once again a turn to numbers is instructive.  Figure 6 focuses once 
more on corruption discourse proper (leaving ‘reform’, ‘representation’ etc. aside). It 
shows the key words ‘corruption’ and ‘rotten boroughs’, as well as the combinations 
of the term ‘corruption’ with ‘election’ and ‘reform’. These two combinations show 
how many of the newspaper articles that mentioned corruption also problematized 
election or reform, or more broadly speaking, how much of corruption discourse was 
also concerned with issues of elections and reform.  
 
Figure 6. Corruption word combinations, 1800 to 1900, election years added 
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In addition, to determine if there was a connection between corruption discourse 
and general elections, imposed on this graph as black dots are the years in which 
general elections took place.   
In my view, this graph is a visualised confirmation of the three phases of corruption 
discourse, marked here by two vertical lines in 1830 and in the 1870s. The key to this 
lies in both the alignment of election dates with the peaks in corruption, as well as 
the degree to which ‘reform’ was part of corruption discourse. Before 1830, the peaks 
in ‘corruption’ are unconnected to election years. But as of the 1831 election they 
are connected significantly, with almost all peaks appearing in years of general 
elections (the highest peak in 1853 owes much of its substance to the 1852 election 
which took place late in the year in November). Also, between 1830 and 1867 
corruption discourse is to a large extent dominated by concerns of both ‘election’ and 
‘reform’, shown in the graph in the prominence of the lines ‘corruption and election’ 
and ‘corruption and reform’ during this phase. In addition, we can see here peaks in 
‘rotten boroughs’ in the same years as the other lines peak. What can be concluded 
from this is that corruption discourse in this period of time – in its contestation phase 
- indeed followed a similar structure, digested similar issues, followed similar themes 
to corruption discourse in 1830 to 1832. The latter was thus indeed representative, 
and in many ways a prototype for the kinds of debates that followed in the decades 
to come. 
What changes after 1867 (the one high peak that was not caused or accompanied by 
a general election but by the debates surrounding the second Electoral Reform Act) 
is a slight decrease of corruption debate in absolute terms, as well as a slightly less 
pronounced alignment with election dates (while general elections still caused spikes, 
the distance between the peaks and the valleys are less pronounced). It is clear that 
electoral corruption here is still an issue - general election years are still accompanied 
not just with peaks in ‘corruption’, but also in the combination of ‘corruption’ and 
‘election’. What changes significantly after around 1867, however, is the frequency 
of ‘rotten boroughs’ as well as ‘reform’ as part of corruption discourse. Both these 
terms refer to systemic issues, they indicate a corruption discourse that is focussed 
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on critiquing what is wrong with the electoral system and that calls for changes to it. 
Their flattening out after 1867 therefore points to a change of focus, away from 
corruption as a signifier of systemic issues, and towards, as the next case study will 
show, a signifier of situational issues, of certain kinds of behaviours of individuals in 
the public offices of the administration that are seen as illegitimate.  
 
Consolidating State Administration: The Corrupt Practices Act 1889 
The ‘Act for the more effectual Prevention and Punishment of Bribery and Corruption 
of and by Members, Officers, or Servants of Corporations, Councils, Boards, 
Commissions, or other Public Bodies’, in short Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
(PBCPA), made active or passive bribery a criminal offence. On a mere three pages, it 
defined what exactly counted as ‘corrupt practice’ and what punishment courts 
should use in case of violations (up to two years, with or without hard labour and/or 
a fine of up to 500 pounds35). As shown in its long title, it applied to officials in any 
public bodies, with the notable exception of Parliament itself which had been covered 
by a separate Act in 1883 (cf. Oliver 1997:542). The PBCPA consolidated previous laws 
that had application only to some of the bodies it covered, and remained valid until 
repealed by the Bribery Act in 2010. 
This case study discussion looks first at the context in which the Act was conceived, 
and on how it built on and consolidated other reforms that had been passed during 
the so-called Age of Reform in the preceding decades. Secondly, it looks at the 
discourses surrounding it, or more precisely the lack of corruption discourse that 
accompanied the Act, and the significance of this lack. As a result of this absence of 
discourse, the analysis of this case is significantly shorter than of the previous ones. 
This does not, however, mean that the case itself is any less significant. 
 
                                                          




The Age of Anti-Corruption Reform, 1832 to 1889 
The PBCPA needs to be seen in the context of other reforms. Historians have written 
widely and broadly about Britain’s ‘Age of Reform’, which lasted either from 1780 to 
1850 (Burns/Innes 2003), 1815 to 1870 (Woodward 1988), 1830 to 1852 (Mandler 
1990) or, on the more generous end of the spectrum, 1790 to 1885 (Jaggard 1999). 
In light of this conceptual eclecticism, I want to take the liberty to suggest another 
Age of Reform: The Age of Anti-Corruption Reform. It spans from the Electoral Reform 
in 1832 to the Corrupt Practices Act in 1889. 
In addition to the three Electoral Reform Acts (a third one followed in 1884), some of 
the reforms that were instrumental in establishing a stronger control of corruption 
during this period were: The Municipal Corporations Act 1835 which built on the 1832 
Electoral Reform and addressed similar issues of representation and electoral 
corruption on local government level (Sweet 2007). The Northcote Trevelyan report 
1854 and the resulting reforms to the Civil Service in 1856 introduced entry exams 
and clearer criteria for promotion in the civil service, replacing a system based largely 
on patronage (e.g. Greenaway 1985). Also in 1854, Parliament passed a Corrupt 
Practices Act, defining bribery and criminalising it for MPs. The 1872 Ballot Act, 
following the 1867 Reform that had enfranchised skilled working class men, made 
votes secret – landlords could now no longer pressure their tenants into voting for a 
certain candidate (e.g. Woodall 1974). The aforementioned 1883 Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Prevention Act elaborated on the 1854 Act, and set caps on the money 
allowed to be spent on election campaigns (Rix 2008, Blaxill 2011). A third 
Representation of the People Act in 1884 further extended the right to vote to wider 
sections of the male population. The 1889 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act itself 
was to an extent an add-on to the Local Government Act of 1888, which had 
succeeded, and updated, some of the reforms of the 1835 Municipal Corporations 
Act.  
This list of Acts and Bills demonstrates the reformist fervour of this Age of Anti-
Corruption Reform. What makes the 1889 legislation stand out against many others, 
however, is its longevity. While it was updated and amended in 1906 and 1916, its 
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core remained intact throughout the 20th century and was only repealed as recently 
as 2010 by the Bribery Act (a result of the expenses scandal in the House of 
Commons). It therefore formed the basis of much of corruption legislation 
throughout the 20th and into the 21st century. It is thus clear that the passing of this 
law represents a consolidation of corruption legislation. In what ways, however, does 
this case also represent a consolidation of corruption discourse?  
 
The Lack of Corruption Discourse surrounding the PBCPA 
The process from the inception of the Act in July 1888 to its Royal Assent in August 
1889 was relatively uneventful. In addition to this, both in terms of academic 
literature as well as parliamentary and newspaper corruption discourse, this was and 
is almost a non-event. While the Act frequently merits a mention in the historical 
literature (e.g. Boesch 2009a: 424, Engels 2006: 333), and in recent years has been 
routinely referenced as the piece of legislation that was repealed by the 2010 Act 
(e.g. Yeoh 2012, Kirk 2011), there is to the best of my knowledge no detailed analysis 
of the history of this particular piece of legislation, of why and how it came into being. 
And this is unsurprising. As the following analysis shows, there was little debate 
surrounding the act, and no significant controversy attached to it. In a way, this is 
boring. But exactly herein lies the significance of this case. It is this boringness, the 
lack of controversy and the broad consensus across the political parties, public 
opinion and the different sectors of the press, that make this case significant.  
The following maps out the corruption discourse that did take place. The minutes 
provided by Hansard record the parliamentary history of the Bill. The initiative in the 
House of Commons thus came from Lord Randolph Churchill who, referring to the 
recently passed Local Government Bill, pointed out that it would not be in the scope 
of this Bill to deal with cases of corruption (Hansard, July 13, 1888). He therefore 
asked the House for leave so he could come up with an additional bill (ibid.). The 
three-page draft, authored by Lord Churchill, Sir Robert Fowler, a Mr Jennings, a Mr 
Whitbread, Sir Henry James and a Mr Richard Power, was then introduced to the 
117 
 
House on July 19. The Commons at this stage seemed ready to sign it off and refer it 
to committee. However, in a rather strange footnote of history, a certain Mr. 
Conybeare managed to derail the motion, somehow leading to its postponement for 
several months36. On March 13, 1889, the Bill was presented to the Commons again, 
and this time processed successfully. On July 29th, the Bill was passed by the House 
of Lords, and after some amendments finally approved on August 26. On August 30, 
1889 the Act got its Royal Assent. 
If parliamentary debate was uneventful and lacking in contest, so was newspaper 
discourse. While most papers covered the Bill as it proceeded through its different 
stages in the two Houses, they did so through their daily ‘Imperial Parliament’ section 
and used the standard protocols provided by Hansard (or their own ‘gallery reporters’ 
if they afforded themselves the luxury). No single paper could be found that opposed 
the proposed Bill, in fact its usefulness seemed so self-evident that few even saw it 
necessary to publish any kind of comment on it. The few opinions that were 
communicated tended to appear in little snippets: The York Herald showed “concern” 
that the bill, which it deemed “highly necessary” would not go through in the present 
session but taken into the next (July 16 1888). The Morning Post, on the other hand, 
expected the Bill to pass without opposition (July 18, 1888). A little more explicitly, 
the Manchester Times thought it would “go far to eradicate a serious and growing 
evil” (Mar 23 1889), the Newcastle Weekly Courant simply added the phrase “which 
it is hoped will be passed” to the Parliamentary minutes (June 1, 1889), and Reynold’s 
Newspaper, in concluding its report on a local case of corruption, emphasized that 
this case showed that it was necessary that the bill was passed quickly (Mar 24, 1889). 
An interesting detail is added by the Glasgow Herald which records a petition from 
the Convention of Parliamentary Burghs of Scotland that was presented to the House 
of Commons in support of the passing of the bill (May 8, 1889), further indication of 
widespread support from throughout the United Kingdom. 
                                                          
36 A rather strange character in this affair, Conybeare seemed to be some troublemaker, which in fact 
earned him the suspension from the House on a different matter, on the very same day. The Cornwall 
Royal Cornwall Gazette Falmouth Packet, Cornish Weekly News, & General Advertiser (July 26, 1888) 
reports in detail about this rather entertaining parliamentary session.  
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The frames of reference employed here indeed manifest a different kind of 
corruption discourse. No longer is parliamentary corruption the focus. There are now 
references to smaller-scale scandals that have made the news recently, either 
directly (the Reynold’s newspaper piece) or indirectly (“highly necessary”, “eradicate 
a serious and growing evil”). Indeed, as Boesch argues, the 1880s had seen a 
proliferation of corruption scandals in the UK following the establishment of mass 
media (2009a: 424). And these new scandals now problematized areas that are still 
typical for corruption scandals today, such as construction contracts or sport (ibid.). 
Some of the scandals of the years preceding the Act had for example been the tennis-
focussed ‘Wimbledon scandal’ in 1880 or the ‘Cricket scandal’ in 1882 (ibid.: footnote 
12). Doig (1984: 70 ff.) goes into more detail on some construction-related corruption 
cases of the time, such as the Music Halls scandal, and Fennel and Thomas (1983) 
elaborate on corruption as an everyday phenomenon (cf. Boesch 2009a: 424, 
footnote 12). While during its contestation phase, corruption discourse had attached 
itself to systemic issues, it now seemed more concerned with a higher number of 
situational cases rather than systemic corruption. The reforms that had taken place 
in the institutional framework over the preceding decades indeed had found their 
way into the frames employed by the newspapers. Within this settled legal 
framework, perceived as largely legitimate, corruption discourse now attached itself 
to the misbehaviours of individuals who did not follow the norms and rules that had 
been established for them through the changes in this framework. This is what Bratsis 
(2003) called the bourgeois ontology in action. As a normative project, it had 
established its ideas of what behaviours were legitimate and which were not, and the 
focus could now shift to the prevention of the illegitimate rather than the codification 
of the illegitimate in law.  
A further illustration of this shift is provided by a quick look at some of the numbers 
that show the relatively small role the bill played for corruption discourse overall. The 
time frames July 13 to July 30 1888 and March 12 to September 15, 1889 – the time 
periods in which the Bill was discussed in Parliament plus some ten days afterwards 
to account for further debate and evaluation – show this: While there are 1949 
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mentions of ‘corruption’ or ‘corrupt’, there are a mere 99 hits for ‘bribery public 
bodies’ (before it went into the history books as ‘Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act’, 
it was at the time discussed as ‘Bribery (Public Bodies) Prevention Bill’ – this search 
combination covers it generously). This accounts for no more than 5% of corruption 
discourse in these periods. In absolute numbers this is small, in relation to the 92% 
of corruption discourse that concerned itself with matters of ‘Reform’ in the 1830 to 
1832 case, the PBCPA is dwarfed into insignificance. In other words, while a change 
in legislation was almost the exclusive focus of corruption discourse in 1830 to 1832, 
in 1889 it is marginal, the relevant changes had already been achieved.  
As argued above, it is this lack of significance that makes the case significant. 
Corruption discourse has thus settled down, corruption control - referring to 
‘corruption’ as defined in the modern bourgeois sense - has become the new normal. 
The role of corruption discourse, then, has become to police the new normal, and to 
defend the order of the modern semi-democratic state against behaviours that are 
seen as violating the ‘public interest’ on which this state is supposedly built. It thus 
has a consolidating effect for the political system, and corruption discourse has 
developed from being a challenger of the existing order in the contestation phase to 
the role of consolidator of the existing order in its consolidation phase. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of corruption discourse in 19th century Britain, 
highlighting its development through three distinct phases using three case studies 
for exemplification. To summarise, it makes sense to look at the trajectory of the anti-
corruption movement, and at where the personnel that carried the anti-corruption 
movement was located. 
The Duke of York case in 1809 showcases how a situational corruption scandal, the 
Duke’s selling of officer commissions through his mistress, was transformed into a 
more fundamental critique of the electoral system. Corruption discourse was 
weaponised, discovered as a political weapon, to undermine the legitimacy first of 
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the Duke, then of parliamentarians and the system that got them elected. In this 
discovery phase, as exemplified in the Duke of York case, the conflict line between 
reformers and traditionalist ran between a largely conservative House of Commons 
and the largely reformist extra-parliamentary opposition.  
In 1830 to 1832, the reformist movement started to take over the Commons. 
Reluctantly first, with the aristocrat Earl Grey, himself seeing reform as a concession 
rather than enthusiastically supporting it, struggling to find a majority in the initial 
Parliament: but more decidedly so once the early elections had been conducted and 
had produced a clear reformist majority. The conflict line thus shifted from being 
between a majority of the Commons and a majority outside the Commons as in 1809, 
to a majority of the Lords against a now reformist majority of the Commons. 
Reformism in this contestation phase was thus contesting and taking over the 
political institutions. Again, corruption discourse served as a means of questioning 
the legitimacy of the existing institutional arrangements, undermining them, and 
justifying the need for reform. 
This process continued throughout the Age of Anti-Corruption Reform, in particular 
until the second Electoral Reform Act in 1867. After this reform, and further 
enhanced by a number of other reforms, corruption discourse entered its 
consolidation phase. By 1889, the time of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, the 
conflict line had shifted further: Whether this piece of legislation was necessary or 
not was not a matter of contest. Anti-corruption norms had indeed been normalised. 
In combination with the 1809 and 1832 cases, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 
thus showed how the anti-corruption movement had run its course from being an 
extra-parliamentary opposition movement in 1809, to being somewhat established 
but strongly contested in Parliament in 1832 to being well-established and 
unquestioned in 1889. 
By 1900, Britain had become a more democratic, more meritocratic, and in a modern 
sense less corrupt country as compared to 100 years before. What this analysis has 
shown is that corruption discourse, through its questioning of authority, its shifting 
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and re-organising of ideas of legitimacy, its contesting of undemocratic institutions 
and its consolidating of the new semi-democratic institutions, had played an 
important part in this process. Democratic reforms and the development of the 
institutions of the modern state in Britain came into existence on the back of 

























Chapter Five: Corruption Discourse in Germany 
What, then, can Germany add to the equation? As pointed out in chapter three, 
Germany represents an authoritarian/traditional path to corruption control, 
compared to Britain’s democratic path. While modern state institutions in the United 
Kingdom were formed through a dynamic interaction process between state and civil 
society, driven, as demonstrated, in no small part by corruption discourse, reforms 
to the state administration in the Germanies in the 18th and 19th centuries were 
primarily introduced top-down, driven by the state’s need to raise taxes and armies. 
The equivalent to Britain’s Civil Service here was the Staatsdienst, State Service.  
These different paths of development find an expression in the case studies available 
for selection. While the cases chosen for the UK were all played out in the arena of 
the legislative branch of government, the German cases shift the focus to the 
judiciary. This was not intentional at the point of case study selection. But at close 
inspection this shift is anything but a coincidence. While British corruption discourse 
unfolded within a largely absent legal framework, to then become one of the drivers 
for establishing this framework, it was already firmly in place when German 
corruption discourses came to the fore. For every case of perceived corruption here, 
a law that could be applied was already firmly in place. The first big difference 
between corruption discourses in Britain and Germany thus manifests itself at the 
very outset of the German analysis: the pre-existence of a legal framework that 
determines fundamentally the kinds of corruption cases on offer to the researcher. 
This chapter proceeds similarly to the equivalent UK chapter: It looks in turn at the 
three case studies chosen, and contextualises them within corruption discourses in 
the different eras more generally. The Tausch affair of 1896/97 represents a case of 
authoritarian manipulation of corruption discourse that reflects a wider trend 
observable throughout the Kaiserreich. This, too, is a discovery phase for corruption 
discourse, but while in Britain it happened largely uninterrupted and the press was 
able to establish itself as a self-styled Fourth Estate that challenged government 
authority, in the Germany of 1871 to 1914, this freedom always remains curtailed. 
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The second case, the Erzberger v Helfferich case of 1919/20 showcases many of the 
problems the Weimar Republic was to struggle with in its short existence from 1919 
to 1933. It, too, was a contestation phase in which corruption discourse was used to 
challenge a political system that was perceived as illegitimate. However, in a reversal 
to the UK case, the challengers here were anti-democratic forces, and the system that 
was undermined was a democratic one. Finally, the Spiegel Affair of 1962/63 
represents another attempt by authoritarian state actors to manipulate corruption 
discourse and press freedom. However, in this case the attempt failed, and 
corruption discourse was then able to settle into the role of consolidator of the 
democratic order. Before going into the details of these three cases, however, a short 
excursion to the time before 1871, and its lack of corruption discourse, is instructive. 
As I will argue, it offers further insights into the ways in which corruption discourse is 
embedded into state formation processes. 
While this chapter proceeds through a similar structure as the one on the UK cases, 
there is a marked change in the methodological tools available. Due to the absence 
of a comprehensively digitised archive that provides any quantitative data of note, 
there is no corresponding numerical analysis. The investigation of the German cases 
thus relies entirely on a qualitative evaluation, and the interpretative input of both 
the historical literature on the cases and myself. 
 
The curious absence of corruption debate before the 1870s 
A number of historians have noted the absence of corruption scandals in the years 
preceding German unification in 1871, but then do little to investigate why this might 
be the case (e.g. Boesch 2009a: 424, Engels 2006: 335). The obvious explanation is 
that press freedoms were largely restricted in the Germanies before the 1870s, and 
critique of authority was routinely prosecuted. However, there is one period of time 
in particular in which this was not the case: Following the 1848 March Revolution, 
far-reaching freedoms of the press were indeed granted. Newspapers flourished, and 
new publications started emerging all over the German territories. In a number of 
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ways, this period of time was similar to Britain in 1830 to 1832. In both there was a 
strong mobilisation of a broad popular movement for democratisation, supported by 
a coalition of middle and working class interests. And yet, while 1830 to 32 in Britain 
saw an explosion of reform and corruption discourse, this failed entirely to 
materialise in Germany. A search of some of the digital archives available for the 1848 
to 1850 years (I have looked at the extensive collection of the Bayerische 
Landesbibliothek) indeed shows almost no problematisation of corruption at all.  
Given that similar conditions seemed to be in place as in Britain in 1830 – freedom of 
the press to criticise government, the existence of a strong popular movement – this 
begs the question of what was different. A clue to this may lie in some of the names 
of the newly emerging newspaper publications – these are just some examples from 
the Landesbibliothek Collection: Der Freie Staatsbuerger (The Free Citizen, 
Nuremberg), Gradaus mein Deutsches Volk! (Onwards my German People! Munich), 
Teutsches Volksblatt (German People’s Paper, Wuerzburg), Deutsche Constitutionelle 
Zeitung (German Constitutional Newspaper, Munich).  
Norbert Elias (1982) famously described the different phases through which modern 
European states had developed in their respective processes of state formation: First, 
a monopoly of violence was established. Secondly, the boundaries of its territory had 
to be defined and consolidated. Thirdly, administrative institutions were developed 
and power was diffused to include broader sections of society. What we can see in 
Germany in 1848 to 1850 is a political movement that is primarily occupied with 
concerns of territorial definition. Britain, on the other hand, had left this phase well 
behind in 1832 and was able to move on to institutional development and the 
diffusion of power. The revolutionary goals in Germany were national unity, freedom 
of the press and freedom of assembly. Corruption thus, with its association with later 
stages of state formation, simply was not on the agenda yet. If this interpretation is 
correct, the curious absence of corruption discourse in Germany in this period of time 
once again points to how underlying macro-processes of state formation shaped the 
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ways in which corruption discourse materialised. It is here its very absence that 
supports the hypothesis.37  
 
Discovering Corruption in times of Authoritarianism: The Tausch Affair 
and the Corruption of Corruption Discourse 
It was after German unification in 1871 that home-grown corruption discourse was 
eventually, albeit slowly, allowed to unfold. The Reichspreßgesetz (Imperial Press 
Law) of 1874 gave the newspapers some freedoms to critique authority and point out 
abuses of power by the powerful, as long as it did not either insult them (especially if 
it was majesty) or provoke unrest (Volksverhetzung, cf. Naujoks 1982). Not 
surprisingly, these exceptions were used liberally by state authorities – Bismarck 
himself was reported to have pressed libel and slander charges close to 10,000 times 
(Hall 1977: 66). In addition, freedom of speech was further limited through the 
Socialist Laws from 1878 to 1890, which among other provisions outlawed any 
socialist or social democratic newspapers (ibid.).   
But it was not only this legal corset imposed on the freedom of the press that made 
sure the powers that be still had an influence on what could be written publicly and 
what could not. State actors also took informal action to influence what would appear 
in the papers. As discussed in chapter three, the so-called Reptile Fund, part of the 
infamous Welf Fund, was used to bribe journalists and gather intelligence on 
opposition campaigners38.  The case study chosen to represent this discovery phase 
                                                          
37 Some corruption debate, however, did exist before the 1870s. Looking at the Bayerische 
Staatsbibliothek collection of Bavarian newspapers from 1800 to 1870, an interesting pattern 
emerges: Corruption debates here seemed to trend at exactly the same times as they did in British 
newspaper discourses. I have compiled the incidences and have run some correlations. The correlation 
of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek 19th century press collection to the 19th century British library 
newspapers for the frequency of ‘corruption’ reaches a highly significant 0.80 for the years 1800 to 
1870. A closer look at some of the newspaper articles reveals why: Rather than reporting on corruption 
in the Germanies of the time, German newspapers reported on corruption cases in Britain, and to a 
lesser extent, France. Many of the articles were in fact verbatim translations of the corresponding 
Times articles published in London. This goes to show that corruption was at least not a completely 
unknown quantity to newspaper editors in Germany before the 1870s, and that the modern concept 
of corruption that was emerging in Britain was exported to other countries from its inception.  
38 More detail for example in Nöll von der Nahmer 1968 and Stöber 1996 
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is an example of very similar authoritarian intervention, merely on a smaller scale. 
The dealings of the police Kommissar Egon von Tausch put on display a microcosm of 
what was happening in the Kaiserreich more broadly, and on the highest levels of the 
state. This case study proceeds in three steps: First, I summarise the main events of 
the trial and how it played out in the courts. Secondly, I analyse the Tausch case as a 
corruption discourse. And thirdly, the specifics of the Tausch affair are then put into 
context with the generalities of the discovery phase of the Kaiserreich.  
 
Summary of the Case 
The Tausch case is another one that has received relatively little attention from 
historians (Bösch 2009a: 347, footnote 82). The East German historian Fricke (1960) 
contextualised it within the governmental crisis of 1897, and Hall (1977) looked at 
the role the Social Democratic Press played in the scandal. More recently Frank Bösch 
has conducted an up-to-date in-depth study of the case (2009a: 329 – 364).39 This 
summary is thus primarily based on Bösch’s and Hall’s accounts. 
The scandal was preceded by growing suspicions since the early 1890s as to the 
origins of stories surfacing in the press. Newspaper articles had been appearing in a 
range of different publications which were unfavourable to government ministers 
and even the Kaiser himself (Hall 1977: 104). This included for example the 
supposedly bad health of the Kaiser, a change in the chancellorship of the 
government or indiscretions by members of the Bundesrat (Bösch 2009a: 345). 
Speculation was rife as to who was, or were, the sources of these stories. And while 
early suspicions focussed on rival politicians’ attempts to undermine their political 
adversaries, the Tausch scandal showed that one of the key players was in fact the 
police, more precisely the political police (Politische Polizei), the domestic intelligence 
branch of the federal police apparatus. The scandal took off over the misreporting of 
                                                          
39 Bösch refers to the case as the Tausch-Leckert-Lützow scandal (ibd.: 345). For simplicity, I refer to 
it as the Tausch scandal or affair, as Tausch was the man pulling the strings (Leckert and Lützow were 
the journalists who had been paid by Tausch to engineer the story, and who were persecuted in the 
initial court case). 
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a toast to the Russian tsar by the Kaiser during his visit in Breslau on Sep 5, 1895. 
What was supposed to be a friendly gesture to the tsar was reported in the Welt am 
Sonntag (Sept 28 and Oct 5, 1896) as an anti-Russian toast40. This was political 
dynamite, and as a consequence, the state prosecutor began to investigate. 
Ironically, the perpetrator of the crime, Eugen von Tausch, was in fact the police 
officer who was in charge of gathering the evidence of the crime. His attempt to 
deflect the blame onto exterior state secretary Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein 
backfired. Marschall, who over the previous years had in fact been one of the victims 
of smear campaigns, commissioned his own private investigation and was able to 
expose Tausch’s doings. He did this very publicly in the rather dramatic initial trial 
against the journalists Leckert and Lützow in December 1896, who had been 
identified as the sources of the Kaiser’s toast misreporting. Both Marschall and 
Tausch were witnesses in this trial, and the former produced his evidence against the 
latter in the arena of the court, calling it ‘seeking refuge in publicity’ (Flucht an die 
Öffentlichkeit, Hall 1977: 107). In this first trial, Leckert and Lützow were both 
sentenced to 18 months in prison, but the revelation were also to have consequences 
for Tausch himself. 
Tausch was arrested soon after, on December 5, 1896. Further investigations for his 
own trial, to take place in May and June 1897, uncovered an intricate network of 
press manipulation. With the help of some of his officers Tausch had fed numerous 
stories – some true, some fabricated - to a variety of different press outlets. His 
motives for this were not entirely clear, but it is likely that monetary reasons played 
a role, and that he had sold information to the press to finance his lavish lifestyle 
(Evans & Etges 1996: 617). Some of his efforts seemed to have been successful – the 
eventual failure of Bismarck’s successor as chancellor, Caprivi, in 1894 and the 
resignation of Interior minister von Köller in 1895, as well as a number of other 
                                                          
40 The actual toast “I can assure you, Sir, that I am motivated by the same traditional feelings [towards 
Russia] as his majesty” had been altered to “[…] as my father”. Wilhelm’s father was known to have 
little sympathy for Russia (Hall 1977: 105, Bösch 2009a: 347, footnote 82). 
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scandals of previous years, were now associated, at least in some sections of the 
press, with indiscretions fabricated or leaked by Tausch (Bösch 2009a: 352). 
In the end, however, the case against Tausch collapsed. Similar to the Duke of York 
case in 1809, while it was clear to any observer that the accused was guilty of the 
crimes brought against him, the court (in the case of the Duke the House of 
Commons) found him not guilty. Tausch was initially allowed to continue in his role 
at the political police, but eventually suspended in November 1897. Disciplinary 
procedures were implemented in January 1898 but did not proceed very decisively, 
and he was retired on a full pension in December of the same year (Hall 1977: 111). 
Marschall on the other hand had fallen into disrepute among his government 
colleagues for breaking rank discipline and exposing the scandal, and by October 
1898 was relieved of his ministerial duties (ibid.: 110f.). Much unlike the Duke of York 
case, however, the discourse surrounding this case developed a rather different 
dynamic. 
 
The Tausch Scandal as Corruption Discourse 
When the scandal broke, it immediately caught the attention of national and 
international media. German newspapers in the late 19th century were largely divided 
along party lines, and indeed more often than not saw themselves as mouthpieces 
for particular political parties. The social democrat Vorwärts for example used the 
scandal for a wider ranging critique of the Kaiserreich in general. It conducted its own 
investigations, ironically itself using methods similar to that of the political police 
(Bösch 2009a: 353). Liberal, Catholic and leftist publications all supported Marschall’s 
actions and saw them as a “commendable and necessary act of purification” (ibd.: 
354, my translation)41. Some sections of the conservative press however interpreted 
the case differently. In their opinion, it should have been handled behind closed doors 
rather than made public, as this damaged the reputation of the civil service and was 
thus only helping the Social Democrats (e.g. Deutsche Zeitung 02/02/1897, Berliner 
                                                          
41 All translations in this chapter are by myself, unless otherwise stated 
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Börsen-Zeitung 03/02/1897, cf. Bösch 2009a: 354). The following looks in more detail 
into the discourses surrounding the Tausch case, and in particular what kinds of 
framings the different publications used when reporting on it. There are three distinct 
phases in this case which are handled in turn: First, the trial against Leckert and 
Lützow in December 1896 which also included the publication of the allegations 
against Tausch; secondly, the widely reported debate in the Reichstag in February 
1897; and thirdly, the court case against Tausch in May and June 1897. 
From the very beginnings of the trial, the press was (unsurprisingly) less interested in 
the allegations against the small fish, Leckert and Lützow, but focussed on the 
revelations that the eloquent Marschall was presenting against Tausch. One of the 
notable features across many publications was here that rather than explaining the 
exposed dealings as ‘corruption’, ‘bribery’ or the spreading of falsehoods, they were 
framed as a much more systemic case of a ‘parallel government’ (Nebenregierung). 
The more liberal Freiburger Zeitung for example made it their lead story as soon as 
the news broke. On December 3, it reported on the ensuing trial on the Secrets of the 
Parallel Government, but also stated that it did not believe that the state attorney 
would be able to disentangle it. On December 8, it referred to the “corruption, lies 
and intrigue” and speculated on what more there was going to be revealed, as surely 
Kommissar Tausch could only be a small fish in the whole system – a thinly veiled 
critique of the well-known secretive dealings of the government through its reptile 
fund. A December 10 comment questioned what other cases Tausch was involved in 
‘solving’ and why there was so much money for ‘special police purposes’ that was out 
with public control. The Staufener Wochenblatt (Staufen Weekly – another liberal 
publication from the South-West of Germany) reported similarly on the case. In a lead 
story on December 8, it lauded Marschall’s efforts and encouraged him to “stick to 
his guns” (“nicht locker lassen”). On Tausch’s proclamation after his arrest that he 
was going to talk, the Staufener, expecting further revelations on the parallel 
government, noted: “This could be promising!” (Dec 10). It also expressed its hope 
that Marschall continued with his anti-Semitic efforts (Leckert and Lützow were Jewish), 
its bourgeois anti-Semitism openly displayed. 
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An excellent representation of a conservative standpoint is provided by the 
Henneberger Zeitung. At the beginning of the trial, it decided to report it only 
marginally (Dec 5, 6 and 8) in a short report under ‘miscellaneous’ in the back pages. 
Only when public attention to the scandal began to escalate in other newspapers it 
published a lead that summarised the happening thus far (Dec 9). A strongly worded 
opinion piece on December 11 explained the initial reluctance: The author attacked 
the “excesses of the freedom of the press”, blaming both the journalism of other 
papers and their readers who were only too eager on sensation and scandal. Also, it 
voiced its concerns that publicising this trial only helped the Social Democrats, 
referencing a recent Vorwärts article claiming that the conditions in the Reich were 
now almost exactly the same as before the French Revolution, and that, hence, 
revolution was near. On December 13, the Henneberger in another lead comment 
came to the defence of the political police. It bemoaned that the force was being 
criticised as a whole, again especially by the Social Democrats, because of Tausch. But 
actually it was a very important, “indispensable” institution, especially to keep Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) in check. The enemy, thus, could hardly be defined more 
clearly. 
Indeed, this case was a field day for the SPD and its associated media outlets. As Hall 
(1977: 107) notes: “It was the sort of occasion which placed no further demands on 
the party other than intelligent reporting, and enabled them, moreover, to stand 
back and cheer on both sides from the touchlines.” The leading Social Democrat 
publication, the aforementioned Vorwärts (Forward), on December 8 invoked the 
scenario of an impending revolution, and saw the scandal as the “stormy petrel 
announcing the forthcoming tempest” (ibid.). And the Neue Zeit (New Time) 
speculated that Tausch was just one small player in the network of a military that 
secretly undermined the state (Hall 1977: 108). The state prosecution reacted to 
these allegations by forbidding the mention of a Nebenregierung and criminalising 
the claim under the lèse-majesté law (ibid.).  
The frames of reference employed in this debate point to the grander political 
processes and conflicts that were taking place at the time of the scandal. The liberal 
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papers’ suspicions about the parallel government display an uneasiness as to the 
authoritarianism of the state of Germany, and the possibility that government was 
not what it seemed. In contrast to the social democrat publications who emphasised 
the possibility of a revolution, however, the liberal papers seemed to root for change 
from within the system, cheering on Marschall and his efforts rather than proclaiming 
that revolution was nigh. The Conservative papers emphasised the socialist threat, 
and defended the forces of order (the political police, a media that keeps quiet) that 
kept it at bay. An interesting detail is the Staufener’s reference to anti-Semitic efforts, 
showing that this seemed a normal thing to say for a mainstream newspaper, also 
pointing to problematic underlying developments. 
The Reichstag debate in February 1897, the second instance of this discourse, showed 
a very similar distribution of opinions: Leftists, liberals and Catholics in all their 
different ways supported Marschall, while some conservatives spoke out against him 
(Bösch 2009: 355). This equal lining up of opinion in political parties and newspapers 
is no surprise given the closeness of the two spheres.  
The debate was started with a motion by the Conservative MPs Anker and Gen42 who 
asked the Reichskanzler (Imperial Chancellor) to make sure that in the future, there 
would not be any raising of suspicions against any of the state’s institutions by any 
other state institutions (Berliner Gerichtszeitung Feb 6). This thinly veiled attack 
against Marschall gave way to an eloquent defence by the minister – and if the 
Staufener Wochenblatt (Feb 9) is to be believed, he enjoyed the vocal support of 
many parliamentarians. Marschall thus claimed that he had known at the time that 
the Social Democrats were aware of Tausch’s doings, and that it was better if he 
himself published the allegations before they did. He also let it be known that he had 
not found any Hintermänner (background men) who might be standing behind 
Tausch. This prompted Bismarck’s son to proclaim that his father had not even known 
Tausch. Similarly, the Berliner Gerichtszeitung on Feb 8 reported that despite the 
                                                          




motion from the Conservative Party all speakers supported Marschall. One thanked 
him for the anti-Semitic effect his actions had had.  
The parliamentary debate thus shows the extension of the frames found during the 
initial trial in the newspapers. The general hostility against the Social Democrats 
seemed particularly dominant here. Both sides saw the question of whether 
Marschall should really have exposed Tausch’s doings in public as a question of which 
gave the SPD less to feed on. Marschall’s assurance that he had not found any 
background men, similarly meant that there was no danger to the existing political 
order. The casual antisemitism once again illustrated problematic developments that 
were to escalate further in the following decades. 
Finally, the trial against Eugen von Tausch in May and June 1897, part three of this 
discourse, was not just widely reported in papers up and down the country but 
became some kind of society event – the Hamburger Echo (June 9) reported the 
appearance of well-heeled society women who added to the theatricality of the 
event, sporting their opera glasses (see also Hall 1977: 110).  
Proceedings started with the unusual opening statement by the judge who voiced his 
disapproval of comments that had been written in the press before the trial had even 
started, let alone any judgement passed, either in support or against Tausch (Berliner 
Gerichtszeitung May 27), demonstrating the media attention and pressure he was 
already dealing with. Two days later, the Staufener Wochenblatt reported ‘no 
progress yet’ and that ‘it’s a complicated case’ (May 29), concluding that those 
politicians who thought Tausch was a ‘tool of the old course’ would not see 
themselves confirmed, as no Hintermann had yet been found43. On June 5, it noted 
that the Kaiser was unhappy about the revelations that were coming to light (the 
Berliner Gerichtszeitung claims the same on June 11). And on June 10, on the end of 
the trial, it concluded that “rightly the press demands that an end be put to the 
political police in its current form” (similar the Straßburger Post, see below). The 
                                                          
43 certainly a change of direction by the paper considering its “this could be promising!” exclamation 
after the arrest of Tausch in December 
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conservative Henneberger on the other hand restricted itself to factual reports from 
the trial (May 27, 29 and 30, June 1 to 6) and refrained from further comments.  
To add more substance to this map of press discourses in the absence of fully digitised 
newspaper archives, a look at some of the Presseschaus in the publications available 
– reviews of what other papers were writing - is instructive.  The Staufener’s review 
on June 3 featured the conservative Nation which picked apart Tausch’s defence in 
which he had claimed to have acted ”in the interest of the state” and called it a 
“roguery in all directions in the interest of the state” (Gaunerei nach allen Richtungen 
aus Staatsinteresse). The liberal Straßburger Post diagnosed chaos (“everyone 
against everyone”) and called for reforms, claiming that even the parties in power 
were now acknowledging this necessity. The Berliner Gerichtszeitung in its review 
(June 11) observed that both the conservative Schlesiche Zeitung and 
Nationalzeitung, while lauding Marschall for his conviction, criticized him for taking 
the wrong path and ignoring what they both called “old Prussian administrative 
tradition” (Marschall was from Baden in the South-West of Germany).  
Did the Tausch case lead to any changes? There are conflicting interpretations of this. 
Bösch sees in it the collapse of the Bismarckian system of press manipulation. 
Established by Bismarck through his Reptile Fund, it had now spun out of control and 
turned against the authoritarian state that had given birth to it (2009a: 347). Hall on 
the other hand concludes: “Although the affair severely depressed government 
morale […], it had little or no effect on the distribution of political power or the 
influence which the political police continued to wield” (1977: 111). In fact, as he 
points out, rather than reducing the role of the Politische Polizei, its budget was 
further boosted in the following years (ibid.: 112).  
The extent to which corruption discourse had been ‘discovered’ during the 
Kaiserreich as a weapon for undermining the legitimacy of the existing order is 
expressed by the remarkable letter the SPD chairman August Bebel wrote to his 
comrade Adler (quoted in Hall 1977: 110): 
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The Tausch trial has ended in the best possible way for us; once again a splendid 
episode like that succeeds in shaking the credibility of the state and government. We 
are such lucky fellows. All that our opponents do works simply to our own advantage. 
And the tragic nature of it! The only man who has the courage to campaign openly 
for an honest form of government [Marschall] has to capitulate, and one of the 
representatives of the most abominable corruption triumphs. Long live corruption!  
As Hall concludes: “For the first time, the seedier aspects of the country’s system of 
a political police had been illuminated from within. The affair had strengthened SPD 
suspicions of the corruptness of government and its various agencies” (Hall 1977: 
111). 
The two scandals that represent the discovery phase in Britain and Germany have 
some commonalities. They both problematize the misconduct of state personnel in 
high office. They both look not just at the individual but also at systemic issues. They 
both see the perpetrator acquitted despite their apparent guilt. But there lies a big 
difference in the role of discourse in the two cases, more precisely in how discourse 
was shaped by the legal framework and state actors. While in Britain in 1809, the 
press could develop its corruption discourse relatively uninhibited by state 
intervention and would soon act as a self-styled ‘Fourth Estate’ (Hampton 2004: 
106ff.), in Germany this process was inhibited by authoritarian interventions. In a 
way, if one wants, this could be described as the ‘corruption of corruption discourse’, 
if the ideal that is being corrupted here is taken to be the press freedom that would 
have been necessary for discourse to freely unfold its potential.  
 
Beyond Tausch: The Kaiserreich as a Discovery Phase 
This section gives a short overview of some of the main corruption scandals of the 
Kaiserreich, in order to illustrate further the kinds of discourses that were typical for 
this phase in which corruption first became relevant in public debates in Germany. 
There had been some scandals before the 1890s, however, they were scarce. In 1873, 
allegations surfaced against the railway baron Strousberg (Borchart 1991), and 
throughout the 1870s, suspicions were raised against Bismarck’s banker von 
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Bleichroeder (Stern 2008). The fact that both these early targets of corruption 
allegations were Jewish is unlikely to have been a coincidence.  
The turning point for corruption discourse came with the expiry of the Socialist Laws 
in 1890 which had put restrictions on what the press could report, and curtailed or 
downright outlawed any Social Democrat activities. It was only after their expiry that 
corruption scandals became a more frequent matter (Bösch 2005: 342). This suggests 
that they were not just a repression of socialism in general but also of the corruption 
discourse that in all likelihood – given the later history - would have been pursued by 
socialist politicians. As the Tausch case shows, this was certainly the case in 1897, as 
the SPD here experienced how useful corruption allegations were for undermining 
the perceived legitimacy of their political enemy. The manipulation of discourse in 
the 1890s was thus merely a continuation of its repression in the 1880s, and both 
were attempts to ‘manage’ the growing threat of the workers’ movement.  
Two further big scandals in the later Kaiserreich are of note: One of its biggest was 
the Eulenburg affair of 1906. A famous aristocrat, Phillip Prince of Eulenburg-
Hertefeld had been outed by a journalist as homosexual. Rather than being merely 
about what was perceived then as private vice, this became an attack on public 
figures which ultimately had the Kaiser himself and aristocrats more broadly as its 
aim (Domeier 2010). While not a corruption scandal in the modern sense of being 
about misconduct in office or bribery, this was seen as a case of moral corruption, 
and was used like other corruption allegations, as a means of challenging the 
legitimacy of persons in positions of power. 
The Kornwalzer affair in 1912/13 revealed that the German War Ministry had leaked 
confidential data to the arms manufacturer Krupp, about the offers as well as 
technical details of rivals’ products in procurement processes (Bösch 2005). An 
interesting detail here is that this scandal was broken by the Social Democrat 
chairman Liebknecht, after he had received anonymous correspondence from a 
Krupp insider. It was thus once again the SPD that used corruption discourse 
strategically and weaponised it to challenge the existing political establishment. 
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The common theme of all these discourses is first, that they reflected deep-seated 
societal conflicts, in particular between the working classes and the aristocratic elite; 
and secondly that its use by the social democrats seemed strategically aimed at 
attacking government and state, as a fundamental challenge to their legitimacy. 
What this discovery phase then led to, was not an Age of Reform as in the British 
case. The authoritarianism that had prevented newspaper discourses from unfolding 
also prevented the reforms that would have been needed to transform Germany into 
a more democratic and pluralistic society in the mould of France or Britain. It had 
failed to address the workers’ question and had instead radicalised the movement. 
What followed instead was the Great War, triggered by an aloof political elite that 
was not just unable to prevent it, but actively dragged the country into it. 
 
Erzberger versus Helfferich and the Hyper-Contestation of the Weimar 
Republic 
The Great War ended in defeat for Germany, and the peace treaty of Versailles that 
was seen as a humiliation by many. The so-called Weimar Republic, with its seat of 
government now in the small town of Weimar, symbolising the new beginning, was 
an attempt at democracy, but one that ultimately failed and led to the takeover by 
Hitler and his Nazi Party and the catastrophes of World War Two and the holocaust. 
The state failed because for too many of its citizens it lacked legitimacy. The question 
here, then, is what role corruption discourse, this organiser of legitimacy, played in 
these developments.  
The Erzberger versus Helfferich case took place during the fallout of the unpopular 
Versailles Peace, and in Erzberger one of the protagonists of the peace process 
became the target of corruption allegations. Due to the prominence of the accused 
as well as the accuser (Erzberger had recently been promoted to finance minister, 
Helfferich had been treasury secretary, secretary of the interior, and at one point 
chancellor during the war), this case features prominently in the history books of the 
Weimar Republic (e.g. Abraham 1986, Kolb 1988, Nicholls 1991, Peukert 1993). 
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Erzberger himself has attracted the interest of a number of biographies (e.g. Epstein 
1971 [1959], Eschenburg 1973). The most in-depth study of this case, however, 
comes from the German historian Annika Klein (2011, 2014) who has meticulously 
catalogued the sequence of events as well as the debates surrounding the case.  
Matthias Erzberger had been an influential politician and a prominent member of 
parliament for the Zentrum (Centre) Party since the early 1900s (Epstein 1971: 61ff.), 
and was involved in high-profile propaganda efforts as well as the diplomatic service 
of the Reich during the Great War (ibid.: 96ff.). Erzberger had been an enthusiastic 
supporter of war when it broke out, but started shifting his position from 1916 
onwards. It was following his initiative that the Reichstag passed a peace resolution 
in 1917 giving up on the idea of annexation of any of the territories it had occupied 
(ibid.: 182ff.). He was later appointed head of the Armistice Commission in charge of 
negotiating peace with the Allies, and on November 11, 1918 was one of the 
signatories of the Armistice of Compiègne that heralded the end of hostilities (ibid.: 
257ff.). In the new republic, Erzberger was soon promoted to one of the most 
important positions the country had to offer, Finance Minister. It did not take long 
for the right-wing nationalists to start their attacks. 
This case study proceeds in three steps: First, it analyses the exchange between 
Erzberger and Helfferich in the Kreuzzeitung and Allgemeine Zeitung in the summer 
of 1919. Helfferich started his campaign against the minister in the Kreuzzeitung in 
July, and published a number of aggressively worded articles, culminating in the 
August pamphlet Fort mit Erzberger! (Away with Erzberger). Secondly, it discusses 
the court case and how it was covered in different newspapers. Erzberger on 
September 1, 1919, finally decided to take Helfferich to court on charges of libel, a 
trial that was discussed extensively in the media. And thirdly, rounding off this case 
study, it is contextualised within corruption discourse in the contestation phase of 





Away with Erzberger! Helfferich’s public attacks on the Finance Minister 
Helfferich and Erzberger’s very public quarrel started with the former’s first article in 
the Kreuzzeitung on July 1, 1919, and the latter’s reply in the Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung on July 2 (written not by the minister himself but his assistants Hemmer and 
Driessen, as Epstein (1971: 352) points out). The exchange lasted for the entire month 
of July, and Helfferich later compiled both his accusations and Erzberger’s replies, 
plus some additional material, in an 83-page pamphlet entitled Away with Erzberger 
– he clearly thought that even the minister’s attempts to defend himself (mostly by 
going on the attack against Helfferich) discredited the minister rather than him.  
As the stab-in-the back legend typically went, the German forces had not been 
defeated in battle but had been betrayed by politicians from within, brokering a 
disadvantageous peace with the Allies that had now ruined the Reich. What riled the 
nationalists about Erzberger in particular was the fact that he had initially supported 
the War. For some reason he had turned, and Helfferich and other right-wing 
agitators alleged that this was because of his personal business interests. In the 
pamphlet’s closing remarks Helfferich states: 
Erzberger was during the war one of the worst annexationists while serving on the 
board of directors of a steel firm. Yet after his sudden and involuntary removal from 
the board of directors he could scarcely find sufficiently strong words of 
condemnation to express his hostility to the steel industry and annexationism. […] 
Erzberger has been accused of deliberate untruthfulness not two or three times but 
ten or twenty times. He has been accused of mixing his political activity with the 
pursuit of private financial gain. (Helfferich 1919: 81, Epstein’s translation 1971: 
352f.) 
While the word ‘corruption’ is not explicitly used here, these allegations certainly fit 
the description of the crime, the misuse of public office for private gain. Erzberger 
was not just filling his own pockets, he was also, according to Helfferich, working for 
the Austrian (and in extension French) monarchy: 
Erzberger stabbed German policy in the back with his July action at the decisive 
moment of the war, acting on the instigation of his Hapsburg-Bourbon employer. He 
destroyed the faith in victory and thereby the power to achieve victory of the 
German people, while re-stimulating the fading faith in victory and the will to victory 
among our enemies. […] Erzberger’s name very properly stands under the miserable 
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armistice. Erzberger helped the Entente in the period of the armistice to paralyze us 
financially and steer our entire merchant fleet into Entente ports. (Helfferich 1919: 
82, Epstein’s translation 1971: 353) 
As this section clearly shows, Erzberger’s corruption from this viewpoint was not just 
immoral in itself but had completely undermined the German war effort. The man 
now in charge of the country’s finances was responsible for the country losing the 
war and being economically crippled. Helfferich concludes: 
Erzberger will soon lead Germany to complete ruin by squandering the little moral, 
political and economic capital that has survived her collapse, unless his political 
power is finally broken. One thing only can save the German people. A single demand 
must be sounded with irresistible force everywhere in the country: Away with 
Erzberger! (1919: 83, Epstein’s translation 1971: 354) 
The allegations made by Helfferich were not new. Before, during and after his 
campaign, the right-wing sections of the press routinely attacked Erzberger. To list 
but few examples, the Tägliche Rundschau on April 12, 1919 voiced their suspicions 
about his change of position during the war in Erzberger then and now. The 
Hamburgischer Correspondent on July 2 wrote about The Spoiler (Der Verderber). The 
Stader Tageblatt on July 11 reported on How Mr Erzberger celebrated the 
ignominious peace (“the goblets were circling, laughter lined the faces, and flowering 
roses had been tucked into the button holes of the dining party”, my translation) and 
the Hamburger Nachrichten on August 1 once again pointed to the change from war 
supporter to peace traitor in Erzberger from yesteryear. Indeed, as Domeier states: 
As a ‘November Criminal’ [referring to the maligned November 1918 truce], an 
‘Erfüllungspolitiker’ [lit. compliance politician, complying with the harsh demands of 
the Allies after the war] and ‘Reichsverderber’ [lit. spoiler of the Empire], the Imperial 
Finance Minister Matthias Erzberger became a focus of the New Right, after the 
danger of a bolshevist revolution (Spartakus revolt) in Germany had passed, and his 
finance and tax reform threatened the accumulated wealth of the rich. (Domeier 
2015: 4, my translation) 
Erzberger’s defence in the Allgemeine Zeitung was initially based on explaining some 
of the details of how events unfolded. For example he (or more precisely Hemmer 
and Driessen) pointed to the fact that Erzberger’s truce initiative in July 1917 had 
been put forward in cooperation with the government, and in fact with Helfferich 
himself (July 4 in Allgemeine). As the dispute proceeded, however, Erzberger 
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increasingly resorted to the counter-attack. In a Reichstag debate he questioned 
Helfferich’s fiscal policies during the war (July 8, 1919, cf. Klein 2014: 79), and 
eventually he threatened to have him put on the list of people to be extradited to the 
Allies (Helferrich himself refers to this threat, 1919: 76). 
The frames employed in this debate are all connected to the national demise and 
humiliation that followed the Great War. It is easy to grasp the strength of feeling 
that is contained in the commonly used expressions of ‘November Criminal’ and 
‘Reichsverderber’. ‘Corruption’ here does feature in some of the discourse, but it is 
overshadowed by references to destruction and decline. Corruption discourse once 
again is thus shaped by wider societal developments. Had this case not been 
connected to the war, ‘corruption’ would likely have been one of the key terms with 
which Erzberger had been challenged. But the fact of the defeat in war and the appeal 
to national sentiment was an even stronger weapon in this battle for the legitimacy 
of Erzberger as a leading minister, and the new post-war elites more generally. 
Helfferich had deliberately tried to provoke Erzberger to sue him for libel. In his 
pamphlet he complains: “[…] Erzberger refuses to sue for libel to refute these 
accusations, preferring instead to escape by muddying the waters in the manner of a 
cuttlefish” (1919: 81, Epstein’s translation 1971: 353). Under German law at the time, 
a court case meant that the court would conduct an examination as to the veracity 
of the allegations – Helfferich was confident they, or at least some of them, would be 
accurate (cf. Epstein 1971: 352). In September 1919, he had his wish granted – after 
publication of the pamphlet, Erzberger decided to take the matter to court.  
 
Taking it to Court: Erzberger’s Own Goal 
The trial started on January 19, 1920 and lasted until the verdict on March 12. Epstein 
paints the picture of a hostile atmosphere in the courthouse in Berlin. Most of the 
audience seemed to be from the upper classes of the city, and they openly showed 
their disdain for the minister: “The spectators frequently cheered Helfferich and 
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laughed at Erzberger” (Epstein 1971: 355). But it did not stop there. The judiciary 
itself seemed to have little sympathy for the claimant: 
Judges and prosecutors alike had been raised in a strait-laced bureaucratic tradition 
which was utterly ignorant of the realities of parliamentary life. They did little to hide 
their contempt for a party politician, and were horrified by any conduct on the part 
of the deputy that did not conform to their accustomed bureaucratic code of honour. 
They were, specifically, hostile to a deputy engaging in business affairs that would be 
unbecoming in a state official. (ibid.: 356) 
The court divided the allegations into four different themes: The mixing of public 
office and private business interest, untruthfulness, impropriety and, lastly, political 
activity to the disadvantage of the German Reich (Domeier 2015: 5). And while the 
last point was excluded from the court case for not falling under the responsibility of 
the court, the question of what role Erzberger’s activities played in the development 
and the eventual outcome of the war remained, implicitly, one of the leading motifs 
of the proceedings to follow (ibid.: 6). 
While Erzberger was the accuser and Helfferich the accused, the way the court case 
was put on stage, as Epstein observes, made the roles appear in reverse: 
The day’s session usually opened with a carefully prepared statement of accusation 
by Helfferich, which was distributed to the press in advance. […] Helfferich’s 
accusation would usually be followed by a defence by Erzberger – a procedure that 
effectively concealed the fact that Helfferich was the man who, technically, stood on 
trial. (Epstein 1971: 356f.) 
Erzberger then was subject to an assassination attempt by the radicalised officer 
candidate Oltwig von Hirschfeld. On January 26, the 19 year-old who had followed 
proceedings in the court that day approached Erzberger’s car and fired two shots. 
One hit Erzberger in the shoulder, the second was deflected off a gold chain of his 
watch (Klein 2014: 86). The minister recovered and was able to resume the trial. 
However, this serves as further illustration of how explosive the atmosphere was. 
Hirschfeld was later tried, and he revealed that it was Helfferich’s pamphlet that had 
convinced him of Erzberger’s guilt as the ‘Reichsverderber’. His patriotism was lauded 
by the court and he was sentenced to a mere eighteen months in jail for aggravated 
assault rather than attempted murder (more detail in Epstein 1971: 357ff.). 
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Erzberger, of course, like a number of other high-profile politicians in the Weimar 
Republic, did not survive for long, and another assassination attempt, this time by 
the right-wing terrorist group Organisation Consul, was sadly successful in August 
1921. 
The court’s verdict on March 12, 1920 found Helfferich guilty of libel and sentenced 
him to a penalty of 300 Deutschmarks, a comparatively small sum for this kind of case 
(Klein 2014: 87). In the judge’s explanation, the ‘guilty’ verdict was based on the 
allegations by Helfferich that could not be proved to be correct, on the personal 
insults, and on those attacks that had clearly been made to force a trial and could not 
be counted as self-defence (ibid.). However, it also noted that some of Helfferich’s 
allegations were true, namely “three cases of impropriety, six of perjury, and seven 
of mixing politics with business” (Epstein 1971: 367). Erzberger’s position as finance 
minister had become untenable, and he resigned on the same day. 
Unsurprisingly, the court case was a big story in the young republic’s newspapers, 
and equally unsurprisingly, coverage continued much along the established lines. The 
right-wing press lauded the court for the “objective and impartial” verdict on 
Erzberger’s questionable character (Hamburger Fremdenblatt, Mar 12). The 
Rheinisch-Westfaelische Zeitung published a lengthy essay on Erzberger’s history, 
framing his autobiography within the development, and decline, of Germany more 
generally. It concluded that “this today has become more of a trial against the 
parliamentary system than a trial against Erzberger” (Mar 13). Left-wing publications 
like Vorwaerts (March 6), Rote Fahne (Red Flag, Feb 27) and Freiheit (Freedom, March 
13) also used the case as a more fundamental critique of bourgeois politics, whether 
in the Kaiserreich or in the Republic (see Klein 2014: 94). The Rote Fahne for example 
claimed, “It is in the nature of parliamentarianism in the capitalist state that 
bourgeois representatives all too easily overstep the boundaries across which politics 
becomes dependent on economic interest” (Feb 27, quoted in Klein 2014: 94, 
footnote 91, my translation), and went on to lament the double standards of other 
bourgeois politicians who had made the allegations.  
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While this last example is a far cry from the aggressive challenge to the political 
system that could be observed by the right-wing press, it is still that, a questioning of 
the political system per se, not just the politicians acting within it. This is a frame that 
was employed throughout the Erzberger/Helfferich case – corruption was not just an 
individual act but a product of parliamentary democracy. In this contestation phase, 
the political system as a whole was in question. In Britain’s contestation phase by 
contrast, it was primarily the electoral system that was challenged, but the aim was 
to improve it rather than to dismantle it altogether. As Klein concludes:  
One of the features of corruption scandals in Weimar is, however, this attack against 
not only the scandalised person or party, but against the political system as a whole: 
from the beginning, in the press reports as well as in the parliamentary debates on 
federal and state level, as well as in the courtrooms, the concrete allegations of 
corruption are coupled with a far-ranging critique of political decisions, into an 
overall picture of moral corruption. (Klein 2011: 61, my translation) 
Another main difference between the two contestation phases lies in who challenged 
the system and who defended it. In Britain in 1830 to 1867, a reformist coalition of 
middle and working class interest combined to challenge the old order of the 
aristocracy. In the Weimar Republic, the existing system already was a democracy, 
and the challenge came from reactionary forces from the right and the left wing of 
the political spectrum. In the case of the right wing challenge, this was mixed with 
monarchist motives, and in a way it thus presents a reverse case to the UK’s: Here, a 
democratic order was challenged by authoritarian monarchism, there, the monarchy 
was challenged by democratic reformers. 
 
Beyond Erzberger versus Helfferich: Corruption Discourse in the 
Weimar Republic 
Indeed the Erzberger versus Helfferich case was a mirror of what was to come.  
According to Geyer, “corruption was one of the weapons in political discourse for 
both the left and right-wing opposition in the Weimar Republic” (2014: 333, my 
translation). And Klein adds: 
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The enemies of the republic on the other hand used cases like Zeigner’s or 
Erzberger’s to establish a ‘corruption continuity’ and through it to provide proof for 
an all-pervasive and hopeless corruption of parliamentary democracy as such. Both 
lines of argument carry in them in the form of emotionalised catch-words like 
‘political justice’ or the ‘corrupt republic’ a strong – and deliberately used – potential 
for scandalisation. (Klein 2011: 64, my translation)   
Domeier connects the case with similar ones during the preceding Kaiserreich. If the 
latter was the phase in which corruption discourse was discovered as a weapon for 
political contestation, in Weimar the battle over legitimacy, under conditions of 
democracy, pluralism and freedom of press, was fully unleashed. In his words: 
The court case of Erzberger-Helfferich can be seen as a typical extension of politics 
by legal means. As in the Kaiserreich against the monarchy, sensational political trials 
after 1918 could be turned against the republic. Even more so given the fact that the 
Weimar judiciary had to a considerable extent been socialised in times of the 
monarchy, and treated the democratic regime sceptically, mistrustfully, and even 
with hostility. […] Another new feature of the judicial and press coverage was the 
extent to which political language had become polarised, radicalised and brutalised. 
This contributed to the disappearance into the far distance of any societal ‘common 
sense’ that could have carried the republic in the long term. (Domeier 2015: 10, my 
translation) 
As discussed in the case study selection in chapter three, the Weimar Republic failed 
because of a combination of factors: It was built on the ruins of the defeat in the 
Great War, its citizens did not value the pluralism of democratic politics, there was 
an increasing radicalisation of the left and right wings of politics culminating in 
paramilitary groups and coups, the judiciary was ‘blind on the right-hand side, all too 
clear-sighted on the left’, and finally, the global economic crisis after 1929 and its 
mass unemployment eventually led to its collapse.  
Apart from the economic problems, all of these issues found their expression in the 
Erzberger-Helfferich case: political opponents were vilified, the defeat in the Great 
War escalated the situation, the employees of the judiciary were biased in favour of 
right-wing nationalism. And while there were no paramilitary street gangs as yet, 
there was a murder attempt and later a successful assassination of Erzberger, 
illustrating the brutality of political contest even then. It is clear to see how this 
instance of corruption discourse was indeed shaped by greater, underlying political 
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processes, and expressed problems that went on to haunt the Weimar state as a 
whole. 
Corruption discourse in this contestation phase, however, also had real effects on 
how the state developed and ultimately collapsed. Right-wing politicians continued 
to attack the political system and continued undermining its legitimacy using 
corruption allegations. While in Britain, democracy and the modern state came into 
existence on the back of corruption discourse, in Germany it was the National 
Socialists who came into power in 1933, and to a considerable extent, they, too, did 
so on the back of corruption discourse (Ludwig 1998 goes into more detail on this). 
Erzberger versus Helfferich might have come at the beginning of a new era, but in 
many ways it also signalled the beginning of the end of this era.  
 
Consolidating Democracy: Der Spiegel in the early Bundesrepublik 
It is worth bearing in mind that West Germany’s fate in the 1950s and 60s was far 
from a foregone conclusion. Its first attempts at democracy had failed spectacularly, 
and there were doubts about whether or not it would now embrace the 
parliamentary democracy installed by the Western Allies after World War Two. In 
their now classic study on Civic Culture in five countries, Almond and Verba, writing 
in 1963, claimed: 
It has been argued that while Germany developed both a Rechtsstaat [state authority 
based on the rule of law] and a subject political culture, the experiments with 
democratic participation in the late nineteenth century and in the Weimar period 
never developed a participant political culture necessary to sustain these democratic 
institutions and give them force and legitimacy. (1963: 38) 
And at the end of their investigation they conclude: 
In Germany, a passive subject orientation persists and has not yet been balanced by 
a participant orientation. Our German respondents appear more at ease in dealing 
with the output side of governmental activity, where government becomes 
administration rather than politics. […] [T]he balance of the political culture is 
weighted in the direction of the subject role and the passive forms of participation. 
(ibid.: 495, my emphasis) 
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As this case study will show, the Spiegel Scandal provoked, possibly for the first time, 
more active forms of participation. The student protests that that played out 
throughout the 60s and culminated in 1968, first manifested themselves as 
demonstrations that supported the Spiegel against government interference. And all 
sections of the press, including the more conservative and right-wing ones, came to 
the support of their colleagues, defending together press freedom. 
The Spiegel Affair itself was triggered by the article bedingt abwehrbereit which was 
on matters of national defence. It was thus not directly a corruption affair. However, 
its significance for corruption discourse becomes evident when put into context with 
corruption discourses that preceded 1962. The Spiegel had been not just involved in 
reporting cases of corruption in the years before, but had in fact been the driving 
force behind a number of prominent cases in which members of the federal 
government, including Chancellor Adenauer himself, but most importantly Strauss, 
the minister for defence, had been implicated. The magazine had been on Strauss’s 
list of enemies for some time, and it seemed that it was in its 1962 article that he saw 
the chance to finally retaliate. 
The following looks first at the main corruption cases that the Spiegel had been 
involved in prior to 1962. This illustrates the role the magazine had played in holding 
the government of the young Bundesrepublik to account, and the way it had enforced 
corruption discourse, not to attack the political system, but to defend it against its 
own supposed custodians, the politicians and the federal government of the time. 
Having established this context, I then move on to the Spiegel affair itself, to look at 
how it unfolded, what the press and the wider public made of it, and how this attempt 
at authoritarian intervention eventually failed against the resistance of the press, civil 
society, parts of the government and the judiciary.  
 
Democracy’s Self-Styled Assault Gun 
The Spiegel was and still is a weekly magazine in the format of Time or Newsweek. 
Under its editor-in-chief Peter Augstein, it became a thorn in the side of the German 
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government almost from the inception of the new state. Many of the big scandals of 
the 1950s had initially been investigated by the Spiegel’s vast corps of specially 
trained investigative journalists. The following takes a brief look at four different 
corruption scandals preceding the 1962 affair.  
The new Bundesrepublik’s very first corruption scandal could hardly have been more 
symbolic. The outcome of the vote for where the new seat of government was going 
to be located was anything but certain. In the end, on November 3, 1949 it went in 
favour of Bonn against Frankfurt by 33 to 29 votes. Ten months later, however, in 
September 1950, Der Spiegel obtained documents that exposed irregularities. An 
internal party arbitration report of the Bayernpartei (Bavaria Party) had documented 
that some of their MPs had received money for voting for Bonn. The MP Hermann 
Aumer was quoted in the Spiegel:  
Aumer: A sum of overall about two million Deutsch Mark has been paid to MPs of all 
fractions. About 100 MPs had been bribed with sums between 20,000, 10,000 and 
1000 DM, Aumer explained. 20,000 for those who really have a say, 10,000 for those 
who have some influence and 1000 for those who can give their vote only. (Spiegel 
Sep 27, 1950, my translation) 
Parliament established an investigation committee (Untersuchungsausschuss) on 
‘Corruption Allegations in connection with the capital question Bonn-Frankfurt’44. 
The committee was widely referred to as the ‘Spiegel Committee’, and the case was 
discussed throughout the media in 1950 and 1951. The new republic had its first 
corruption scandal (cf. Huge/Schmidt/Thränhardt 1989, Floehr 1986). 
The year 1952 saw the co-called Schmeißer-Affäre (Elzer 2008). This was the first time 
Adenauer himself became subject of the Spiegel’s relentless investigative journalism. 
The former French secret agent Schmeißer had given an interview to the magazine in 
which he claimed that Adenauer had personally authorised the leaking of information 
to him while he was working for the French. Through Adenauer’s assistant 
Blankenhorn he was thus able to obtain top secret information on a range of issues. 
Schmeißer is cited in the Spiegel: 
                                                          
44 The official document is available at tp://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/01/022/0102274.pdf 
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His [Blankenhorn’s] reports were concerned with: Adenauer’s most in-house 
domestic policy intentions as far as they were at the time of interest for the French 
intelligence agency; Adenauer’s foreign policy plans, aiming at a close and enduring 
cooperation with France (at this point Blankenhorn asked me to be careful on the 
phone as he was concerned that our conversations might be picked up by the British 
Intelligence Service); details that might be of interest for the French service regarding 
West German politicians like Dr Adolf Süsterhenn, Dr Anton Pfeiffer, Dr Joseph 
Müller, Dr Kurt Schumacher and many others; anti-communist information. “All this 
was top secret information that has never been publicised and was only known to 
the closest circle around Dr Adenauer.” (Spiegel, Jul 7, 1952) 
In addition to this, Schmeißer claimed that he had tried to secure 800.000 DM from 
his French superiors to support Adenauer’s 1949 election campaign. Adenauer sued 
both him and the magazine for libel, but the case was dropped in 1955 (Adams 2009: 
400). 
The 1958/59 Leihwagen Affair (Rental Car Affair) was not exposed by the Spiegel itself 
– it was a criminal investigation by the state prosecution that started it – however, it 
again saw the Spiegel in a leading role as a scandaliser of the crime. A string of police 
investigations brought to light that there existed a network of influence between the 
car industry and the federal government in Bonn. The first story to surface was that 
of a senior lobbyist in Bonn who had helped a senior member of the Bundestag’s 
transport committee to a free Volkswagen Cabriolet, and had done so on request of 
Mercedes Benz (reported in Der Spiegel Nov 20. 1957). Further revelations followed, 
culminating in the Leihwagen Affair itself, which concerned one of Adenauer’s 
personal assistants, Hans Kilb. The latter had liberally made use of Mercedes Benz’s 
offer to ‘test drive’ for weeks on end some of their best cars, for example to go on 
holidays to France (reported in Spiegel Nov 26, 1958). Kilb in return, when it was time 
for Adenauer to have his car fleet updated, tried to convince the chancellor to 
procure another Mercedes 300, against the rival BMW 505. The Spiegel reports in 
detail his efforts in influencing the procurement process (ibid.). Adenauer did pick the 
Mercedes again, but it seemed – even the Spiegel acknowledged this - he did so 




There is one indeed respectable success of the government of Konrad Adenauer that 
the governmental propaganda has yet to put firmly in the spotlight: the contribution 
that the aging head of government has made for the development of the West 
German automobile frame-and-body construction. (Nov 26, 1958) 
On July 9, 1958, the Spiegel had similarly tried to lay the case at the door of Adenauer:  
Building on the investigations by several special commissions of the state police of 
North-Rhine-Westphalia directly subordinate to him [the senior public prosecutor Dr 
Drügh], he has uncovered a true flood of corruption affairs which do not just 
implicate members of almost all of the ministries in Bonn, but also from the federal 
chancellory and the federal government. 
Finally, the 1961/62 Fibag scandal was again exposed by Der Spiegel on May 31, 1961. 
It was one of a number of big confrontations of the magazine with the then defence 
minister Franz-Josef Strauss. He had taken office in 1956, and it was above all the 
Spiegel Affair that cost him his job in 1962. Strauss polarised opinion, most notably 
through his campaign for Germany to obtain nuclear arms which started in 1957 
(Germany had pledged in the Bonn-Paris Conventions in 1954 not to produce nuclear 
weapons, but this did not include the possession or use of the same). Peter Wild, 
working for the Spiegel during the 1962 affair, recalled on its 50th anniversary, writing 
in the Sueddeutsche (Sept 22, 2012): 
Of course the article [bedingt abwehrbereit] was a declaration of war against Strauss, 
as the author David Schoenbaum writes. But in fact this war was in full flow since 
1957. […][He was] a politician who in the predominant opinion of the Spiegel – but 
by no means just here – was unfit for ministerial office, dangerous as a defence 
minister and impossible as a potential successor to Adenauer (my translation)  
Fibag, short for Finanzbau Aktiengesellschaft (Finance Construction Stock 
Corporation), was a shareholder’s company established by some of Strauss’s friends 
(most notably the owner and publisher of the Passauer Neue Presse, Hans Kapfinger) 
to bid for a construction contract with the US armed forces. The contract was worth 
300 million DM, and incorporated 5434 flats in 47 locations throughout Germany 
(Spiegel Jul 9, 1961). The Spiegel in its trademark sarcastic delivery remarked how the 
architect Lothar Schloß lacked any kind of experience or qualification (he had only 
completed one semester at university), and how the bid had scant chances of 
succeeding. After poking fun at length at the incompetence of the company, this is 
how the Spiegel finally introduced Strauss to the frame: 
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In fact the chances of the Fibag people to be awarded the contract for the monster 
project of the American military without Hans Kapfinger were close to zero. When 
they talked about Kapfinger’s connections in Bonn which were to be used to the 
benefit of the company [this was mentioned in a document the Spiegel seemed to 
have acquired], among others who this referred to – this was well known to the 
gentlemen of Fibag – was the newspaper man’s Duzfreund (lit. ‘You-Friend’, meaning 
they were on first name terms), a potent military man of the German nation, the 
Bavarian Franz-Josef Strauss. (Spiegel Jul 9, 1961, my translation) 
The article went on to describe in detail how Strauss (who later compared the Spiegel 
to the Gestapo as it had its spies everywhere) had lobbied the Pentagon to give 
support to this particular bid. Ultimately, this was not successful, and the contract 
went to a rival company. The damage for Strauss, however, had been done. He took 
the magazine to court and effected a preliminary injunction against what he argued 
was a case of libel. Der Spiegel’s appeal was rejected, leading it to lament what this 
meant for press freedom – a precursor of the kinds of arguments that would come to 
the fore in 1962: 
And the verdict in the Strauss trial has unfortunately not restricted itself to decide 
whether [the allegations] were true or not, whether libellous or not. Had the 
Nuremberg judges done this, one would have had to agree with them. What they 
have done instead is they have forged chains for journalists which will be more of a 
hindrance in their trying to do their jobs than the burdensome weights attached to 
the feet can be for prisoners in a medieval state. If the Nuremberg verdict was indeed 
just, it would not just be a verdict against Mr Augstein, but it would be the death 
sentence for political journalism in the federal republic. (Spiegel, Oct 18, 1961, my 
translation) 
As these examples show, with its new brand of investigative journalism, Der Spiegel 
had become one of the driving forces of corruption discourse in the young 
Bundesrepublik. It was Augstein himself who described the magazine as the ‘Assault 
Gun of Democracy’ (Sturmgeschütz der Demokratie), ready to defend democracy 
against those trying to undermine it - an expression that has become synonymous 
with the magazine to this day. Set into context with the corruption discourses 
discussed for the Weimar Republic, this is a particularly significant statement: 
Corruption discourse then had been used by anti-democratic forces to undermine the 
parliamentary system. Here, it is equally weaponised – Augstein himself uses the 
151 
 
belligerent metaphor - but now the democratic political system is defended against 
those who seek to undermine it. 
 
Escalation: The Spiegel Scandal 1962 
The Spiegel Scandal was triggered by the publication of an in-depth, 8,000 word-long 
analysis of the capacity of the German federal defence force, the Bundeswehr, to 
defend the country, titled bedingt abwehrbereit (partially ready to defend). It starts 
with a detailed description of the NATO manoeuvre Fallex 62 that for the first time 
was based on the premise that the third world war was going to start by a nuclear 
missile attack of the Soviet Union on Europe. The Spiegel lists a number of 
shortcomings of the Bundeswehr in particular (less so from their NATO partners) that 
became evident during the manoeuvre (Oct 10, 1962). It concludes:  
The NATO high command qualifies the allied forces in four steps: 
▷ fully ready to attack  
▷ partially ready to attack  
▷ fully ready to defend  
▷ partially ready to defend [zur Abwehr bedingt geeignet – the article’s title 
is a play on this]. 
The Bundeswehr today – after almost seven years of German rearmament and after 
six years of administration by its commander-in-chief Strauss – still had the lowest 
NATO ranking: partially ready to defend (Spiegel Oct 10, 1962, my translation) 
The rest of the article goes into more detail on the kinds of troops and weapons, and 
the strength of troops and weapons on both sides that would come into action in 
case of a war. What happened after the publication of the article is chronicled by 
Spiegel online (September 17, 2012)45, but also for example by the web project ‘Die 
                                                          




Spiegel-Affaere 1962’46 or indeed the Encyclopaedia Britannica47. The following is 
merely a summary of the most important developments. 
After the publication of the article, the Bundesanwalt (federal prosecutor) Albin Kuhn 
asked the ministry of defence to probe whether any of the claims in it constituted 
treason. The Oberregierungsrat (a senior civil servant position, untranslatable) 
Heinrich Wunder in his subsequent report (Oct 18) indeed found that 41 state secrets 
had been publicised in the article48. On October 23, the investigating judge ordered 
the raid of the Spiegel headquarters in Hamburg and offices in Bonn, and the arrest 
of the editors Engel, Jacobi and Augstein, carried out on October 26. In the same 
night, the journalist who wrote the article, Conrad Ahlers, together with his wife were 
arrested in Spain while on holiday. As it later turned out, this was done on the illegal 
personal intervention of Strauss. The search of the vast Spiegel offices took close to 
a month, and in the meantime other newspapers in Hamburg (most notably Die Zeit 
and Der Stern) offered their facilities to the magazine. First protests manifested 
themselves in the aftermath of the raids, and on October 31, demonstrations took 
place in Berlin, Hamburg, Hannover and Braunschweig in support of the Spiegel. 
Augstein remained behind bars for 103 days, and was the last to be released from 
prison on February 7, 1963. 
Politically, Chancellor Adenauer came under increasing pressure. The CDU’s coalition 
partner FDP (the liberal Freedom Party) showed itself sympathetic to the Spiegel’s 
freedom to report, and on November 19, all five FDP ministers resigned from the 
government. Adenauer was forced to form a new government, and his new cabinet 
on December 14 included the coalition partner ministers once again, but did not 
include Strauss, effectively sacking the defence minister.  
In the legal arena, the Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshofs) on May 13, 1963, decided 
not to press charges against Augstein and Ahlers as no evidence could be found that 
                                                          
46 A university-based web project initiated by a Prof. Johannes Ludwig in 2012, combining historical 
research, art and illustration into a very nicely crafted website, available at http://www.spiegel-
affaere.de/ 
47 Available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/Spiegel-affair 
48 The reported in full length is available at http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-28352.pdf 
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the accused had deliberately disclosed any state secrets. On June 2, the state 
prosecutor in Bonn determined that Strauss had been guilty of both overstepping his 
public authority (Amtsanmaßung) as well as false imprisonment. However, he was 
found to be under a Verbotsirrtum (mistake as to the wrongful nature of the act) and 
could therefore not be charged. On December 22, an independent military report 
confirmed that indeed no state secrets had been breached. And finally, three years 
later, on August 5, 1966, Germany’s supreme court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
acknowledged the importance of press freedom for the informing of political opinion 
in the population, and called on the federal government to guarantee safeguards for 
these freedoms (e.g. in the ownership structure). This ruling went down in history as 
the Spiegel Ruling (Spiegel-Urteil). 
A look at how other newspapers reported on the case shows a strong bond of 
solidarity among the press. It should be noted that the Spiegel was by no means 
popular with some of Germany’s other newspapers. Too brash was its style, too 
sensationalist its reporting. Yet, the support it received in this affair was almost 
unanimous, and as the following examples show, the wider issue of the freedom of 
the press tended to be given preference over sympathies or lacks of sympathy for the 
magazine.49 
The Frankfurter Rundschau, one of the leading liberal, left-of-centre voices, took a 
historical perspective: 
Anyone who has been following the course of action of the federal criminal office’s 
security group Bonn […] against the editor and staff of the news magazine Der Spiegel 
cannot but get the feeling that in the night of Friday to Saturday the chapter ‘Second 
Post-War Democacy’ of recent German history has been attempted to be slammed 
shut through the tight grip of a crude German police operation. It is more than a 
coincidence, it is a sign, that the decisive act of this drama, the arrest of the editor 
Conrad Ahlers on German request was conducted by the police of fascist Spain.  
While it is unsurprising that more liberal papers supported the Spiegel, even 
publications who had previously been critical of it now sided with the magazine. The 
                                                          
49 The Spiegel itself collated press reactions from around the world (Nov 7, 1962), available at 




Frankfurter Allgemeine’s statement, one of the leading conservative papers in 
Germany, expressed this in strong words: 
The acting chairman of the CDU has made a provocative statement on the arrest of 
the Spiegel editors. He has said: “This is not an affair of the German press but an 
affair of the Spiegel.” What is most provocative about this provocation is that a man 
from the highest ranks of the country’s politicians seemed to think that this was a 
conciliation rather than a provocation. […] Let there be no mistake, there is and must 
not be the difference between the Spiegel and the press that has been suggested 
here, even though one might by personal opinion and value think so, but not when 
principals and […] methods of prosecution and the handling of the press are up for 
debate.  
A still more qualified support comes from the Bild-Zeitung, one of Spiegel’s traditional 
enemies: 
Bild has no reason to do Spiegel any favours. We think their politics are wrong, yes, 
even dangerous. Yet we offered our collegial help and allowed the Spiegel to use our 
archives as long as it cannot access its own. We decided to offer this practical help 
instead of loudly proclaiming our opinions before the scope and the severity of the 
incriminating evidence are established. […] Treason has nothing to do with freedom 
of the press, a freedom that we think is vital, and that we do not think is in danger in 
the Bundesrepublik. Not even now. 
Even in this potential negation of the Spiegel’s case against the government – it could 
be treason after all – a recurring frame makes a strong appearance: Freedom of the 
press, and directly tied to it, democracy. This frame is dominant throughout the 
Spiegel scandal discourse. The Handelsblatt for example writes:  
The traces of the past are shocking. One robustly conducted operation destroys the 
foundations that have been built with skill and patience, and strengthens the reserve 
of those who, apparently not quite without reason, are afraid that the expansion of 
governmental competencies in Germany unavoidably leads to abuse. Of course, 
freedom of the press in Germany never was particularly valued by the authorities. 
But the fact that since the end of the war a pleasant change has been taking place, 
that the federal citizen (Bundesbürger) has become less subject (Untertan) and more 
citizen (Staatsbürger), has been acknowledged, particularly abroad, with 
satisfaction.  
And the Stuttgarter Zeitung states:  
It is not about whether one likes the Spiegel or not, but about whether the legal 
norms of state protection on the one hand and freedom of press on the other have 
been adequately adhered to. Freedom of the press is not a friendly concession by 
state authorities, and it is not just a right on paper but a constitutional duty for any 
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journalist who is conscious of the special responsibilities of their profession. If 
freedom of press is not taken seriously, democracy is not taken seriously, and one 
can add: Tell me what you think of the freedom of the press and I will tell you what 
kind of democrat you are.  
Once again, political discourse thus reflects ongoing processes in the development of 
the state. The democracy frame and the references to recent history highlight the 
concern about the future of the young democracy, and how the authorities were 
conducting themselves within it. The Handelsblatt’s article further highlights a 
national self-consciousness that followed the totalitarian disaster and accompanied 
the efforts of building a new, functional democracy – its reference to ‘subject’ and 
‘citizen’ nicely spans the bridge to the ideas of Almond and Verba, as discussed in the 
introduction to this case study.  
 
Beyond the Spiegel Affair: The Failure of Authoritarian Intervention 
As the 50 year anniversary of the case showed, the Spiegel Affair has become one of 
the foundational myths of the Bundesrepublik. The Sueddeutsche called it ‘The day 
on which the Republic woke up’ (Sep 22, 2012)50, The Spiegel itself celebrated the 
event with a special symposium of historians, and the Federal Centre for Political 
Education (Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung) called it, as so many others in 
print, on TV or online, a ‘milestone of press freedom’ (Oct 10, 2012)51. Unlike the 
preceding corruption cases of the 1950s, now largely forgotten, the Spiegel Affair to 
this day captures the imagination of the country’s public, and remains an important 
myth in the history of post-war Germany. As myths tend to go, the affair itself tends 
to get elevated in its meaning, and the context and pre-history that led up to it tend 
to be neglected52. However, it is exactly in this mystification that the long-term 
                                                          
50 Available at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/medien/jahre-spiegel-affaere-der-tag-an-dem-die-
republik-erwachte-1.1475071 
51 Available at http://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/145749/50-jahre-spiegel-affaere-10-
10-2012 
52 Indeed, the historians in the symposium organised by the Spiegel made exactly this point. The 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, never the biggest friend of the Spiegel, reported on this with some satisfaction 




effects of the Spiegel Affair can be found. The short-term effects were the ruptures 
in the coalition, the dropping of Strauss and the affirmation of the rule of law over 
authoritarian arbitrariness.  In the long term, however, this has produced the myth 
of the victory of the new democracy over the old authoritarianism. And while this 
interpretation is not incorrect, it ignores that the affair itself was only one part of a 
larger struggle that was fought out over a longer period of time through a number of 
different cases, some of them listed above. 
As corruption discourse, the role of the Spiegel in post-war Germany, and the 
culmination of the conflict between it and the federal government, show two 
important markers of what I have described as a consolidation phase: Firstly, unlike 
Weimar, the judiciary now seems fully signed up not just to the letter of the law but 
also to the democratic ideals behind it. It does not function as a defender of the old 
order, as it had done in Weimar, but as a defender of the new democratic order. 
Corruption discourse can thus take place within not just a formally established legal 
framework, but also one that is adhered to by the judiciary, and impartially 
implemented. Secondly, there is an almost unanimous consensus among the press 
publications that the freedom of the Spiegel needs to be defended against 
authoritarian intervention. It is notable that plenty of the papers make it clear that 
they might not always agree with the magazine and how it conducts its business, but 
they defend its right to conduct its business this way – a classic example of where 
different parties do not agree on the score of the game, but they agree on the rules 
of the game. The idea of the freedom of the press within the democratic state is thus 
a well consolidated one. And on this basis, building on these two premises, corruption 
discourse can take a role within the institutional set-up of the state, rather than 
attacking it. Similar to the 1889 case in Britain, where there was unanimous support 
for implementing anti-corruption measures, there is now unanimous support for the 
freedom of the press to challenge authority, and like in Britain towards the end of the 
19th century, corruption discourse now has started to contribute to policing and 





This chapter has provided an overview of corruption discourse in late 19th to mid-20th 
century Germany, highlighting the different roles it played within the different 
political systems, and the ways in which it was shaped by as well as shaped the 
political processes taking place within these systems.  
In the Kaiserreich of 1871 to 1914, corruption discourse struggled to fully develop. 
Freedom of the press was curtailed, especially before 1890, by formal measures such 
as the Socialist Laws. But it was also through informal intervention and bribery by the 
authorities of the Obrigkeitsstaat that the press sector was manipulated. The Tausch 
affair is one example of how the freedom of the press, as far as it existed on paper, 
was further undermined in reality. In this discovery phase, two patterns emerged: 
Firstly, corruption discourse was itself corrupted by authoritarian intervention. 
Secondly, the polarisation of the Socialists against the rest, and the SPD’s use of 
corruption discourse to attack not just individual politicians but the political system 
as a whole (Bebel’s “Long live corruption!”), was an early sign of what was to come 
in the Weimar Republic. 
The Weimar Republic saw the hyper-mobilisation of corruption discourse. It became 
the weapon of choice for left-wing groups as in the Kaiserreich, but in this phase 
particularly also for right-wing political parties. The Erzberger versus Helfferich case 
of 1919/20 shows almost all of the signs of the troubles that would come to strangle 
political life in the republic and eventually lead to its downfall: The radicalisation and 
extreme polarisation of political competition; the fall-out of the Great War and the 
Versailles Treaty; the political violence that lurked just beneath the surface; the 
judiciary that was still wedded to the authoritarian ideas of the Kaiserreich. 
Corruption discourse in the contestation phase was used to attack and undermine 
the political system. But unlike in Britain’s contestation phase, in which this was done 
by democratisers against an undemocratic system with the aim of reforming it, it was 
done here by undemocratic forces against the entire political system with the aim of 
overthrowing it. In Britain, reformist forces came to power on the back of corruption 
discourse. In Germany, Hitler and the National Socialists did. 
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The case of the Spiegel magazine and its role in post-World War Two Germany finally 
illustrates the country’s consolidation as a fully-functional democracy firmly in the 
modern ‘Western’ sense. The unanimous support the Spiegel received from press 
publications across the political spectrum showed that while there were still different 
political positions, there was a broad and strong agreement as to the rules of the 
game, and the importance of the freedom of the press and their right to hold 
authority to account. The verdicts passed by the courts showed that the judiciary too 
was committed to the new democratic regime. Corruption discourse could now settle 
into a role in which it held power to account within the existing democratic system, 



















Chapter Six: Comparison and Theory-Building 
This chapter broadens out the discussion of the case studies and relates them to a 
range of broader considerations: What are the key themes that emerge from the 
comparison? Can they be applied to corruption discourse generally? And how do the 
findings reflect on the theoretical premises discussed in chapter two? To address 
these questions, the chapter contains six propositions. They are not meant as 
definitive answers. Rather, they are intended as comments, amendments, remarks, 
suggestions. These six propositions are divided into two sections, based on 
Skocpol/Somers (1980) distinction of historical comparison as contrasting contexts 
and for the parallel demonstration of theory, as discussed in the methodology 
chapter.  
Section One thus looks at comparative history as a contrast of contexts and focuses 
mostly on what the differences between Britain and Germany tell us: It illustrates - 
proposition one - how context affects corruption discourses in different ways, and – 
proposition two - how corruption discourse affects contexts in different ways. These 
two suggestions lead to proposition three – that three groups of variables can be 
identified, and that they can be applied to corruption discourse generally. Section 
Two of this chapter looks at the ways in which this study can be used as a parallel 
demonstration of theory, focussing mostly on the commonalities of the cases. It looks 
at the ways in which three different theoretical tenets bear fruit: Proposition four 
argues that the comparison demonstrates how historicity matters, and draws 
attention to the phases and sequences identified in both Britain and Germany. 
Proposition five addresses the epistemological matter of considering discourse as an 
integral factor in institutional development. And Proposition six goes back to the 
ontological foundations laid out in the theory chapter, and discusses the ways in 
which a social constructionist perspective has helped in conceptualising the centrality 
of notions of corruption for ideas of the modern state.  
This comparison chapter thus climbs the ladder of abstraction and moves from the 
more concrete to the more abstract, from data-richness to theory-richness. It should 
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also be noted that while the first two propositions are built directly on the empirical 
evidence from the comparison, propositions three and four, spanning across the two 
sections of this chapter, elaborate theoretical findings that emerge from the 
comparison, and the final two propositions re-visit and re-evaluate two meta-
theoretical premises from the theory chapter. The discussion thus moves from a 
more inductive approach in which theory emerges from data, towards a more 
deductive one in which theory is put to the test of the data. 
 
Comparative History as the Contrast of Contexts 
Previous studies on corruption discourse have focussed on single countries in 
relatively restricted periods of time. Breit (2010, 2011a, 2011b) looked at Norway 
from 2003 to 2008, Kajsiu (2013, 2015) at Albania from 1991 to 2005, and Zurnić 
(2013a, 2013b, 2017) at corruption discourse in Serbia in the years after the 
democratic opening, 2000 to 2012. While these in-depth studies have all achieved an 
admirable level of detail, my own investigation has pursued different aims. An 
analysis of two countries over a relatively long period of time with changing 
institutional frameworks within the parameters of a PhD project never had the 
potential to achieve the standards set by these pioneers of corruption discourse 
analysis in terms of their thickness of description. Instead, the hope has been that 
additional insights could be gained not just from the cases themselves but from 
comparing them historically.  
According to Skocpol/Somers, if one uses comparative history as a contrast of 
contexts, it is “to bring out the unique features of each particular case included in 
their discussions, and to show how these unique features affect the working-out of 
putatively general social processes” (Skocpol/Somers 1980: 178). They continue: “[…] 
the task of the contrast-oriented comparative historian is facilitated when maximally 
different cases within given bounds are chosen for comparison” (ibid.: 179). 
In this study, the ‘putatively general social process’ is corruption discourse. The 
‘unique features of each particular case’ are the very different ways in which 
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corruption discourse was shaped by and in turn shaped its contextual political 
processes in Britain and Germany. This first section thus looks at these two arenas in 
turn, and derives its three proposition from them. Firstly, the spotlight is on how 
different contexts affected corruption discourse in different ways; secondly at how 
corruption discourse in turn affected institutional developments in different ways. 
And thirdly, building on the first two propositions, a closer look follows on the three 
groups of variables that can be identified across all six case studies. 
 
Proposition One: Context affects corruption discourse in different ways 
This first proposition looks at how different circumstances – political, legal, 
institutional, societal - shaped corruption discourse in different ways, looking in turn 
at the three phases of corruption discourse in the two countries. What kinds of 
factors affected in what kinds of ways the social and political construction of 
corruption discourse? 
Discovery Phase: Britain in 1809 was at war, the political institutions were firmly in 
the hands of the ‘old elites’ facing the challenge of reformists and radicals, and taxes 
and state expenditure were rising. These macro-historical developments were clearly 
manifested in the frames that dominated corruption discourse in the Duke of York 
case: It was a patriotic duty to challenge the misdemeanours of the Duke, reform was 
necessary to make sure that MPs actually represented the people, and this was 
particularly justified – and urgent - given the taxes everyone was paying. In Germany 
in 1896 by contrast, we can see the intervention by the Obrigkeitsstaat that prevents 
corruption discourse from freely developing, a reflection of a state that was not just 
authoritarian and restrictive by law, but also intervened informally and illegally – 
state actors placing themselves above the law - in the affairs of the press. The 
repression of the Socialist movement – amply expressed in corruption discourse - 
reflects one of the dominant cleavages of the Kaiserreich. Finally, there is a marked 
difference in how the cases were dealt with legally. The UK case is predominantly a 
political affair, staged in the House of Commons, whereas the German case is a legal 
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one, its stage is a court of law.53 What so far in the discussion might have seemed like 
a random list of macro-historical events and developments in fact has a specific order 
to it: All these factors can be summarised in three distinct categories: The legal-
institutional framework (Parliament and its elections in the UK, the legal restrictions 
of press freedom in Germany, the different stage of development of the legal system 
in the UK and Germany), societal cleavages (the middle class reformist and working 
class radical challenge in the UK, the Socialist challenge in Germany), and finally 
exogenous factors such as the geopolitical challenge of the Napoleonic wars 
(expressed in the patriotism frame in the UK). It is these three groups of factors that 
find their expression in the way corruption discourse plays out here. 
Contestation Phase: This is continued in the contestation phase. Corruption 
discourses in Britain in 1830 to 1867 are essentially an escalation of the cleavages of 
the discovery phase, with a subtraction of the War variable. Debates here are 
focussed on reform in a more general sense, and electoral reform specifically. This 
expresses the continued conflict of the old elites, of ‘Old Corruption’ as it was 
sometimes referred to, against both the emerging middle and working classes 
campaigning for their right to vote, and using allegations of corruption as a way of 
questioning the legitimacy of the existing electoral system. This employment of 
‘corruption’ as part of the democratisation tool-kit is further illustrated by the 
clustering of expressions like ‘reform’, ‘corruption’, ‘representation’ and ‘democracy’ 
as shown in the quantitative analysis of the 1830 to 32 debate. Germany during the 
Weimar Republic equally continued some of its cleavages, and added a geopolitical 
dimension to it: The defeat in the Great War, and the perceived illegitimacy of the 
peace arrangement. This opened up, and indeed escalated, another cleavage, 
between the defenders of new democratic republic and the defenders of the old 
                                                          
53 It is no coincidence that German political discourse to this day has a strong legalistic orientation that 
seeks to frame political questions in terms of their legal underpinnings. There is a strong hint here that 
this is at least to some extent because at the time when political discourse proper emerged in Germany 
in the 1870s, it already had a legal framework that it could use as a frame of reference. In Britain by 
contrast, like corruption discourse specifically, political discourse more generally developed parallel 
to, and often preceded changes to the respective legal framework. Here it was more often than not 
the reverse effect: The legislation eventually implemented built on a preceding public discourse and 
had it as its point of reference, rather than vice versa.  
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authoritarian state. The radical far right that wanted to dismantle the new state thus 
joined the far left that equally questioned the legitimacy of what it perceived as the 
corrupt bourgeois republic. Again, the ways in which the legal-institutional order was 
bound up in corruption debates was very different: While in both Britain and 
Germany, corruption discourse was used to undermine existing political institutions, 
the radicalism with which this was done diverged markedly: Contestation in the UK 
aimed at reforming the institutions. It wanted to change the way MPs were elected, 
but did not question the existence of Parliament itself. In Weimar Germany on the 
other hand, both left and right wing agitators used corruption discourse to attack the 
political system per se. The comparison of these contestation phases also puts the 
‘who’ question in the spotlight, emphasising this as an important factor that needs to 
be taken into account. While in Britain, the combination of institutional, cleavage and 
exogenous factors produced a reformist, democracy-promoting anti-corruption 
movement, in Germany it manifested a coalition of anti-democratic forces that aimed 
to overthrow democracy. In this phase, too, corruption discourse thus reflected on 
the one hand societal cleavages (the middle and working class challenges in the UK, 
the right and left-wing extremist challenges in Germany), the legal-institutional 
framework (aiming to reform it in the UK, aiming to overthrow it in Germany), and 
exogenous challenges (the defeat in the Great War and the maligned peace order in 
Germany). 
Consolidation Phase: What defines this phase is its lack of conflict, therefore it is 
unsurprising that societal cleavages played a lesser role here. The legal-institutional 
frameworks here were also relatively settled, or in the process of settling on a 
democratic order. Geopolitical challenges did play a role in the German case, but 
were not dominant. Looking at the details in the UK consolidation phase, the 1889 
Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act marked the end of what could be called the Age  
of Anti-Corruption Reform. It was carried by a majority in the House of Commons as 
well as the House of Lords. Class and other cleavages still existed at this time, 
however, they no longer manifested themselves in corruption discourse. The Act 
itself was an improvement to the legal-institutional framework, but only in details – 
164 
 
anti-corruption legislation had existed before. The object of corruption allegations in 
the preceding contestation phase, the electoral system, had been further reformed 
and was for the time being not under significant dispute.54 In Germany on the other 
hand, the legal-institutional framework post-World War Two had been settled on a 
democratic pluralistic order. However, in an echo from the 1890s Kaiserreich, a 
handful of political actors, Strauss leading the charge, attempted to once again 
circumvent the rule of law and use authoritarian intervention to manipulate and 
restrict press freedom. This was a situational conflict rather than a broader societal 
cleavage, between an authoritarian style of governance and the newly installed 
democracy. The unanimous reaction from all sections of the press showed that this 
authoritarianism was no longer tolerated, at least as far as the country’s journalists 
and press editors were concerned. Here too, any cleavages that existed in society did 
not manifest themselves in corruption discourse. The geopolitical factor here was the 
influence of the Western Allies following the Second World War, and the new 
constitution that had been designed under their tutelage to prevent the mistakes of 
the Weimar Republic. Political parties as well as newspapers and other media now 
had to officially be in line with the laws of the new constitution in order to be licensed. 
Thus, in both cases we can see that societal cleavages, while they certainly continued 
to exist, did no longer materialise in corruption discourse. In both cases, the legal-
institutional framework was no longer contested. In both cases, corruption discourse 
was no longer used to attack the legal-political order but rather to make sure that the 
various political actors adhered to its rules. In my view, there is Foucauldian element 
here (Foucault 1977) in how corruption discourse functioned to discipline its objects, 
and future research might conceptualise this further. Exogenous influences played a 
role indirectly, through the strengthening of the democratic institutions in Germany 
following the Nazi regime and defeat in World War Two.  
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The proposition emerging from this perspective is therefore that corruption 
discourse expresses and is constituted by these three distinct categories of factors: 
societal cleavages, the legal-institutional framework and, at times, exogenous factors 
such as geopolitical struggles. And as shown, it is not just important to look at when 
they manifest themselves in discourse, but also to pay attention to when they fail to 
manifest themselves, as this, too, can be highly significant. 
 
Proposition Two: Corruption discourse affects context in different ways 
This second proposition looks at how corruption discourse in turn influences its 
contextual framework in different ways. It sometimes leads to changes but not 
always. What are the conditions under which it does? And when does it not do so? If 
proposition one was about the social and political construction processes underlying 
corruption discourse, this second one is about the power it has, its potential to 
challenge notions of legitimacy, and under specific circumstances to lead to social 
and political change.  
Discovery Phase: By definition, due to its ‘careful beginnings’ character, it is unlikely 
that in this phase corruption discourse leads to substantial change. The Duke of York 
case did have two effects: It led to the resignation of the Duke, and it led to calls for 
reforms. The resignation, however, was merely an exchange of personnel, no change 
to the political or legal system was effected. The call for reforms did not for the time 
being have further systemic consequences either. However, it is the attaching of the 
signifier ‘corruption’ onto reform following the Duke of York scandal that constituted 
the discovery of this phase, of the possibility of weaponising corruption allegations in 
the campaign for change. Corruption could thus serve as one of the themes around 
which campaign was organised. Similarly in Germany in 1897, while Tausch was 
allowed to continue in his position at the political police and there seemed little ‘real’ 
change, the Social Democrats had discovered how powerful corruption allegations 
could be in undermining the state’s perceived legitimacy. Here too, corruption 
became a topic through which societal cleavages were not just mobilised, but 
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organised around. In both countries the effects on cleavages, laws and institutions 
were thus not immediately significant, but the internal dynamic of how these 
cleavages were fought out were changed. This had effects for decades later, when 
corruption discourse became a central element of reform discourse in Britain’s 
contestation phase, and of the revolutionary discourse in Germany’s. The discovery 
phase is thus characterised by little impact of corruption discourse on its contextual 
legal-institutional framework but by an important change in corruption discourse 
itself, its reinvention as a weapon in political contest. 
Contestation Phase: It is during this phase that the strongest impact on the contextual 
legal-institutional framework can be observed. In Britain’s Age of Reform, corruption 
discourse became an inherent element of reform discourse. As exemplified in the 
1830 to 1832 Reform Act debate, 28% of newspaper articles that mentioned ‘reform’ 
during this period also referred to one or several elements of the ‘corruption cluster’. 
Throughout this contestation phase, ‘corruption’ was thus part of a cluster of 
expressions that combined to form a democratisation discourse that advocated 
reform. If reform and democracy were the values promoted by the reformist and 
radical movements, corruption was the anti-value, that which was to be overcome. 
Reform was achieved, to the electoral system in 1832, 1867 and 1884, and to a 
number of other institutions in the decades in between. It is worth keeping in mind, 
however, that change came not solely through the extra-parliamentary newspapers 
and public rallies and demonstrations. Corruption/reform discourse only truly took 
off in 1830 after the new Grey government had introduced its ideas for reform in 
Parliament. According to Grey himself, it was a reaction to growing unrest in the 
population, and with an eye on revolutions taking place in other parts of Europe. But 
what would have happened if reform had not been advocated by government itself? 
It might never have been implemented. It would likely have led to increased tensions 
and possibly a more revolutionary discourse, as was the case in Germany. In its 
contestation phase, corruption discourse was used to express grievances with the 
political system per se. And this had effects on the political system per se. Corruption 
discourse here was one of the tools used by right as well as left-wing political 
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campaigners in the Weimar Republic, to question the legitimacy of the parliamentary 
democracy as a whole. And by being part of the armoury of political contest, it 
contributed to the eventual failure of the republic, and its usurpation by Hitler and 
the Nazi Party. In this contestation phase, we thus see corruption discourse at its 
most effective, for better or worse. In Britain, it contributed to campaigns that 
resulted in a number of reforms to the legal-institutional framework. In Germany it 
contributed to campaigns that resulted in the dismantling of the democratic state as 
a whole. Again, one of the lessons from these specific two case studies is the 
importance of looking at who was behind these campaigns, and who used the 
discourse to attack what kind of legal or political institutions. 
Consolidation Phase: Similar to the discovery phase, corruption discourse here is 
unlikely to have any significant systemic effects, albeit for different reasons. The 
example chosen for Britain’s consolidation phase does have at its centre the passing 
of anti-corruption law. However, as the analysis in chapter three showed, there was 
little corruption discourse associated with the 1889 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices 
Act. A consensus existed that this kind of legislation needed to be implemented, and 
there was little controversy over it. The role of corruption discourse in this case was 
marginal, and its support for the act, expressed by both Houses of Parliament and all 
sections of the press, served as a consolidator of the existing, in this case slightly 
reformed and amended, legal framework of corruption. In Germany by contrast, this 
existing legal framework, in the Spiegel case the wider legal context of press freedom, 
was subject to the challenge by authority. But just like in Britain, discourse in this 
phase almost unanimously supported the legal-institutional arrangements in place, 
and defended it against this challenge. Again, corruption discourse’s role here was 
that of consolidator of the existing order. It would be wrong to thus claim that 
corruption discourse in this consolidation phase did not have any systemic effects. Its 
effects here were not in causing change but in stabilising the existing arrangements.  
The proposition emerging here is thus that corruption discourse is not just 
constituted by but also constitutes the three groups of variables identified in 
proposition one. It can serve to mobilise and accentuate existing cleavages (Britain in 
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1809 and 1832, Germany in 1890s), or even play part in their escalation (Weimar 
Germany). It can contribute to campaigns that demand changes to the legal and/or 
institutional framework by delegitimising the existing arrangements (Britain in 1830 
to 1867, Weimar Germany). Or it can stabilise existing legislation and existing 
institutions that are perceived as legitimate, by defending them against situational 
illegitimate behaviour (Britain in the 1880s, Germany post-World War Two). There 
has been no mention of the third category that could be affected by corruption 
discourse, exogenous factors. This is simply because in the cases examined, this did 
not materialise to any significant extent. However, it is a theoretical possibility, and 
as proposition three will show, it too needs to be taken into account. 
 
Proposition Three: Three groups of factors constitute corruption 
discourse, and are in turn – to some extent - constituted by it 
This third proposition is an attempt to move beyond the specific case studies of this 
investigation, and explore ways in which its findings can be generalised to other, 
including more contemporary, cases. The key groups of variables identified in 
propositions one and two are (a) legal and political institutions, (b) societal cleavages 
and (c) exogenous factors such as geopolitical events. The following will look at these 
three clusters in turn, detach them from their UK and German cases and apply them 
more widely, at times speculatively, to other examples.  
Legal and political institutions: Questions to be asked here are: In what ways is the 
discourse under observation embedded in and framed by legal and political 
institutions? And on the output side: Does discourse aim at changes in these 
institutions, and if so, in what ways? One of the main differences between corruption 
discourses in Britain and Germany, as discussed in the methodology chapter, is the 
fact that they historically emerged within very different institutional contexts. While 
in Britain, little legislation against corruption existed when discourse became 
important in the early 1800s, Germany already had an elaborate legal framework for 
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how to deal with corruption at the time discourse was eventually allowed to develop 
from the 1870s. As the comparison showed, this made a difference in how corruption 
cases themselves played out (in court, as a legal matter, rather than in Parliament, as 
a political matter), as well as the aims that were pursued through corruption 
discourse (reform in the case of Britain, the discrediting of the political system to aid 
a socialist revolution in the case of Germany). The strongly statist tradition of 
Germany, however, also brought with it a more authoritarian way of doing politics, 
which contributed to the difficulties experienced by the newly free press, in fully 
developing their role as a Fourth Estate that could hold government to account.  
In more recent and contemporary cases, this group of variables continues to be 
important. It is no coincidence that two of the very first studies on corruption 
discourse, Kajsiu’s on Albania post-1991 (2013, 2015) and Zurnić on Serbia post-2000 
(2013a, 2013b, 2017), looked at the transitional periods from autocratic to 
democratic rule. Much of contemporary and recent corruption research, too, while 
not with a focus on discourse, has been conducted on the former socialist countries 
in Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. Sajo 1998, Broadman & Recanatini 2001, 
Gadowska 2010, Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu 2011, Batory 2012). The suggestion here is 
that these so-called ‘transition’ countries with their new intersections between public 
and private offered new opportunities for corruption. Under these conditions, was 
existing anti-corruption legislation adequate to deal with the new realities? How did 
corruption discourse interact with the evolving legal-institutional framework? 
Zurnić’s work investigates what kinds of scandals in Serbia led to political action, and 
which ones did not (2013: 119). Kajsiu looks at how corruption discourse was 
strategically used to institute neoliberal reforms in Albania, undermining the 
legitimacy of state intervention and justifying market liberalism (2015). Corruption 
discourse thus expresses broader underlying institutional developments, but it can 
also be used to re-organise ideas of legitimacy, re-branding the old institutions as 
corrupt and the new ones as legitimate.  
It should not be assumed that consolidated democracies always have adequate 
legislation in place. New forms of what is seen as corruption develop, and some 
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behaviours that were previously not ‘corrupt’ are newly categorised as such. Existing 
legislation then does not apply or is not specific enough. Examples of this are the 
House of Commons expenses scandal in 2010 that led to a revision of legislation in 
the 2010 Bribery Act. More recently, international tax evasion schemes as brought to 
light by the 2016 Panama Papers scandal have been discussed as ‘corruption’, and 
calls for new legislation have been made (albeit to little effect at the time of writing). 
The point here is that while the overall legal-institutional frameworks in which these 
examples were embedded might have been very well-established ones, the concrete 
laws that dealt with the corruption cases at the centre of the scandals were not.  
Legal and political institutions thus, on the one hand, play an important role in the 
constitution of corruption discourse. This is expressed in the ways in which corruption 
cases are institutionally dealt with, for example as a political or legal matter, and in 
the kinds of framings that are used in the sense-making of corruption statements in 
discourses. On the other hand, corruption discourse also contributes to the further 
constitution of these institutions, above all by playing an important part in organising 
their legitimacy – as the analysis of Britain and Germany has shown, they can be both 
stabilising or destabilising. 
Societal cleavages: In what ways do societal cleavages and conflicts manifest 
themselves in corruption discourse? And does then, in turn, discourse have any 
effects on these cleavages? In the case studies examined, this was evident in both 
discovery and contestation phases, but not in consolidation. The cleavages seen here 
were mostly centred on class (the middle class reformers and working class radicals 
in Britain, the working class socialist movement in Germany), and in Germany also 
around what can only inadequately be described as a religious cleavage (the anti-
Semitism) and value systems (the monarchists and other right-wing world views 
against democratic and socialist values).  
Kajsiu (2015) distinguishes between different ways in which corruption discourse has 
been mobilised in Albania: to attack the Communist Party (‘red corruption’), to 
challenge the Democratic Party (‘blue corruption’) and as a comment on the 
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difficulties of transition processes (‘black corruption’). Red and blue here stand for 
the mobilisation of party political conflict lines. Black corruption on the other hand 
states that there is no blue and red, and corruption is always black (ibid.: 68). This is 
either a discourse that does indeed not manifest societal cleavages, or it is one that 
pretends not to but in fact only functions to institute its own version of normality. 
Special attention should thus be paid to cases in which societal cleavages, while they 
still existed, did not seem to find expression in corruption discourse, as in Britain’s 
and Germany’s consolidation phases. The absence of conflict over what constitutes 
corruption is highly significant. It can be an indicator of general political stability, and 
of corruption discourse having entered a consolidating or consolidated phase. And 
this, in turn, depending on interpretation, can mean that either the bourgeois 
ontology (Bratsis 2003) has been established or that ethical universalism (Mungiu-
Pippidi 2006) is now a principle of governance. 
It should not be assumed that such a consolidation necessarily lasts. The historical 
trajectories of Britain and Germany might suggest a Fukuyamaesque ‘end of history’ 
(1989) kind of scenario. However, this might or might not be the case. Societal norms 
and values constantly shift, new cleavages and their agents might re-discover 
corruption discourse as a tool to employ in political contest to undermine their 
opponent’s legitimacy. At the time of writing, the American reality TV entertainer 
Donald John Trump is running for President of the United States. One of his preferred 
modes of attacking his opponent Hillary Diane Rodham Clinton is to name-call her 
‘crooked Hillary’, and he has on several occasions accused the Democrat primaries 
electoral system as being ‘rigged’ and Hillary herself the ‘most corrupt candidate in 
US history’55. This is no less than a post-modern, Twitter-driven rediscovery of an old 
technique, portraying one’s political opponent as fundamentally corrupted, and thus 
having no legitimacy to run for presidential office. Whether or not this mobilisation 
of corruption discourse will be successful and whether or not it marks another 
milestone in what could be a ‘De-consolidation Phase’ remains to be seen. The 
                                                          
55 BBC online, June 22, 2016, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-us-2016-36601314 
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example illustrates that the consensus on what behaviours constitute corruption can 
be undone at any time, and more often than not it will be done in an attempt to 
mobilise social cleavages, specifically the resentment in certain parts of the 
population for the ‘establishment’. 
Hence, whether societal cleavages find their way into corruption discourses or not is 
an important starting distinction. It indicates the extent to which the signifier 
corruption is subject to political rivalry or whether there is a universal agreement on 
what it means and how it should be dealt with. Secondly, if cleavages are indeed 
observed to be manifest, it is then instructive to look at what kinds of cleavages and 
conflicts are expressed in the framings of the discourse. This is once again the point 
at which these macro-historical processes - class struggle, transition to democracy or 
the clash of value systems (in addition to the macro-level institutional framework) - 
are expressed on the micro-level of the utterances and writings that make up 
corruption discourse. What effects discourse then has on these cleavages is difficult 
to determine. If there is an effect, due to corruption’s character as a challenger to 
legitimacy, it is likely to be one of radicalisation. However, while it might be possible 
to measure the frequency of the use of ‘corruption’ in newspaper or other discourses, 
the challenge then would be to devise a reliable measurement for the radicalisation 
of political discourse, and to then meaningfully connect it to corruption discourse. 
Exogenous factors: This group of factors played some role in some of the UK and 
German cases. In Britain, the 1809 Duke of York case happened during, and was 
directly related to, the war against Napoleon. The 1830 to 32 reform debate followed, 
and was influenced by, the revolution in France. In Germany, both the Erzberger 
versus Helfferich case in 1919, and less directly the Spiegel case of 1962 were shaped 
by the country’s defeats in the two World Wars. While in these cases, exogenous 
factors played some role, for more recent and contemporary corruption discourses 
in an increasingly globalised world, they play an ever more important role. This 
happens on the one hand through the influence of international, intranational and 
supranational institutions, and on the other through an increasingly internationalised 
corruption discourse.  
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Again, both Kajsiu’s work on Albania and Zurnić’s on Serbia showcase examples of 
the influence of international institutions. Zurnić (2013b, 2017) describes how 
institutional anti-corruption change in Serbia came mostly through the accession 
process to the European Union and through the ratification of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Council of Europe’s Civil and 
Criminal Conventions on Corruption. Kajsiu similarly examines the influence of such 
organisations as the World Bank, the United States Agency of International Aid 
(USAID), the Council of Europe and the European Union (2015: 46). 
In a second dimension, exogenous influence manifests itself through an increasingly 
globalised corruption discourse. This is to an extent driven by the above institutions 
(ibid.). The undisputed flagship in wider public discourses, however, is Transparency 
International’s (TI) global Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Its annual publication 
attracts headlines and media commentaries throughout the world. There is no doubt 
that its simulation of accuracy through numbers56 combined with the national 
competition aspect appeals to large numbers of people (both to those who use it to 
proudly proclaim that their country is less corrupt than their neighbour and to those 
who use it to shame their country’s elites for being corrupt). In addition to TI’s index, 
global mass media and the influence of international organisations, there is also the 
factor of the proliferation of academic corruption research since the 1990s (often 
funded by above institutions) that informs the debate. Again, Kajsiu’ analysis sheds 
further light on this. He distinguishes between a locally grown discourse and an 
international one, with notable differences:  
[I]n contrast to existing local discourses in which corruption appeared as a floating 
signifier that qualified numerous phenomena as corrupt, the international discourse 
sought to fix the meaning of corruption by tying it to a very specific definition and to 
specific acts, such as bribery, and to specific spheres, such as the public sector (2015: 
8, for the full discussion see ibid.: 75ff.) 
Localised corruption discourses that function relatively autonomously outside of this 
global version are thus likely to be a thing of the past, and for contemporary case 
                                                          
56 Critical assessments of TI’s index can be found in e.g. Philp 2006, Knack 2006, UNDP 2008, Andersson 
and Heywood 2009b, Olken 2009, Kenny 2009, Hawken and Munck 2009, Langbein and Knack 2010. 
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studies it is thus imperative to pay ample attention to exogenous factors. Johnston 
argues that future corruption research was in need of “getting specific about 
globalisation” (2015: 644ff.), and he calls for an “enhanced international perspective” 
(ibid.: 645). This interaction between local and global corruption discourses appears 
to me to fulfil these criteria. 
Proposition three thus suggests that corruption discourse analysis should consider 
three groups of factors that constitute the discourse and are in turn – to one degree 
or another - constituted by them: (a) legal and political institutions that provide 
institutionalised procedures for dealing with corruption and frameworks of reference 
for making sense of it; discourse on the other hand acts as an important organiser of 
the legitimacy of institutions and can stabilise or destabilise them; (b) societal 
cleavages that can be expressed in the discourse to varying degrees; discourse on the 
other hand can have the effect of radicalising these cleavages; (c) exogenous factors 
such as geopolitical events, international institutions and globalised discourse that 
have an increased importance in the constitution of local manifestations of discourse. 
As set out at the beginning of this section, these three propositions are derived from 
the use of historical comparison as a contrast of contexts. It is the juxtaposition of 
the developments in the two countries, and the contrasting of the different ways in 
which the different phases of corruption discourse manifested themselves that has 
allowed these factors to be fully recognised.  
 
Comparative History as the Parallel Demonstration of Theory 
While the propositions of the ‘contrasts of contexts’ are firmly rooted in the empirical 
findings of the case studies, this section on the ‘parallel demonstration of theory’ 
harks back to some of the points made in the theory chapter. According to 
Skocpol/Somers, if one uses comparative history for a parallel demonstration of 
theory,  
…the reason for juxtaposing case histories is to persuade the reader that a given, 
explicitly delineated hypothesis or theory can repeatedly demonstrate its fruitfulness 
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- its ability convincingly to order the evidence - when applied to a series of relevant 
historical trajectories. (1980: 176)  
It is worth noting that proposition three is in fact a hybrid of ‘contrast of contexts’ 
and ‘parallel demonstration of theory’. One the one hand, it focuses on the different 
ways in which the legal-institutional framework, societal cleavages and exogenous 
factors interacted with corruption discourse. It thus builds on a contrast of the 
contexts. On the other hand it shows how the factors identified, even though they 
manifested themselves in different ways, were in fact of the same family of factors. 
In this sense, proposition three is also a parallel demonstration of the theory, derived 
from the comparison, that these three groups of factors shaped, and in turn were 
shaped, by corruption discourse. As Skocpol and Somers put it, these three groups 
can indeed be used to ‘convincingly order the evidence’. 
In the following, I take a closer look at three theoretical tenets that the comparison 
of corruption discourse in 19th century Britain and late 19th to mid-20th century 
Germany helps demonstrate. Firstly, the claim that one needs to understand the 
history of the phenomenon in order to get to grips with its present manifestation, a 
classic but often neglected premise of historical sociology. Proposition four looks at 
the ways in which this is the case with corruption discourse. Proposition five 
examines the claim that discourses are an important factor in understanding 
institutional developments, as put forward by discursive institutionalism. Lastly, 
proposition six extends the suggestion that taking the ontological position of social 
constructionism helps further illustrate the centrality of the concept of corruption for 
an understanding of modern statehood.  
 
Proposition Four: Corruption discourse’s historicity matters 
The great sociologist C. Wright Mills famously argued the importance of history for 
understanding present phenomena. In his words: 
Historical types […] are a very important part of what we are studying; they are also 
indispensable to our explanations of it. To eliminate such materials - the record of all 
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that man has done and become - from our studies would be like pretending to study 
the process of birth but ignoring motherhood. (Mills 1959: 147) 
Proposition four thus puts corruption discourse’s historicity in the spotlight. It 
suggests ways in which the historical analysis over time points to specific ways in 
which corruption discourse is historically constituted, and hence needs to be 
understood in its historicity. The key to this is to focus on the phases of corruption 
discourse that emerged from the comparison. The following looks first at how these 
phases manifested themselves as interconnected sequences; secondly at how not 
just discourse itself but also the three groups of variables identified in proposition 
three have their own separate histories. Thirdly, the extent to which history teaches 
us about potential future scenarios is discussed. And lastly, I consider some 
limitations as to the generalisability of the phase model. 
Phases and Sequences: Both Britain and Germany – if my analysis is correct - went 
through three distinct phases of corruption discourse. The point here is that they 
were not just three different, unconnected manifestations, but that they were part 
of a sequence that built on what had happened before, and in fact could not be 
understood without what happened before. Britain’s 1830 to 1832 discourse that 
attached corruption so firmly to debates of reform and democratisation built on what 
happened in 1809, when reformers discovered how they could use corruption 
allegations to delegitimise the existing electoral system and advocate for reform. 
Similarly, to make sense of the overheated discourse in Weimar Germany, one needs 
to consider how it was discovered decades earlier, as a powerful critique of the 
existing political system in its entirety. These discovery phases were the critical 
junctures of corruption discourse, and any analysis should thus pay attention to these 
starting points in history – as indeed exemplified by some of the early work on 
corruption discourse (Kajsiu 2013, 2015 and Zurnić 2013b, 2017). The significance of 
the Spiegel affair, both for this analysis but also for popular perception in the 
Bundesrepublik to this day lies in the fact that it represents a break from the ways in 
which corruption discourse had become institutionalised in both the Kaiserreich and 
Weimar. A re-set button had been pressed, and the Spiegel scandal became a critical 
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juncture in its own right, but not without explicitly demarcating itself from the 
previous authoritarianism. Any corruption discourse thus points to its past, as well as 
to a possible future. 
The three groups of variables: This historicity can also be observed separately in the 
three groups of factors. Legal and political institutions, societal cleavages and 
conflicts as well as exogenous factors have histories of their own. And while my own 
analysis has kept its focus firmly on discourse itself, the turn to context appears to 
me a particularly rich ground for further historical-comparative analysis: Comparative 
logic would suggest for example to juxtapose corruption discourses that have in 
common, say, a stable political framework and largely unchanged exogenous 
influences, but different societal cleavages – if such a case could be identified this 
could highlight the effect that these cleavages have on corruption discourse. Or it 
could look at changes in anti-corruption legislation in one state system and analyse 
not just the differences this change might have made for corruption itself but also for 
the discourses surrounding it. Exogenous factors, too, have their own history. As 
Kajsiu discusses in his work, in the 1960s international corruption discourse in its 
public-office centred definition was used to communicate and legitimise the 
superiority of the developed world above the so-called Third World (2015: 12ff., see 
also chapter two). And as proposition three discussed, this international corruption 
discourse has become even more prominent in recent decades, in particular since the 
introduction of Transparency International’s annual global corruption perception 
ranking in 1995. Studies here could make comparisons between the two, or trace 
how international corruption discourse has changed or has not changed the 
meanings it communicates over the decades. It could compare discourses before and 
after the TI index, and analyse how its introduction has changed it. The point here is 
that case study selection for future corruption discourse analysis and imagining 
possibilities for research can profit greatly from looking at the different variables that 
inform it, and in particular so if it considers their history. 
Future developments: However, it is not just in looking to the past that corruption’s 
historicity is relevant. It is also important when looking to the future. And while it is 
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still not possible to predict the future, the phase model does suggest at least some 
parameters to be aware of when considering possible future scenarios. From the 
perspective of liberal democracy, the gold standard to aspire to is unquestionably a 
consolidated corruption discourse that builds on a broad consensus on universalist 
democratic values and uses corruption discourse to defend these values. In discourse, 
this manifests itself in the relative absence of the political mobilisation of corruption. 
The opposite can be seen when discourse is routinely used to undermine not just 
individuals but entire political ideologies or parties (as in Kajsiu’s Albania) or entire 
political systems (as in Weimar), or if a case of corruption is fabricated by one side 
while the other side has no idea what he is talking about (Trump’s attacks on Clinton). 
This distinction of desirable and undesirable discourse becomes particularly relevant 
when trying to assess whether a specific corruption discourse is developing towards 
either direction. Questions to be asked then would be along these lines: To what 
extent is the perception of corruption dependent on political affiliation? Is corruption 
discourse situational or systemic, i.e. is it used to attack a relatively isolated case or 
does it question an entire group of people or the political system? If corruption 
discourse develops towards a more consolidated version, this should be ground for 
optimism. If it develops in the opposite direction, increasingly shows signs of societal 
cleavages and systemic rather than situational attacks, this could be an early warning 
system for the stability of liberal democracy more generally. Johnston once claimed 
in the context of democratic consolidation that “analysing a country's corruption 
helps us understand […][its consolidation] problems” (2000: 1). The same can be said 
on corruption discourse. It is through an awareness for its historicity and an attention 
to the factors listed that it can be made fruitful as an indicator for wider societal and 
political processes.   
Limitations of the phase model: This brings me to a final comment on proposition 
four. While I suggest that corruption discourse moved from a discovery phase 
through contestation to consolidation in both Britain and Germany, I do not suggest 
that (a) this is necessarily the path that is always follows and (b) that this is a complete 
typology of corruption discourses. On (a), it is entirely possible that corruption 
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discourse never reaches the ‘gold standard’ of consolidation, just like the universalist 
values of liberal democracy might never enjoy a broad consensus in a given society. 
Likewise, it is entirely thinkable that corruption discourse reaches a stage of relative 
consolidation but then ‘regresses’ back into contestation. There are circumstances in 
which it is conceivable that corruption discourse never gets ‘discovered’ as a tool for 
political conflict in the first place, although, especially in the age of globalised 
corruption discourse, these circumstances are unlikely – they would probably lie 
outside democracy altogether or in a rentier state in which citizens pay little or no 
taxes and therefore have little stake in the state and in protecting its public resources. 
Equally, on (b), there might be different types or different phases of corruption 
discourse not covered by this study. ‘Discovery phases’ might not be phases at all but 
could be singular key events that immediately morph into different kinds of phases. 
Indeed, the 19th to mid-20th century cases considered in this thesis took place in a 
rather different phase of modern history compared to the time of writing. What does 
the existence of the globalised corruption discourse mean for these phases? Does it 
make old distinctions, in particular discovery, obsolete, as notions of corruption are 
now omnipresent in global discourses and are already universally ‘discovered’? Are 
local corruption discourses now merely the localised expression of a global 
phenomenon? And if so, in what ways do the two levels interact?  
Proposition four thus stipulates that history matters, and that corruption discourses 
should be analysed with a view to their historicity. An awareness for the past brings 
into focus critical junctures both within corruption discourse as well as the contextual 
variables that help explain why it manifests itself in the way it does. An awareness of 
possible future scenarios of discourses sensitises for possible uses of its analysis as 
an indicator for underlying social and political developments. However, more 
research is needed to come to a more coherent understanding of the different phases 
and types in which it occurs, and the extent to which the phases I have suggested for 
Britain and Germany can be generalised or not. 
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Proposition Five: Discourse matters, analysing discourse matters, and 
analysing the absence of discourse matters 
To choose the category of discourse as the key concept for this study has been an 
epistemological decision, in the sense that it determined what kind of knowledge this 
investigation was going to produce, and in which terms and categories this 
knowledge would then be conceptualised. This proposition looks at the implications 
this decision has had, and how this focus on discourse, on the dynamics of the 
communication of corruption, has been able to help explain and understand what 
role notions of corruption can play in the development of political and legal 
institutions specifically, and social change more generally. 
As discussed in chapter two, Schmidt sets out the goals that discursive 
institutionalists should pursue: 
The research agenda for D[iscursive] I[nstitutionalism][…] should not just be to seek 
to convince political scientists theoretically that ideas and discourse matter – by now 
all neo-institutionalists seem to have accepted this to some degree – but to show 
empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional 
change, and when they do not. (Schmidt 2010a: 21)  
Discourse analysis in her theoretical framework focuses on “interactive processes of 
ideas generation, deliberation and legitimization” (ibid. 2010: 15). Similarly in my 
analysis, corruption discourse in chapter two has been defined as having a dynamic 
capable of shifting perceptions of legitimacy, either of behaviours, individuals, groups 
or institutions. This was premised to sometimes lead to calls for change, which then 
sometimes resulted in actual social and political change. The following looks at the 
cases in which these calls have been successful, the cases in which they have not, and 
the cases in which there were no calls for changes in the first place. In Schmidt’s 
above words, it thus tries to “show empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and 
discourse matter for institutional change, and when they do not.” In some ways, it 
repeats some of the points made in the first three propositions. However, the 
intention here is to integrate them in the theoretical framework of DI. 
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Successful calls for changes: These can be observed in the contestation phases in both 
countries. The 1830 to 1832 debate in Britain has been particularly good in illustrating 
the dynamics of corruption discourse. Juxtaposing the political events from the 
French Revolution in 1830 to the passing of the Reform Act in 1832 on the one hand 
and the frequency graphs of the keywords of the debate on the other, shows how 
they interacted dynamically with one another. The French revolution was followed 
by a peak in talk about revolution. This revolutionary threat in turn convinced Earl 
Grey to introduce Reform legislation. The different obstacles this faced in first the 
House of Commons and then the Lords was matched with an explosion of ‘corruption’ 
and ‘reform’ talk in the newspapers and on the streets. In this contestation phase of 
1830 to 1867 more globally, there is a marked co-occurrence of general election years 
with peaks in corruption discourse, eventually changing its character and associated 
themes (such as reform and rotten boroughs), and slowly ebbing away after 1867. In 
short, corruption discourse here is observable in all its dynamic, as reaction and 
counter-reaction between political events and developments in the legal and political 
institutions on the one hand and discourse on the other. This dynamic would have 
been difficult to capture if the analysis had focussed on the more static concepts of 
ideas, values and norms.  
The German case of Erzberger versus Helfferich in 1919 to 1920 had no direct 
consequences for the institutional framework. However, corruption discourse went 
on to contribute throughout the Weimar Republic to the polarisation of public debate 
and the radicalisation of political actors, which eventually became one of the key 
factors for the failure of the state and its complete institutional overhaul. In this 
sense, corruption discourse with its power of undermining the legitimacy of the 
existing political structures, here too was eventually successful in effecting 
institutional change. 
From these two examples alone, important theoretical generalisations can be made 
in relation to discourse’s role in social change more generally. First, the focus on 
discourse as a dynamic process, a back and forth between different political actors 
that runs over an extended period of time re-emphasises the points made in 
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proposition four: Discourse can be analysed in its individual manifestations, but it 
should then not ignore the fact that it is part, a mere snapshot, of a longer-term 
dynamic development. And sometimes even a relatively long period of time might 
not produce conclusive results as to whether discourse had any effects on institutions 
or not. Had an analysis of Britain from 1832 onwards stopped in, say, 1865, it would 
have concluded that the electoral reform discourse had not effected much change. 
Two years later, however, it looked like in the years 1832 to 1865 corruption 
discourse had merely been gaining momentum so that in 1867 further reform had 
become unavoidable. This is similar in Germany in the Weimar Republic: Had the 
state eventually become a success, and until 1933 this was still a possibility (albeit an 
increasingly remote one), history would have judged its radicalised corruption 
discourse to have failed. Secondly, the Weimar example in particular shows that 
more discourse, as an expression of freedom of speech, is not necessarily better. This 
contradicts DI’s assumption that ‘good institutions’ are better the more open they 
are to discourse (cf. Peters’ comments to that effect, 2012: 124, also cf. Zurnic 2014: 
230 on this topic). Discourses can be good for liberal democracy - or whatever 
political system one is inclined to support – but they can also be very damaging when 
the agents of discourse are anti-democratic. 
Whether discourse does lead to any changes or not is therefore not always a 
straightforward conclusion. This brings me directly to the second category, 
unsuccessful calls for changes, which in Germany and Britain are mostly to be found 
in the discovery phase of corruption discourse. In both the 1809 Duke of York case 
and the Tausch affair in 1896/97, there were changes in terms of the personnel of 
the state, with the resignations of some of the key players, but not in regards to the 
legal-institutional framework. The change here, however, as discussed previously, 
could be found in the discourses themselves. In the Duke of York case it could be 
shown how ‘corruption’, in its quality as a free-floating signifier, attached itself first 
to the Duke of York but then increasingly to the idea of reform. This illustrates the 
above case in which discourse did indeed not have immediate effects on the 
institutions it was targeting, but it did have transformative effects on discourse itself. 
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And as the analysis of 1830 to 1832 showed, this 1809 transformation in which 
corruption became an integral aspect of reform discourse did then, decades later, 
have profound effects for the 1832 reform. This was similar in the German discovery 
phase of the Kaiserreich: Corruption allegations here were discovered as an effective 
weapon to attack the political system as a whole. While this did not lead to the 
collapse of the Kaiserreich, corruption discourse in the form it was conceived in that 
era was later used with effect for the exact same purposes, and did contribute to the 
collapse of the Weimar Republic. This focus on unsuccessful calls for changes 
therefore underlines the theoretical generalisations made above. Once again, it puts 
into profile the importance of hindsight and historical analysis. And even more than 
the above examples showed, it points to the importance of not just looking at the 
external dynamics between corruption discourse and the political and institutional 
framework, but also at the internal dynamics of discourse itself.57 
Finally, some remarks on the cases in which there was a lack of call for change are in 
order: In both consolidation phases, and in fact this is one of the defining factors for 
consolidation or consolidated phases, corruption discourse was not used to demand 
changes to the institutions. The two cases chosen for Britain and Germany, however, 
had one very telling difference: The Corrupt Practices Act in 1889 constituted a 
consolidation of the existing legislation. As a result, it hardly even provoked much 
discussion, and corruption discourse’s role here, as far as it materialised at all, was to 
merely applaud the passing of the Act. The German Spiegel case on the other hand 
looked at an example in which the existing order was challenged. This challenge led 
to a much higher mobilisation of discourse as it was employed to defend the existing 
                                                          
57 These unsuccessful calls for changes also further reflect on the limitations of the distinction between 
the discovery phase and other phases. While the starting point of a discovery phase can be relatively 
clearly identified as the moment in which corruption discourse becomes relevant (although this too 
can be debated), it is less clear where the phase ends and the next one begins. In fact, it is entirely 
arguable that in some cases the discovery of corruption as a tool for political conflict is simultaneously 
the start of a contestation phase. Or in a new democracy, in theory at least, it can mark the beginning 
of a consolidation phase, in which from the start, corruption discourse is used to consolidate and 
strengthen the newly formed democratic institutions. It is up to the researcher conducting the analysis 
to argue how the historical trajectories of discourse are best categorised to serve the purpose of their 
investigation, and whether the categories chosen, to again use Skocpol and Somers’ expression, help 
“convincingly to order the evidence” (1980: 176). 
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legal statute of press freedom. This contrast points to the importance of what could 
be called ‘slumbering discourse’. Discourse in 1889 Britain – and this trend can be 
seen more generally in the declining frequency of corruption keywords towards the 
end of the 19th century in Britain - had decreased alongside the establishment of a 
robust idea of corruption. Corruption discourse was starting to fall into a slumber. 
The Spiegel case in Germany shows an example of when discourse was woken from 
its slumber, the existing consensus was under threat, and discourse was mobilised to 
defend it.  
From this, two further theoretical generalisations can be derived: First, discourses 
comes in varying degrees of intensity. One could conceptualise this as a continuum 
running from ‘slumbering discourse’ to the hyper-mobilisation equivalent to an all-
out questioning of whatever is the object of the discourse. In my own analysis, 
Britain’s 1889 case comes closest to the slumbering end of the spectrum, the Weimar 
Republic illustrates hyper-mobilisation. In the context of DI, this suggests to consider 
the degree of mobilisation as one of the key factors that leads to institutional change. 
This leads directly to a further theoretical generalisation, namely that researchers 
should not just pay attention to discourses as they manifest themselves but also to 
when they fail to do so. If for example there is a clear case of corruption (clear in the 
eyes of the researcher), but this does not lead to the mobilisation of anti-corruption 
norms into a discourse, this raises questions, and it is likely to be an indicator either 
of an absence of significant anti-corruption norms, or of the relative marginality of 
the issues of corruption as other issues are more salient. This could for example point 
to the greater importance of other state formation-related issues, as seems to have 
been the case in Germany in 1848 to 1850. The point here is that the non-
manifestation of discourse is an aspect of discourse analysis that should not be 
neglected, as it too can provide insight into the social and political world we are trying 
to understand and explain.  
Proposition five thus looks at the consequences of the epistemological decision to 
use the concept of discourse, and derives a number of theoretical generalisations in 
185 
 
relation to the framework of Discursive Institutionalism: First, it suggests that the 
dynamic character of discourse as defined by DI further points to the importance of 
historicity, as these dynamics often play out over a longer period of time, and their 
effects can sometimes only be observed accordingly. Second, it challenges the notion 
that more discourse is necessarily good, as discourse can be mobilised for both 
constructive and destructive purposes. Third, it suggests to conceptualise discourse 
on a scale that reflects its intensity, ranging from slumbering discourse to hyper-
mobilisation, and that its intensity can be an important factor as to whether discourse 
leads to change or not. Fourth, it argues the importance of analysing the absence of 
discourse, as this too can be highly significant. 
Proposition Six: Ontology matters: the merits of social constructionism 
In this thesis, corruption discourse has been conceptualised as a means through 
which understandings of legitimacy could be challenged and rearranged. It could be 
shown that it was used as an effective tool that shifted ideas of what was appropriate 
behaviour and what was not, of who were respectable political leaders and who were 
not, and of what were the right political structures and which ones were not. This 
final proposition connects back to the ontological foundations laid out in chapter one, 
and looks at how corruption discourse in these formative periods in Britain and 
Germany was part of a wider project: the rearranging of ideas of normality towards 
the version that carries the state and its institutions in Western Europe today. It 
makes sense at this stage to revisit Bratsis’ social constructionist premise:  
Since the modern concept of corruption does not function as an explicitly normative 
construct but rather as an articulation of categories of bourgeois political ontology, 
it has the effect of constituting and reaffirming the dominant public/private split 
through its application and subsequent categorization of phenomena as corrupt or 
uncorrupt, as pathological or normal. In so doing, the normative dimension of the 
modern concept of corruption becomes manifest precisely because of its way of 
categorizing social phenomena. (Bratsis 2003: 17) 
If this is correct, the entire history of corruption discourse in the course of 
modernisation processes can thus be seen as the struggle to establish these 
‘categories of bourgeois ontology’. In Britain, this process can indeed be observed 
particularly well. The activities of the Duke of York, the use of his public office for 
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private gain, would not have been seen as particularly corrupt in earlier centuries. 
They were simply an expression of a patrimonial system in which the Duke saw the 
office as his private property. It therefore indeed could only be perceived as ‘corrupt’ 
on the basis of the distinction between private and public. And as the analysis 
suggested, one of the main reasons for this distinction to slowly gain the upper hand 
against the patrimonial interpretation was the increasing sense of ownership of the 
state that the bourgeoisie developed. Due to the growing tax burden to finance the 
war, the institutions of the state were increasingly perceived not as being owned by 
the aristocracy, but as in public ownership. The recurring framings in corruption 
discourse in 1809 were those of patriotism, taxation and representation.  
This struggle over legitimacy became even more apparent in the reform discourse of 
the contestation phase. What reformers essentially did here, was label anything that 
smacked of the old patrimonial state as ‘corrupt’. The reform movement was in this 
sense a gigantic re-branding exercise. The Duke of York was corrupt and had to be 
disposed of. The electoral system was corrupt and had to be reformed. The rotten 
boroughs were the epitome of corruption and had to be abolished. Local government 
was corrupt and needed overhaul. Institution by institution was attached the signifier 
of corruption, their legitimacy undermined for good. The new institutions, on the 
other hand, or more precisely the reformed and improved institutions which allowed 
access for broader sections of the middle and later the working classes, were spared 
this fate, their legitimacy unchallenged and, in fact, enforced. What used to be the 
normal within the patrimonial framework of interpretation was thus rebranded as 
the corrupt, and a new normal, that of the emerging middle classes, was successfully 
installed in its place.   
The outcome of this struggle over what was the normal and what was its aberration 
was illustrated by the 1889 Corrupt Practices Act. Bratsis continues: 
By establishing the division between the normal and pathological in the 
public/private split, the modern understanding of political corruption is at once 
making a statement of fact and presenting us with the political goal of fully realizing 
the normal. […] In this way, the modern concept of corruption repeats the 
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normative-political emphasis of the traditional understanding of political corruption 
but does so in an essentialist and apolitical manner. (Bratsis 2003: 17) 
The passing of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act was indeed apolitical, in the 
sense that support for the legislation was no longer subject to political affiliation. It 
had become an administrative rather than politicised act, and its goal was now no 
longer to implement the new normal against the old, but, as Bratsis puts it above, to 
fully realize it. The question of what was corrupt had been transformed into a 
statement of fact, codified and objectified by law. And this new normality was now 
protected by corruption discourse, which in this phase functioned to defend it against 
its aberration, corruption. Corruption discourse in Britain over the 19th century was 
thus a social and political re-construction effort of sorts, a complete reorganisation 
of legitimacy, and according changes to the institutions of the state.  
The history of corruption discourse in Germany was less straightforward in relation 
to Bratsis’ ideas, reflecting the fact that its development towards what could be called 
a bourgeois state was less straightforward. A good starting point here is the 
observation that in both the Tausch affair and the Erzberger versus Helfferich case, 
those accused of misdoings, Tausch in 1897 and Helfferich in 1920, justified their 
deeds by invoking a sense of duty to a higher authority. Tausch claimed he had run 
his network of press manipulation and intelligence gathering for the greater good of 
the country, and to fend off the Socialist danger. Helfferich similarly saw himself as 
the defender of the German nation against the subversion by the Reichsverderber 
Erzberger. This justification could also be seen – and was indeed effective in reducing 
sentence – in the case of the attempted murder of Erzberger by von Hirschfeld. The 
pattern repeated itself numerous times in the courts of law of the Weimar Republic, 
and the judiciary indeed famously tended to be ‘blind on the right eye and all too 
clear-sighted on the left’.  
Similar to Chibnall and Saunders’ Poulsen and Pottinger case (1977) and some of 
Granovetter’s examples (2004: 3ff and 8ff), the social constructionist essence here is 
the employment of different frameworks of sense-making by the different actors to 
justify their actions. These frameworks indeed reveal similar kinds of struggles over 
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normality as in Britain, albeit over completely different versions of normality. One 
version, followed by Tausch, Helfferich, von Hirschberger etc. was the position of 
authoritarian nationalism, in which the interest of the nation stood above all, 
including the law, and the ends justified the means. The conflicting version was one 
that emphasised the rule of law and the accountability of government. This conflict 
of different normalities indeed was a recurring feature in German corruption 
discourses, including Strauss’s failed attempt to silence the Spiegel in 1962. Like in 
Britain’s struggle, what kinds of behaviours were here justified, and what kinds were 
labelled corrupt, libellous or otherwise malicious, depended on the framework of 
normality the respective political actors used as reference.  
One notable difference to Britain is that corruption discourse here was not so much 
used by what can be called the bourgeoisie, but, especially in Weimar, by those 
challenging the bourgeois order of the state. This raises questions about Bratsis’ 
claim, and indeed about the often taken-for-granted assumption that the distinction 
between public and private, rooted in its bourgeois framework of reference, always 
necessarily was foundational for modern ideas of corruption. If there are multiple 
modernities (Eisenstadt 2000), maybe there are also multiple modern 
understandings of corruption, developed in the course of different modernisation 
experiences in different parts of the world? Johnston in his reflections on possible 
new directions in corruption research concludes that “a promising approach is to 
question basic distinctions between the public and the private” (2015: 643). This 
indeed seems to be such a case. 
Taking the vantage point of social constructionism, it thus becomes clearer where the 
centrality of ideas of corruption in the modern state lies. The signifier of corruption 
in modernity’s prototype state Britain made an enormous historical contribution to 
challenging the old patrimonial order and instituting and legitimising the new modern 
state. It is not an exaggeration to claim that corruption for the reformist movement 
became the enemy within, the ‘other’ against which the newly emerging modern 
state was defined. Corruption discourse is thus at the heart of the modern state’s 
construction of legitimacy – the ‘other’ within. 
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Proposition six suggests that the choice of a social constructionist ontology offers 
particularly clear insights into the centrality that the idea of corruption has for the 
modern democratic state. It shows that ‘corruption’ is an integral part of the idea of 
the modern state as the ‘other’ against which it historically defined itself, at least in 
the case of liberal statehood as it developed in Britain.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed a range of propositions that emerge from the comparison 
of corruption discourses in Britain and Germany. Using the historical comparison of 
the cases as a contrast of contexts, and thus focussing on their differences, three 
main findings were discussed: Proposition one suggested that different contexts 
shape corruption discourses in different ways, and that a distinction can be made 
between institutional variables, societal cleavages and exogenous factors. 
Proposition two discussed the ways in which, in turn, corruption discourse has effects 
on these contextual variables. Proposition three built on the findings from one and 
two, and further conceptualised the three groups of factors, applying them not just 
to the case studies examined but extending them to corruption discourse analysis 
more generally.   
The second part of the chapter looked at how the historical comparison could be used 
as a parallel demonstration of theories, building mostly on the commonalities of the 
case studies. Proposition four discussed the ways in which the findings of the analysis 
demonstrated the importance of taking historicity into account, and conceptualising 
corruption debates and discourses within their longer-term historical framework. 
This was reiterated in proposition five which argued that discursive institutionalism 
could profit from a longer-term view, and should not just look at institutional changes 
but also at changes to the internal dynamics of discourse. It further suggested that 
the absence of discourse could in some cases be highly significant. Proposition six 
finally made the case of the social constructionist ontology that was chosen for the 
analysis, and argued that it provided a particularly clear view to the centrality of the 
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modern understanding of corruption for the modern state. Corruption was thus 
conceptualised as the ‘other’ of the modern democratic state. 
The distinct substantive and empirical contribution of this thesis thus lies in the 
application of a comparative and longer-term historical framework of analysis to the 
concept of corruption discourse. As discussed in chapter two, research has been 
conducted before on corruption discourse (or debates or communication) in both 
Britain and Germany, and to some extent in the time periods chosen, some of it 
indeed comparing these two countries. However, what this study adds is a specific 
focus on the role corruption discourses played in the legitimation of the modern 
democratic state, and with a focus on those longer durations of time that were 
indeed relevant for this focus, leading to the choice of desynchronised time frames. 
As these six propositions demonstrate, this approach has allowed a number of 
observations that could otherwise have been overlooked, or that could not have been 
contrasted very well in the absence of a different time or place to contrast them 
against. The resulting identification of the different factors that interacted with 
corruption discourse and their categorisation into three groups – institutional, 
cleavage-related and exogenous - certainly beg for revision and refinement. 
However, it is hoped that they can indeed help order the evidence, and potentially 
provide avenues for further conceptualisations in future corruption discourse 
research. 
On a more theoretical level, the thesis helps better understand the significance of 
corruption discourse in modern democratic states, and its place within fundamental 
legitimation discourses. While the function of corruption discourse as ascribing 
illegitimacy to certain acts, behaviours and institutions is well established in the 
literature, this study highlights that this is not just a situational effect that can end 
political careers and occasionally bring down a government. More fundamentally, 
corruption discourse can shift perceptions of the legitimacy of the political order per 
se, and can lead to significant changes in it. At least as far as this thesis is concerned, 
it has been the consistent application of a critical social constructionist perspective 
191 
 
to the longue durée of the relationship between corruption discourse and state 


























Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
This thesis has looked at the role corruption discourses have played in the modern 
state legitimation processes of Britain in the 19th and Germany in the late 19th to mid-
20th centuries. More specifically, it has explored the different ways in which these 
discourses were, on the one hand, constituted by a range of different factors, from 
legal and political institutions to societal cleavages to exogenous factors. And on the 
other hand it has considered the different ways in which corruption discourse in turn 
shaped and constituted the different contexts in which it was embedded. It could be 
shown that both in Britain and Germany it functioned as an important organiser of 
legitimacy, but that in the contrasting contexts of the two countries’ state formation 
processes this materialised in very different ways. In the introduction of the thesis I 
argued that concepts of corruption were of a centrality to the modern state that was 
often overlooked or not fully conceptualised by political science approaches. The 
hope at the conclusion is that some of the elements of this centrality could be 
demonstrated and illustrated, theoretically as well as practically.  
The beginnings of this were theoretical. Chapter two thus considered some of the 
theoretical foundations on which this study has been built. It started with establishing 
how its social constructionist position related to other approaches in the vast 
catalogue of corruption research. To visualise this relationship, I suggested to order 
the different types of studies on a continuum according to their theoretical stance as 
predominantly objectivist or taking, to varying degrees, subjectivist concerns into 
account. I argued that the social constructionist discourse analysis as presented in 
this study constituted an approach that was located close to the subjectivist end of 
the spectrum. Some recent political science literature on corruption was then taken 
into account. My suggestion here was that they, with their emphasis on integrity, 
quality of government, ethical universalism and deep democratisation, constituted a 
turn to context, as corruption was analysed within the context of different versions 
of non-corruption.  
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Attention then turned to the themes and concepts that my own study built on, those 
of social constructionism and discourse analysis. In my reading, the theories of the 
former were primarily concerned with the first part of the equation of corruption 
discourse, the ways it was socially and politically constituted. Discourse analysis 
approaches on the other hand paid more attention to the second part of the 
equation, to how discourse then developed its own dynamic and was able to 
constitute its subjects and have effects on the social and political world which it was 
part of. This chapter was rounded off with a definition of corruption discourse as a 
political practice through which notions of legitimacy could be challenged and 
rearranged. Attaching the signifier of corruption to a certain kind of behaviour, to a 
person, institution or the political system as a whole, could thus undermine the 
perceived legitimacy of this behaviour or person or system, and in some cases this 
shift of perceived legitimacy could convince political actors to implement changes. 
This definition was then consequently applied throughout the thesis, and the 
different case studies served to illustrate different aspects of how corruption 
discourse defined in this way indeed functioned as an organiser of legitimacy.   
The focus then moved to some of the aspects of the research design and 
methodology of the thesis. Chapter three gave insights into the rationale behind the 
research decisions taken in the design of the study, as well as some of the more 
practical considerations of data collection and analysis. I argued here that the 
historical comparison could be used both as a contrast of contexts as well as a parallel 
demonstration of theory, following Skocpol and Somers (1980) definition of these 
two strategies. The paired comparison of Germany and Britain was particularly 
fruitful in this sense as it offered a good combination of commonalities, in particular 
their success in establishing a relatively high level of corruption control, and also a 
number of marked differences. Fundamentally, their experiences of modern state 
formation processes, as a relatively smooth and civil society-driven process in the 
case of Britain and a ruptured and primarily elite-driven process in the case of 
Germany, diverged markedly. This resulted in the contrasting paths to corruption 
control, a mostly democratic path in Britain and an authoritarian/traditional path in 
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Germany, a distinction suggested by Mungiu-Pippidi in her Falling Walls speech in 
2014.  
Chapter four then moved to the discussion of corruption discourse in Britain, and the 
three case studies that had been chosen to represent its three phases of discovery, 
contestation and consolidation. In the Duke of York scandal of 1809, the numerical 
trends of the terms ‘Duke of York’, ‘corruption’ and ‘reform’ in the newspapers of the 
time revealed an intriguing pattern: While the scandal started as a personalised affair 
that primarily revolved around the Duke himself, it soon detached itself from the 
person and moved on to the topic of reforming parliament. The free-floating signifier 
of corruption was thus not just used to express outrage regarding the misconduct of 
a person in high office but subsequently recruited for the political goals of the reform 
movement. It was thus discovered as a potent weapon for political conflict. This 
politicisation of corruption discourse continued throughout what could be termed a 
contestation phase of corruption discourse, which was found to be most intense from 
1830 to some point after 1867, when the second Electoral Reform Act heralded the 
decline of this phase. The 1830 to 1832 electoral reform debate was here used as a 
case study to illustrate how this contestation manifested itself. What the analysis 
found, again with the help of some quantitative measures, was that corruption 
discourse here became not just an integral but a central part of a wider reform 
discourse. First, the existing institutions of the state were branded as corrupt, then 
suggestions were made on how to reform them to overcome this corruption. This is, 
in fact, a pattern reminiscent of the widely discussed medicalisation (e.g. Conrad 
1975, Fox 1977), in which the medical industry defined a certain condition as 
pathological while at the same time offering a cure for it, at a price. The medical 
industry here were the organised tax-paying middle classes, the problem identified 
was corruption as the patrimonialism of the state, the cure offered was increased 
representation, the price to be paid by the aristocracy a loss of political power. While 
more research needs to be done in this area, from the data examined in this thesis it 
appears that this was a pattern that repeated itself throughout the contestation 
phase, and made an important contribution to what became known as the Age of 
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Reform. Numerous institutional reforms were implemented during this age, to the 
parliamentary system, the civil service, local government and others. And it is through 
it that the modern semi-democratic state of late 19th century Britain came into 
existence. The claim developed here is that corruption discourse was one of the key 
drivers of these reforms, by attaching the signifier of corruption to the problems 
identified, branding the old institutions as illegitimate, and demanding their 
overhaul.  
The results of these processes can be seen in the 1889 case study of the Public Bodies 
Corrupt Practices Act. By this time, the implementation of anti-corruption legislation 
had become apolitical, removed from the process of political contest. There was no 
conflict or debate over whether the legislation was needed or what constituted 
corruption in the first place, and the focus was purely on the implementation of the 
law. There is an element here of a top-down implementation as compared to the 
bottom-up challenge of the previous phase. This is not an argument I have engaged 
with due to the focus of my analysis on corruption discourse as an organiser of 
legitimacy. However, it is certainly worth further investigation, and future research 
could look here at the exact process and point in time at which this changes, from a 
discourse of resistance against power to one in which power then uses discourse in 
its efforts to discipline its subjects – a classic Foucauldian puzzle I would think 
(Foucault 1977).    
Corruption discourse in Germany, discussed in chapter five, developed rather 
differently. As an organiser of legitimacy, it came to play different roles in the 
different political systems in which it manifested itself. There was a curious absence 
of corruption discourse before the 1870s, and my suggestion has been that this was 
due not only to the restrictions on press freedom. This was demonstrated by the 
years 1848 to 1850, in which a free press did begin to emerge, but corruption was 
still not on the agenda. I proposed here that this could be another reflection of state 
formation processes. While the reformist energy at this time in Britain was directed 
at changing the institutions of the state, using corruption discourse to aid this 
campaign, in Germany it was concerned with the unification of the state. Both 
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modern state institutions on the one hand and territorial integrity on the other are 
hallmarks of the modern state. In a certain light one could argue that the 
modernisation movement in Britain was thus fighting the enemy within, corruption, 
to achieve modern state institutions, whereas in Germany it was later to fight the 
enemy without, France, to achieve territorial integrity – in both cases the movement 
was thus unified in a campaign against an enemy, corruption in the one case, France 
in the other.  
Corruption discourse did develop once territorial integrity had been achieved in 1871. 
In the authoritarian state of the Kaiserreich, however, discourse was not permitted 
to fully unfold, as state actors manipulated the media through both formal (laws 
restricting press freedoms) and informal (Reptile Fund, Tausch’s doings) intervention. 
And while there were not many corruption scandals in this era, the ones that did 
materialise pointed to the discovery of corruption discourse for revolutionary rather 
than reformist purposes. The Social Democrat chairman Ebel’s enthusiasm regarding 
the outcome of the Tausch scandal and the damage it had done to the reputation of 
the governing elites, is representative of this. One could argue that his proclamation 
“long live corruption” expressed the opposite of the socialists’ usual rallying cry, “long 
live the revolution!”, which would once again point to how corruption could be 
understood as the opposite of whatever political goal one was promoting. Whether 
Bebel really meant it this way or not, however, is a matter of speculation. 
This use of the discourse in revolutionary rather than reformist purposes found its 
continuation in the Weimar Republic. Corruption discourse in this contestation phase 
was not driven by reformers who advocated democratisation. It was driven by 
radicals who aimed not at reform but at the overthrow of the state, and the state in 
this case happened to be a democratic one. This pattern could be observed in the 
1919/1920 case study of the Erzberger versus Helfferich trial. The radicalisation, the 
political violence, the problematic role of the judiciary and the use of corruption 
allegations for political means were a grim precursor of the chaotic politics that were 
to symbolize the Weimar Republic. Corruption discourse here followed the same 
pattern as in the UK contestation phase. It identified a pathology and at the same 
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time offered a cure, at a price. The pathology identified here, however, was 
parliamentary democracy itself. The cure was to overthrow it and install either a 
socialist republic or - and this became the increasingly popular and eventually 
successful option - an authoritarian state that would restore Germany’s pride that 
had been lost in Versailles. The price to be paid for this is tragically all too well known. 
While corruption discourse thus helped build the modern democratic state in Britain, 
it helped undermine and eventually dismantle it in Germany.  
It was only in the Federal Republic after World War Two that it was able to play a 
positive role that protected democracy against its enemies. The 1962/1963 Spiegel 
Scandal discussed as the third case study for Germany illustrated this transformation. 
The Spiegel had been one of the key drivers of corruption discourse in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, and Strauss’s attempt to intimidate if not shut down the magazine is best 
conceptualised in this context. The affair was thus an attempt by authoritarian state 
actors to shut down corruption discourse and limit its capacity to act in its function 
of holding government to account. But this attempt itself was confirmation of the 
discourse’s new role: The Spiegel had pointed out ‘corrupt acts’ of persons in public 
office – including Strauss of course - and had scandalised these aberrations. It thus 
functioned here as a defender of the existing order of the democratic state and its 
laws, contributing to its consolidation. Strauss on the other hand was the attacker 
who had attempted to override the rule of law.  
Corruption discourse across the case studies manifested itself in a number of 
different ways and served a number of different purposes and interests. Chapter six 
has been an attempt to order the evidence and more systematically compare and 
contrast the different case studies. It developed six propositions for how the findings 
could be interpreted and for what kind of future research could build on these 
findings. Propositions one to three were concerned with the three groups of variables 
that I argued could be identified across the case studies, legal and political 
institutions, societal cleavages and conflicts, and exogenous factors such as 
geopolitical conflicts. Proposition one discussed the ways in which these played a part 
in constituting corruption discourse. This happened through, for example, the ways 
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in which existing laws provided a framework through which cases of corruption could 
be interpreted (Germany) – or did not provide such a framework (Britain). It 
happened through the manifestation of cleavages in discourse, when the group on 
one side of the conflict line used the signifier of corruption to brand the behaviours 
of the group on the other side or the institutions that represented them as 
illegitimate. Or it happened through external pressures such as revolutions in 
neighbouring countries that put pressure on political elites to implement reforms in 
order to prevent the same unrest from happening in their own country. Proposition 
two looked at the other side of the equation, at how corruption discourse could in 
turn itself influence these variables, and in cases effect changes. This was expressed 
in the examples in which discourse did lead to institutional change, either in the form 
of incremental reform or as revolutionary overthrow. It manifested itself in the 
mobilisation of campaigns around the banner of corruption and in the polarisation of 
cleavages. And while not much evidence of this was found in the specific case studies 
examined, I argued that corruption discourse in theory could also have effects on 
exogenous variables.  
In proposition three, which further conceptualised the three variables, I discussed 
how this could potentially work. Corruption discourses today, unlike at the time of 
the case studies examined, are a globalised phenomenon, and this third group of 
variables, exogenous factors, had thus a much more prominent role to play in 
contemporary discourses. Exogenous factors now are, above all, the influence of 
inter/intra and supranational organisations such as the EU, the UN or the World Bank, 
as well as a globalised corruption discourse that is to a considerable extent built on 
international rankings and their hierarchy of non-corruptness.  
Propositions four to six were mostly concerned with some of the more theoretical 
issues developed at the outset of the thesis. Proposition four tried to illustrate the 
ways in which the historicity of corruption discourse needed to be taken into account, 
and in particular how it developed dynamically through phases, changing its 
character in the process. I thus argued that analysing any corruption discourse was 
only ever a snapshot of a certain time in its history. Proposition five discussed some 
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of the premises of discursive institutionalism, and how the findings of this study 
reflected on the kinds of puzzles it was trying to solve. And proposition six finally 
revisited the social constructionist perspective introduced in the introduction and the 
theory chapter of this thesis. I here tried to further argue the unique perspective this 
approach offered, and how it allowed particularly clear insights into the central role 
of concepts of corruption in the development of the modern state. Corruption was 
thus its internal enemy, the ‘other’ against which the modern state defined itself. 
How, then, do the findings of this study relate to the existing literature on the topic? 
As discussed in chapter two, this thesis is part of an emerging body of research that 
concerns itself with the ways corruption is socially and politically constructed, and is 
constituted by as well as constitutes the social world it inhabits. This study has thus 
tried to make this theoretical approach fruitful for the historical comparison of 
corruption discourses in 19th century Britain and late 19th to mid-20th century 
Germany. The hope is that it has succeeded at least to some extent in adding a little 
more insight into how these discourses were not just embedded in the modern state 
formation processes of their times but in fact integral to them. Regarding corruption 
literature more generally, in chapter two I suggested to order its different approaches 
as to the degree to which they take subjectivist considerations into account. Most 
corruption research that came out of political science, economics and law 
departments tended thus to be closer to the objectivist end of the spectrum. It 
conceptualised corruption as a fixed entity, a phenomenon that could be pinned 
down, a label that could be attached with confidence to specific behaviours such as 
bribery, misappropriation, nepotism etc. In short, corruption was an umbrella term 
that categorised different kinds of behaviours along the one feature that united 
them, the misuse of a public office for private gain. It is not my contention that these 
definitions, and the studies that build on them, are wrong, or that such definitions 
should not be attempted. Far from it, they serve important purposes when it comes 
to practically oriented research that needs clear definitions of what phenomenon 
exactly it is that their policy recommendations are supposed to address. The way my 
research can relate to, and in its own modest way be relevant for these kinds of 
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approaches is that it can serve as a commentary on these conceptualisations of 
corruption. This is not unique to this research but the same with any social 
constructionist or discursive study that shines the spotlight on the social and political 
processes behind understandings of corruption, and on how the signifier of 
corruption has been and still is used strategically for political purposes. The hope is 
thus that these kinds of studies contribute to what seems to be a growing element of 
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